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ABSTRACT 
Demand Response (DR) refers to modifications to electricity usage by consumers, which are 
derived by changes in the price of electricity or incentive payments offered to induce lower 
electricity use at specific periods. DR is a useful tool for not only electricity market players on both 
the supply and demand sides, but also Independent System Operators (ISO). On the supply side, DR 
is of particular interest for wind power producers, where they can use DR to alleviate their 
production intermittency as well as real-time market price variations. In addition, electricity 
retailers on the demand side may use DR to procure part of their clients’ energy and consequently 
cope with pool market price fluctuations. Furthermore, ISOs are faced with new challenges as the 
integration of renewable resources increases, and therefore may seek DR as a reserve provider. 
Despite the clear understanding of DR benefits for the above market players, they have practically 
low involvement in DR programs. They instead prefer to buy DR products from a third-party 
company. Such a company is called a DR aggregator, which is responsible for carrying out DR 
programs on consumers and selling the outcome to purchasers. To this end, an appropriate DR 
framework is needed to provide mutually attractive DR deals between the aggregator and DR 
purchasers. 
This research aims at proposing a new DR framework through which DR is traded as a public good 
between a DR aggregator and a DR purchaser. Various bilateral DR contracts with unique features 
are proposed and formulated for this purpose. The proposed DR framework is then applied to an 
offering strategy by wind power producers. Two well-known markets, i.e. the Australian National 
Electricity Market (NEM) and the Nordic market, are studied and proper wind offering plans in 
these markets are formulated. In addition, the behaviour of DR aggregators in power offering by a 
wind power producer is modelled. A bilevel problem is formulated in which the upper level refers 
to the wind power producer and the lower level models the DR aggregator behaviour. Furthermore, 
DR application by a strategic wind power producer, being able to alter market prices, is evaluated. 
To this end, a bilevel model is formulated in which the leader is the strategic wind power producer 
and followers are the market clearing mechanism and DR aggregator behaviour, respectively. The 
proposed DR framework is also applied to an energy procurement problem of electricity retailers. A 
cost minimization problem is modelled through which a retailer can purchase DR in addition to the 
commonly-used pool market and forward contracts. Lastly, the application of DR in an electricity 
market integrating high penetration of wind and PV resources is studied. A market dispatch is  
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formulated in which an ISO allows DR aggregators to participate in the reserve market in order to 
cope with renewable power production uncertainty. 
The above problems are stochastically formulated to address the uncertainty of market prices as 
well as wind and PV power production. In addition, risk modelling is carried out using Conditional 
Value at Risk (CVaR). Each problem is rendered as a linear programming approach to be solved 
using General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS), which is a commercially available 
optimization tool. 
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Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of Electricity Markets and Demand Response (DR) 
Power system restructuring has enabled the emergence of electricity markets around the world. 
In the market environment, a single entity is no longer in charge. Multiple agents competitively 
interact to deliver energy to consumers. The structure of the new energy market is shown in Figure 
1.1 [1]. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1.1. Electricity market structure  
 
Agents participating in the electricity market are categorized as follows [1]. 
 Generation companies (GENCOs): along with their main duty, i.e. producing electricity 
and selling it to the market, they may also participate in other services such as regulation 
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and reserve for maintaining the quality and security of the electricity supply. A GENCO 
may sell energy to the electricity market and/or directly to consumers through bilateral 
contracts. 
 Independent system operator (ISO): is a non-profit agent responsible for maintaining the 
security of the power system. The Independent System Operator must provide equal 
access to the grid for all consumers, retailers and producers.  
 Market Operator (MO): is responsible for the economic management of the market. In 
addition, the market operator administers market rules and determines prices and 
quantities of energy traded in the market. In some markets, such as the Australian 
National Electricity Market (NEM), PJM and New England ISO markets, the functions 
performed by the ISO and the MO are carried out by a single entity [2]. In this case, the 
ISO (in Australia, Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) [3]) is in charge of 
market management. 
 Regulator: is a government body responsible for ensuring the fair and efficient operation 
of the market.  
 Transmission system operators (TSOs): own transmission assets such as high voltage 
lines, cables, transformers, etc.  
 Distribution companies (DISCOs): own and operate distribution (low voltage and 
medium voltage) networks and are responsible for the operation, maintenance and 
development of the distribution network.  
 Retailers: play an intermediary role in the market, where they buy energy from the 
wholesale market to sell it to end-users. 
The electricity market has emphasized the importance of resource-efficiency of electricity 
production due to closer alignment between customers’ electricity prices and the value they place 
on electricity [4]. In addition, new challenges such as market price uncertainty, more intermittent 
power resources and the ability to exercise market power by some power plants have been 
introduced in electricity markets. These issues result in new solutions, where enhancing the demand 
side in order to encourage consumers to be more involved in the market is a key driver [4]. As a 
consequence, the so called “Demand Side Management (DSM)” concept which had been used 
before the restructuring of power systems was required to be amended to consider the unique 
features of electricity markets. DSM was therefore redefined and replaced by a new concept called 
Demand Response (DR), to be able to cope with new challenges in the market [5]. 
Demand Response (DR) is defined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of 
the United States as follows [5]. “Changes in electric usage by demand-side resources from their 
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normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to 
incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices 
or when system reliability is jeopardized”. DR programs are basically classified either as time-based 
and/or incentive-based programs [6]. In time-based DR programs, customers change their usage 
patterns in response to the defined prices by utilities. Time-of-use, real-time pricing and critical 
peak pricing are well-known time-based DR actions. In incentive-based programs, customers 
reduce their load for a given period in response to the reward offered by utilities. Direct load 
control, interruptible load and emergency DR are common types in this group.  
DR is becoming more important in facilitating the electricity market: 
 to reduce wholesale power prices; 
 to provide an efficient operation of markets; 
 to enhance reliability and support the use of renewable energy resources [7]. 
Therefore, market regulators have been evaluating DR potential and seeking new ways to explore 
DR products in the market. For instance, Australian Ministerial Council on Energy has asked the 
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) to facilitate an efficient Demand Side Participation 
(DSP) in the NEM. Consequently, a comprehensive investigation has been taken by the AEMC [8]. 
According to the AEMC report [8], it is estimated that load reduction is possible in three major 
states of Australia (NSW, QLD and VIC), which could be from 400 MW to over 1300 MW by 
2020. This would lead to a cost saving of between $4.3 and $11.8 billion over the next ten years, 
which equates to 3-9% of total forecast expenditure on the supply side. FERC in the U.S estimated 
the demand response resource potential contribution from the U.S could be nearly 72,000 MW, or 
about 9.2 percent of U.S demand in 2012 [5]. Various DR programs have been practiced in different 
U.S markets, where load as a capacity resource, interruptible load, direct load control and time-of-
use programs were the most successful ones.  
1.2 Motivation 
While advantages of demand response in electricity markets are well-recognized, there are still 
barriers to DR progress. An important barrier identified is the lack of customers’ engagement in DR 
programs. The FERC [5] in the U.S discusses this issue as follows. “Customers need to be 
effectively educated and informed about demand response and smart grid opportunities. Effective 
outreach and communication are needed to explain demand response, time-based pricing and smart 
grid investments and the impacts of these at the customer level”. In order to cope with this issue, 
there is a need for a market player responsible for engaging with customers to explore their DR 
potential. Such a player has recently evolved in some electricity markets and is known as a “DR 
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aggregator”. The DR aggregator applies various DR programs to electricity consumers and sells its 
outcome to the electricity market. The importance of the role of DR aggregators in the market has 
been emphasized in different countries. For instance, the AEMC in Australia has advised more 
active DR aggregators as a main solution in enhancing DR outcomes [8]. FERC also placed Order 
719 in 2008, through which DR aggregators are required to be treated as similar to other generators 
in the wholesale market. Consequently, they can bid their DR products into the energy and ancillary 
services markets. This participation in the market has consequently been the focus of some 
investigations in very recent years [9-11]. Nevertheless, no work pays attention to bilateral DR 
contracts between a DR aggregator and DR purchasers. Investigation on these types of DR contracts 
is necessary since there are various market players such as wind power producers and electricity 
retailers, which seek DR through these contracts in order to cope with the uncertainty they are faced 
with.  
Wind power is a leading renewable energy resource worldwide. This resource has been growing 
rapidly due to various supportive policies and subsidies established by governments around the 
world. Operation of wind power has almost matured in some countries such as Denmark and 
Germany, and it is expected that this will happen in other markets such as the Australian National 
Electricity Market (NEM) in the near future. As a result, wind power producers are expected to 
participate in the market like other power plants. They are required to place their offer into the 
market while being responsible for their power imbalance during real time. Note that this is the 
current practice in some markets such as Western Denmark [12]. This is indeed a challenging task 
for wind power producers since their power production is uncertain. Thus, they may have to 
compensate their power shortage in the real-time market, where there is a risk of price volatility in 
this market. As a solution for this issue, the coordination of wind power with controllable resources 
such as hydro and storage units is proposed [13-15]. DR is another important issue, which can be 
useful. In this way, wind power producers may need to procure DR from DR aggregators through 
bilateral DR contracts.  
Electricity retailers are the major market players on the demand side. They procure energy from 
the market and sell it to electricity consumers. While their sale price to customers is usually set to a 
flat rate, they have to buy electricity in the pool market where its price is uncertain and in the worst 
cases, it may see huge spikes. In order to cope with price uncertainty, retailers usually procure part 
of their energy through bilateral contracts with generation companies [16-18]. Another way to 
alleviate price spikes could be using a suitable DR scheme. Therefore, electricity retailers may 
implement DR programs with consumers and/or procure DR products from DR aggregators. 
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As previously mentioned, ISOs are in charge of maintaining the security of the market. This has 
become a challenging issue due to the integration of renewable energy resources. Wind power, 
usually in a large scale is uncertain. On the other hand, solar power is variable and it mostly comes 
in small-scale systems such as roof-top PV. The variability of PV power is indeed worse than wind 
power since this resource is on the demand side and is beyond the control of the ISO. The 
uncertainty associated with wind and PV power may require the ISO to procure more reserve 
resources, which is mostly provided by conventional power plants. DR is another beneficial 
resource which is usually fast enough to provide reserve products. Therefore, the ISO may need to 
encourage DR aggregators to participate in the reserve market and sell their DR product to this 
market. 
 
1.3 Thesis Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis are to: 
 propose a demand response framework through which DR is traded as a public good 
between a DR purchaser and a DR aggregator. Various DR contracts with unique features 
are proposed and formulated for this purpose.  
 investigate the proposed DR framework applicability in offering strategies by wind 
power producers in two markets, the Australian NEM and the Nordic Market.  
 address DR aggregator behaviour in DR employment by wind power producers. In this 
way, a wind power producer has to compete with other DR purchasers as well as 
electricity markets to obtain its required DR from a DR aggregator.  
 analyse the application of DR by wind power producers owning a significant amount of 
wind power production. A strategic wind power producer with the ability of exercising 
market power in day-ahead markets is modelled in such a way that the producer can use 
DR to cope with power production and imbalance price deviations.  
 investigate how DR can be useful for electricity retailers. An energy procurement plan is 
proposed and formulated for a retailer in which the retailer is able to procure DR through 
the proposed DR framework in order to lessen its risk of facing uncertain pool prices. 
 finally, evaluate the application of DR by an ISO. The ISO allows DR aggregators to 
participate in the reserve market in order to cope with the uncertainties of wind power on 
the supply side and roof-top PV power on the demand side.  
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1.4 Thesis Structure  
The thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant work to this thesis research. A comprehensive review of demand 
response and its applications for electricity markets is provided. Wind offering strategy and the 
solutions to ease wind power uncertainty are addressed next. Then, a review of studies on electricity 
retailers’ issues is delivered. Finally, investigations on using DR by ISOs are reviewed. 
Chapter 3 discusses the proposed demand response framework. DR contracts are explained and 
formulated in this chapter. In addition, a case study is presented to show the validity of the proposed 
DR framework from a DR aggregator point of view.  
Chapter 4 investigates the application of DR by wind power producers. Two well-known 
markets are considered: the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) and the Nordic Market. 
A proper wind offering strategy for each market is proposed in such a way that a wind power 
producer is able to employ DR through the proposed DR contracts. This strategy is evaluated using 
the realistic data of each market. 
Chapter 5 presents studies on the behaviour of a DR aggregator in wind offering strategy. To this 
end, a bilevel problem is proposed in which the upper level addresses the wind offering strategy 
while the lower-level model formulates the DR aggregator behaviour This behaviour is modelled in 
such a way that the DR aggregator is able to sell its DR product to the wind power producer, other 
market players interested in buying DR and the electricity market. The bilevel model is transformed 
into a single-level linear programming approach using proper techniques and is evaluated on a 
realistic case of the Nordic market. 
Chapter 6 provides assessments on DR application by a strategic wind power producer, which is 
able to exercise market power to alter market prices. For this purpose, a bilevel model including one 
leader and two followers is proposed. The upper-level problem is the offering strategy by the 
strategic wind power producer. The lower-level problem 1 represents the market clearing through a 
social welfare maximization model. DR is considered in the lower-level problem 2, where the DR 
aggregator behaviour is modelled similarly to Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 7 DR applications by an electricity retailer is investigated. The electricity retailer is 
allowed to procure DR through setting DR contracts with DR aggregators and also implementing 
reward-based DR with consumers. An energy procurement plan is proposed in which the retailer 
uses DR in addition to the commonly used pool market and forward contracts. The problem is 
evaluated for a realistic case of Australia and results are presented. 
Chapter 8 provides formulations of an energy and reserve co-optimization model by an ISO. The 
ISO allows DR aggregators to participate in the reserve market and hence, it will be able to manage 
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the uncertainties of wind power on the supply side and roof-top PV power on the demand side 
through the reserve market. The study assesses the impact of increasing wind and PV power levels 
in the network and shows the effectiveness of using DR to ease this issue. A simplified three-bus 
power system is studied to understand the approach and then the IEEE 24-bus system is used to 
show the validity of the proposed approach.  
Chapter 9 provides summary findings of the thesis and concludes the main contributions. In 
addition, possible future research is recommended in this chapter. 
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  Chapter 2
Literature Review  
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive literature review on the relevant work to this thesis 
research. First, a review of DR programs, their integration in electricity markets and experience in 
some leading markets is addressed. Then, investigations on wind offering strategies as well as the 
proposed solutions for alleviating the risk of wind power producers in electricity markets are 
delivered. In addition, studies on using DR in wind offering strategies are reviewed. After that, a 
review of DR applications by electricity retailers is given. Finally, relevant studies on how DR can 
be useful in electricity markets with high penetration of wind and PV power are presented in the last 
section. Note that in each section, the contributions made by this thesis are also highlighted.  
2.1 Literature review 
2.1.1 Demand Response (DR) 
Numerous studies have addressed DR issues in recent years. In specific, these investigations are 
classified in two groups. The first group explains DR basics, various DR programs and technical 
DR implemented with consumers. The second group is mainly relevant to bringing DR into 
electricity markets. 
In line with DR programs in detail, the following investigations are provided. The definition of 
DR programs is addressed in [6]. This work introduces various DR programs and categorizes them 
into two groups, namely incentive and price-based DR. In addition, customers’ response is 
represented in three actions: first, load shifting by customers as a result of high prices; secondly, 
reducing electricity usage in peak periods without changing the load pattern in other periods; 
thirdly, using on-site distributed generation. Elasticity reflects the responsiveness of customers to 
price changes. This concept is discussed in [19, 20]. Reference [19] discusses self and cross 
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elasticity based on consumers behaviour in responding to pool price changes. In addition, the 
impact of elasticity on market prices is evaluated. The authors in [20] further extend this work, 
where it elaborates the challenges with demand side activities and presents new solutions for them.  
Incentive-based DR programs are formulated in several investigations such as [21-23]. 
Reference [21] provides the mathematical formulations of two incentive-based DR programs, i.e. 
interruptible load services and capacity market programs. An economic model is derived for this 
purpose in which the impacts of incentives and penalties in the given DR programs are evaluated 
according to different objectives such as peak reduction, energy reduction and load factor 
improvement. A coupon-based method is formulated in [22] where the incentive offered to 
consumers is determined according to market prices. A load serving entity offers consumers a 
voluntary coupon incentive along with the existing flat rate electricity charge through which 
consumers reduce their usage during price spikes. An incentive-based scheme is presented in [23] 
through which both energy cost and peak-to-average ratio are minimized using a game theory 
approach. Consumers can benefit from two-way communication infrastructures to manage their 
energy consumption according to the prices offered by utilities.  
Price-based DR actions are also presented in some research such as [24-26]. The authors in [24] 
propose a mathematical model for flexible price elasticity of demand to calculate the elasticity of 
each demand response program based on the electricity price before and after implementing that 
program. Paper [25] models a real-time pricing approach for smart grid applications. A robust 
programming approach is formulated in which a consumer maximizes its utility by adjusting its 
consumption in advance based on the market price. A comprehensive time-of-use model is 
formulated in [26] where the elasticity is considered as a non-zero cross and flexible function.  
Control strategies of managing electrical loads such as water heater systems, air conditioners, 
space heating and cooling systems are provided in [27-32]. In [27] a direct load control program is 
proposed in which air-conditioning systems are controlled as an aggregated load and as a result, the 
load shape of peak periods can be effectively reshaped. In a stochastic approach, [28] presents an 
objective function expressing comfort/cost trade-offs for household residents. In this model air-
conditioning systems are controlled in such a way that they permit the controller to respond to both 
energy prices and randomly varying environmental conditions. In a pilot project in the PJM market, 
[29] estimates the water heater control strategies for electricity consumers. The authors in [30] 
present physical models of different residential appliances such as water heater, space 
cooling/heating, clothes drying and electric vehicles, which are aggregated using a stochastic 
method to create controllable load profiles of a distribution feeder. The coordination of demand 
response and storage units is investigated in [31, 32]. 
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With regards to the modelling of DR in electricity markets, many studies have been published. In 
a perfect statement, FERC identified DR applications in its ruling in 2008 [7]: “Demand response 
can provide competitive pressure to reduce wholesale power prices; increases awareness of energy 
usage; provides for more efficient operation of markets; mitigates market power; enhances 
reliability; and in combination with certain new technologies, can support the use of renewable 
energy resources, distributed generation and advanced metering. Thus, enabling demand-side 
resources, as well as supply-side resources, improves the economic operation of electric power 
markets by aligning prices more closely with the value customers place on electric power”. The 
authors in [33] identify the responsibilities of different organizations, known as load serving 
entities, independent system operator (ISO) and regulators, for promoting DR. The authors in [9] 
list various DR programs which are available in U.S markets. These programs range from voluntary 
to mandatory actions in which DR providers can participate in different markets, i.e. energy, reserve 
and capacity markets. A bidding strategy method for day-ahead markets is developed in [34] 
considering DR programs. Air conditioning is taken into account in order to evaluate the impact of 
responsive consumers on demand bidding. A day-ahead market-clearing price is proposed in [35] 
where price-responsive consumers can bid in the market. A load participation factor is developed to 
show the responsiveness of consumers. A new model for responsive loads is proposed in [36], 
where the operating constraints of loads including bids, hourly profiles, and inter-temporal 
characteristics are considered in their bidding into the market. A security constrained unit 
commitment is formulated from an ISO’s point of view in which the impacts of DR on constrained 
power systems are evaluated. A DR aggregator is modelled in [10], where it is able to participate in 
the energy market while scheduling different DR programs such as load curtailment, load shifting 
and onsite generation for consumers. This model is further developed in [11], where customers’ 
characteristics are considered in a hierarchical DR model. A unit commitment problem is proposed 
in [37], where an ISO determines the DR quantity and the incentive paid to DR participants in the 
market. 
 
A new market, called demand response exchange (DRX), is proposed in [38, 39]. The proposed 
market is pool-based in which DR is traded between DR sellers and buyers. A DRX operator is 
modelled which is responsible for clearing the DRX market by receiving offers and bids from DR 
sellers and buyers. This model is improved in [40] by modelling Walrasian auctions, where in an 
iterative way, DR players update their DR quantity bids in response to the prices adjusted by the 
market operator. This is repeated until market equilibrium is obtained at the Pareto optimal.  
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DR is a useful resource in providing ancillary services. The authors in [41] present a security 
constrained unit commitment by an ISO through which DR aggregators provide capacity services in 
a reserve market. DR aggregators submit two sets of offers in the reserve market, i.e. a capacity cost 
and an energy cost of reserve, which the latter is paid if the reserve is deployed by the ISO. In [42], 
a smart micro-gird operator is proposed as a reserve provider. This operator on one hand controls its 
internal load through price signals and on the other hand interacts with an ISO to obtain requests for 
reserve. DR is employed in [43] as a frequency restoration resource during contingencies. An 
adaptive control plan is proposed in which an emergency DR program is applied along with 
spinning reserve to bring frequency to the pre-disturbance level. Reference [44] proposes a method 
for integrating responsive loads in spinning reserve markets and evaluates the flexibility that these 
loads provide for these markets.  
There are some reports representing the experience of DR around the world. For instance, 
experience of implementing DR programs in the PJM market and New York Independent System 
Operator (NYISO) is addressed in [45] and that of European markets is summarized in [46]. In 
Australia, DR has been identified as a critical factor in the future management and operation of the 
electricity market and a target of additional 5% reduction (2,800 MW) in system peak by 2025 has 
been set [47]. 
 
The main contribution of this thesis in DR programs is as follows [48-52]. 
 This thesis proposes A DR framework in which DR is considered as a public good and 
accordingly, a DR aggregator is able to trade it with DR purchasers through various 
contracts. The proposed contracts are fixed DR, flexible DR and DR options, where each 
has unique features which are addressed through mathematical formulations. Fixed DR 
contracts are set at a certain price and volume for a future period. Flexible DR 
agreements allow a DR buyer to set the contract in advance and change its usage 
distribution over the contract period in real time. DR options are signed in advance, but 
a DR buyer has the right not to exercise them during the delivery time. DR options are 
designed in such a way that they can be used in normal pool price fluctuations (pool-
order options), spike price situations (spike-order options), exercised at any time before 
the expiration date (American DR options), and exercised at the expiration date 
(European DR options). 
 
 
 Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
13 
 
2.1.2 Wind Power Offering and Application of DR by Wind Power Producers 
The main challenge with wind power producers is their production uncertainty. Two main 
solutions are provided in the literature to ease this issue. 1) Wind participation in short-term markets 
and proposing an optimal offering strategy for this purpose; 2) Coordination of wind power 
producers with controllable resources.  
 
Optimal trading strategies are addressed in some investigations such as [53-64]. A stochastic 
model is presented in [53], where a wind power producer places its offer into the market while 
taking into account the uncertainty of wind production and market prices. The authors in [54] 
propose a base load contract for reducing the risk of facing uncertainty by a wind power producer. 
With the aim of minimizing the imbalance cost, a stochastic wind power offering plan is provided 
in [55]. The forecast error of power production is added to the actual production and then this is 
offered in the market. Reference [56] determines the energy level contracted in a market with three 
floors, i.e. day-ahead, adjustment and balancing markets. A multistage stochastic approach is 
formulated in which the wind power producer offers in the day-ahead market, corrects its day-ahead 
quantity in the adjustment markets and finally clears deviations in the balancing market. A joint 
energy and bilateral reserve market model for trading wind power has been proposed in [57], where 
it allows wind power producers to model their production uncertainties as well as other competitors 
behaviour in their bidding strategy. The authors in [58] evaluate the profitability of wind power 
producers in enrolling in frequency regulation, particularly in a secondary regulation market. Wind 
power offering under the uncertainty of locational marginal prices is assessed in [59], where offers 
for various risk levels as well as production deviation penalties are derived and compared. An 
agent-based wind offering strategy is proposed in [60], where it is shown that a wind power 
producer can increase its profit by improving power forecasts as well as using learning algorithms. 
A predictive distribution model is presented in [61] to increase the accuracy of wind power offering 
in the market. A risk-constrained offering model is provided in [62], where a wind power producer 
takes into account its operational costs in its offering strategy. The penalty of wind power forecast 
errors in wind offering is evaluated in [63]. In addition, a new model is presented to capture the 
distribution of these errors. Offering strategies based on forecast models and stochastic approaches 
are evaluated in [64]. This work shows the advantages of stochastic models over forecast 
techniques, and also highlights the importance of adjustment markets for wind power producers. 
 
Joint operation strategies are presented in several studies [13-15, 65-72]. A predictive control 
system is proposed in [13] to provide an enhanced wind and battery energy storage systems 
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dispatch. A two-stage stochastic programming approach is proposed in [14], which addresses the 
co-offering of wind and pump-storage units considering the random scenarios of wind power 
production and market prices. The authors in [15] investigate the joint operation of wind and pump-
storage units considering intra-hour wind power variations. The joint operation of wind and battery 
is studied in [65], where sizing and control methodologies for a zinc–bromine flow battery-based 
energy storage system is derived. A price-based unit commitment is formulated in [66] to address 
the coordination of wind and hydro units. Reference [67] proposes a method for joint operation of 
wind and pump-storage plants in day-ahead and ancillary services markets. The impact of wind and 
hydro coordination on a high integration of wind in island systems is evaluated in [68]. The authors 
in [69] evaluate the bidding strategy of wind and hydro in various scenarios, i.e. wind and hydro 
joint bidding, separate bidding, with physical and without physical connection. A new method 
based on the Shapley value is presented in [70], which helps wind and hydro units fairly share their 
joint offering profit. A risk-constrained trading of wind and thermal units is proposed in [71], where 
the optimal trade-off between the expected profit and risk is derived. A stochastic offering method 
for a virtual power plant owning wind and storage systems is presented in [72]. 
 
Demand response (DR) is another source, which can be used in a joint operation with wind 
power producers. Relevant studies mostly provide the joint operation of DR and wind power 
producers to improve network and market operations [73-75]. Few papers investigate DR 
applicability from wind power producers’ point of view [76-78]. The authors in [76] propose a 
method in which a virtual power plant is modelled to coordinate wind power and demand response. 
They model the offering of the virtual power plant in day-ahead and balancing markets. An intraday 
demand response exchange is proposed in [77], where a wind power producer can buy DR from this 
market in order to alleviate its power production deviation in the real-time market. A decision 
framework is proposed in [78], where a wind power producer forecasts its production and 
accordingly uses demand response to mitigate possible deviations.  
 
A few papers have recently raised the issue of market power capability by wind power producers 
[12, 79-82]. Reference [79] is the most recent and comprehensive one of these. The authors 
investigate the high penetration of wind power for a wind power producer by modelling it as a 
strategic player in both day-ahead and balancing markets. An equilibrium problem with equilibrium 
constraints (EPEC) is formulated. The authors in [12] consider a wind power producer which is a 
price maker in the day-ahead market and a deviator in the balancing market. Unlike [12], a wind 
power producer in [80] is fully competitive in the day-ahead market while having market power in 
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the balancing market. The authors in [81] investigate the effect of a price-maker wind power 
producer on the market price. A study of the Nordic market in [82] indicates that producers with 
fluctuating production may act strategically in their bidding on the spot market due to the 
asymmetric cost of the regulating market. 
 
The contributions of this thesis regarding wind offering strategies are as follows. 
 New wind offering strategies are proposed for the Australian National Electricity Market 
(NEM) and the Nordic market, in which a wind power producer in these markets is able 
to procure DR through the proposed DR framework in a two-step plans [51, 52].  
 The behaviour of a DR aggregator is modelled in DR application by a wind power 
producer. To this end, a bilevel problem is proposed in which the upper level problem 
represents wind offering and the lower-level problem models the DR aggregator 
behaviour. In this way, the DR aggregator is able to competitively sell its DR product to 
the wind power producer, other market players and the electricity market [83]. 
 DR application is evaluated by a strategic wind power producer, which has the ability to 
exercise market power. A bilevel approach including one leader and two followers is 
formulated for this purpose. The strategic wind power producer behaviour is presented in 
the upper level and lower-level 1. The lower-level 2 addresses the DR aggregator 
behaviour [84]. 
 
2.1.3 Electricity Retailers and Application of DR in Their Energy Plan 
Electricity retailers buy energy from electricity markets to sell to consumers. Therefore, they 
have to consider two main tasks: procuring energy from different markets while managing pool 
price violations and attracting more consumers through offering competitive electricity sale prices. 
Several investigations are provided to deliver the above issues [16-18, 85-91]. Carrion et al [16] 
propose a yearly framework to decide the forward contracts which retailers should sign and to 
determine the selling price offered to consumers. For this purpose, risk-constrained stochastic 
programming is proposed. Uncertainties of pool prices and client demand are modelled through 
time-series models. In addition, a piecewise price quota is considered to take into account the rival 
retailers’ competition, as well as CVaR for risk modelling. This approach is extended to a bilevel 
model in [85] to take into account retailers’ competition. Thus, the action of the follower (the 
amount of energy purchased by clients) affects the decision plan of the leader (the retailer). 
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Call option contracts and self-production are utilized as energy procurement sources in [17], 
where mixed-integer stochastic programming is proposed to calculate the retailer’s involvement in 
each supplying source, as well as the sale price. Also, a market share function is presented to take 
into account the competition among retailers. The authors in [86] use interruptible loads for 
managing the risk of pool markets faced by a load serving entity (LSE). It is assumed that the LSE 
procures its energy from bilateral contracts and pool markets. In price spike situations, the LSE uses 
interruptible load to mitigate its exposure to high market prices. The concept introduced in [17, 86] 
is further extended in [18] where the selling price offered to consumers is defined based on time-of-
use tariffs. Electricity selling price is determined in [87] using a capital asset pricing model. Also, 
risk adjusted recovery on capital (RAROC) is used to quantify the risk of the pool. A technical-
economic model is proposed in [88] to determine the selling price offered to consumers. The 
impacts of different price strategies, discount on tariffs and the customer’s elasticity are investigated 
on the retailer’s profit. The authors in [89] present a two-stage model in which day-ahead and hour-
ahead markets, as well as DGs are considered for energy procurement by retailers. Short-term 
decisions of distribution companies (DISCOs) are made in the presence of DG and interruptible 
load options in day-ahead markets. The impact of uncertainty modelling on a retailer’s contract 
portfolio is investigated in [90] where the benefit of incorporating the correlation between load and 
price into an energy procurement model is the insight result. Bilateral contracts are evaluated in a 
risk-constrained energy procurement methodology for electricity retailers [91]. A modified model is 
presented where competition among retailers is considered by introducing a switching load 
consumers’ scheme. Also, the risk is modelled using RAROC. 
 
DR is a useful resource for hedging the risk of retailers. A few papers address this concept [86, 
92-100]. The authors in [86] use interruptible loads to alleviate the uncertainty of pool markets 
faced by a load serving entity. Two interruptible load contracts, pay-in-advance and pay-as-you-go, 
are evaluated in [92] as the energy resources of electricity retailers. Self-production is also used in 
[93] to limit the risk of cost fluctuations in pool markets. Reference [94] uses interruptible loads as 
an energy resource of distribution companies. A short-term deterministic model is presented in [95], 
in which distribution companies can use interruptible loads to place bids in the market. Besides 
interruptible loads, real-time pricing and time-of-use are also offered by distribution companies to 
alter the energy usage of consumers [96]. With the aim of reducing the energy bought from pool 
markets, [97] proposes a time of use pricing scheme through which a retailer can apply this program 
to consumers. The authors in [98] investigate the impact of real-time pricing on reducing the risk of 
retailers. A cost minimization problem is proposed in [99], where a retailer uses demand response to 
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avoid cost fluctuations in the market. Peak clipping and load shifting programs are implemented 
with consumers to reduce their load during peak prices. A bilevel problem is presented in [100], 
where consumers, in the lower-level problem, respond to dynamic prices provided by a retailer as 
the leader. 
 
This thesis contributes in this area as follows [49, 50]. 
 The proposed DR framework in section 2.1.1 is applied to the energy procurement 
problem of an electricity retailer. A stochastic cost function is proposed through which 
the retailer uses DR in addition to the commonly used pool market and forward 
contracts. In addition, the uncertainty of pool prices is addressed using their plausible 
scenarios.  
 
2.1.4 Application of DR by ISOs 
A major task for ISOs is to maintain the security of the market. A high penetration of renewable 
resources brings some challenges to electricity markets. Wind power, usually on a large scale, is 
uncertain and non-dispatchable. The good thing however is that as wind penetration becomes 
significant, it is expected to be treated as similar to conventional power plants. Therefore, wind 
power producers have to participate in the market while compensating their power imbalances [12, 
101]. This observation is not valid for PV power, where it is usually on the demand side. Indeed, 
PV power imposes uncertainty to demand, which causes more difficulties in the market dispatch 
carried out by ISOs.  
Investigations are underway to resolve the above issues. A review of the literature indicates the 
majority of the study is dedicated to wind related problems and their proposed  
solutions. The reserve requirement for a system integrating wind power production is addressed in 
[102]. Pool pricing for such a system is presented in [103]. The joint operation of wind and 
controllable resources such as pump-storage systems, hydro power plants and battery storage units 
is provided as a solution for alleviating wind intermittency [104-109]. The authors in [104] assess 
the level of wind penetration in the Portuguese system while using flexible backup production. 
Storage systems are used to cope with wind curtailment during excess generation. A robust unit 
commitment is formulated in [105], which models the worst-case wind power output scenario and 
tries to compensate for it by using pump-storage units. The application of different storage 
technologies for the Dutch system with high wind integration is evaluated in [107]. A security 
constrained unit commitment is formulated in [108], where the dispatch-ability of wind power 
 Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
18 
 
producers is enhanced using pump-storage hydro systems. This problem is addressed using 
transmission-constrained systems in [109]. Correlation analysis of wind and hydro power plants is 
provided in [110], through which a system operator can develop wind based on hydro availability as 
well as load and price variations. 
 
DR is also applied as a solution for easing wind power variability by ISOs [74, 75, 111-117]. 
References [74, 75, 111, 115] indicate that applying real-time pricing schemes results in a higher 
utilization of wind power production and a lower cost to the system. The authors in [112] evaluate 
the impact of DR on the generation mix of a system integrating wind power. A robust optimization 
model is presented in [113], where an ISO uses DR as a reserve provider to cope with wind power 
variability. DR is modelled using an uncertain price-elastic demand curve and its validity to 
accommodate wind power uncertainty is assessed. The impact of proper allocation of DR in a 
system integrating wind power is addressed in [114]. The authors in [116] propose a model to 
determine the load shifting level which an ISO needs to obtain from incentive-based DR programs 
to increase wind utilization and enhance transmission congestion. Time of Use pricing is used in 
[117] which is able to control electric water heaters in order to provide balancing reserve in a 
system with high penetration of wind power production. 
The studies on PV are not as many as that of wind incorporation. Relevant studies mostly 
consider managing roof-top PV in distribution networks. For instance, references [118-120] study 
the impact of storage systems to mitigate PV fluctuations in low-voltage systems. A few 
investigations bring PV power plants into electricity markets, where they mostly seek how these 
power plants can participate in the market [121-123]. An energy management strategy (EMS) is 
proposed in [121], where PV power plants employ storage units through this strategy to mitigate 
their power fluctuations and accordingly, participate in electricity markets. A model for 
participating concentrating solar power in the market is proposed in [122], where a unit can use 
storage to increase its revenue. Economic impacts of solar power on the PJM electricity market are 
analysed in [123].  
 
The thesis contribution on this section comes below [124].  
 There is no investigation in which an ISO explicitly models a system integrating both PV 
(small units) and wind power production while employing DR for easing their 
intermittency. This thesis studies the challenging integration of these resources faced by 
an ISO. The uncertainties of wind power on the supply side and PV power on the demand 
side are modelled in an energy and reserve co-optimization model by the ISO. In 
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addition, the benefit of participating DR aggregators in the reserve market is 
investigated. 
 
The next chapter will present the proposed DR framework. All the DR contracts will be 
explained and a case study is delivered to show the feasibility of using DR by a DR aggregator. 
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  Chapter 3
A New Demand Response Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction1 
Demand Response (DR) is defined as modifying the load profiles of electricity customers via 
offering incentives or establishing new price tariffs [6]. The key drivers of these programs comprise 
network and market issues. While maintaining the security and reliability of the network is the 
primary goal of the network-driven DR, alleviating the risk of pool price volatility is known as the 
main reason for employing market-driven programs [125].  
DR is still at small scale in electricity markets. Many challenges such as customers’ 
unwillingness to participate in DR, lack of enough knowledge and training, lack of proper metering 
facilities (smart metering), as well as market barriers such as market policies are the key reasons. In 
addition, DR purchasers such as wind power producers, retailers and market operators are reluctant 
to contact every single electricity consumer to obtain DR. They prefer to buy DR products from a 
third-party company. In this way, DR is considered as a public good, which is traded between these 
                                                          
1
 This chapter has materials from the following references published by the PhD candidate. 
Proposed DR contracts are explained in: 
1. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, Mehdi Eghbal, “A new demand response scheme for electricity retailers”, Electric Power 
Systems Research, Volume 108, March 2014, Pages 144–152. 
2. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, Mehdi Eghbal, “Wind Power Offering Strategy in Day-Ahead Markets: Employing Demand 
Response in a Two-Stage Plan”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2354571). 
3. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, Mehdi Eghbal, “Wind offering strategy in the Australian National Electricity Market: A 
two-step plan considering demand response”, Electric Power Systems Research, Volume 119, Feb 2015, Pages 187–198. 
Reward-based DR program is proposed in:  
4. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, and Mehdi Eghbal, “Developing a scenario-based demand response for short-term 
decisions of retailers”, Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, Vancouver, British Columbia, 
Canada, 21-25 July 2013. 
DR framework from a DR aggregator viewpoint is addressed in:  
5. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, and Mehdi Eghbal, “A Trading Framework for Demand Response Aggregators”, 
Proceedings of the IEEE Power & Energy Society General meeting, Washington DC, USA, July 27-31, 2014 
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companies and the third-party company. DR aggregators are such companies that are able to 
implement various DR programs with consumers to sell the outcome to DR purchasers.  
A few papers in the literature address this topic. The authors in [38] propose a new DR market, 
which allows aggregators to sell their product through a pool-based market. A hierarchical market 
model is developed in [126], where aggregators are considered as a broker between residential end 
users and the market operator. With the aim of maximizing social welfare, the authors in [127] 
proposes a decomposition algorithm to ease the implementation of DR by aggregators.  
While the above studies focus mostly on participating DR aggregators in the market, there is no 
significant work which addresses the bilateral contracts between DR aggregators and DR 
purchasers. This chapter proposes a new Demand Response (DR) framework in which various DR 
contracts are proposed through which DR purchasers can bilaterally trade DR with a DR 
aggregator.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, the developed DR framework is discussed. Then, 
each DR contract is explained and relevant mathematical formulations are derived. In addition, a 
simple case study from a DR aggregator’s perspective is simulated and the results are analysed. 
Finally, the nomenclature section in the end of the chapter defines all variables, constants and 
numbers. 
3.2 Demand Response Framework 
The proposed DR framework arranges mutually attractive deals between DR purchasers and a 
DR aggregator. It is assumed that the DR aggregator is willing to bilaterally trade DR with these 
purchasers. The proposed DR framework is depicted in Figure 3.1. As can be seen, DR is traded 
through three main contracts: DR options, fixed DR contracts and flexible DR agreements. Note that 
double ended arrows indicate that DR flow can be either from the aggregator to DR purchasers or in 
the opposite direction. That is, the DR aggregator sells DR products to purchasers in specific 
periods, mainly peak periods. On the other hand it is also able to buy energy from them through DR 
agreements, where in this situation it can encourage electricity consumers to consume more energy. 
This usually happens during off-peak periods. 
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Figure ‎3.1. The proposed DR framework 
Each DR contract is discussed in the following subsections.  
3.2.1 DR Options 
A DR purchaser can arrange DR options with DR aggregators. Each DR option is determined 
with a specific offer including a certain volume and price for a given period. According to this 
contract, a DR purchaser has a right but not an obligation to purchase DR. This means that the 
purchaser signs this contract at the beginning of the decision time horizon. However, exercising the 
contract at the energy delivery time depends on whether it is profitable or not. If the contract is not 
carried through in real time, the DR purchaser has to pay a predetermined fee to the DR aggregator 
as the penalty of not exercising the contract. Figure 3.2 shows the structure of a typical DR option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.2. Structure of a typical DR option 
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The cost of a DR option that a DR purchaser has to pay to the DR aggregator is formulated as 
follows.  
              . . .... , ,.. 1DRO peno o o o o oC t P t t v t d t v t f t t o     
(3.1) 
 
Equation (3.1) consists of two terms addressing the cost of practicing the DR option by the DR 
purchaser and the penalty of not exercising the signed DR option. Binary variable 𝑣𝑜(𝑡) indicates 
whether the contract is exercised or not. 𝑣𝑜(𝑡) equal to 1 shows that the DR option 𝑜 is used in real 
time. Otherwise, it states that the contract is not exercised and thus the DR purchaser has to pay 
𝑓𝑜
𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑡) as the penalty of not exercising the DR option during time 𝑡.  
DR options can be categorized in four classes based on their applications. The first two are more 
suitable for the proposed two-step wind energy offering strategy which is presented in Chapter 4. 
The last two options are used for an energy procurement problem of electricity retailers which is 
presented in Chapter 7.  
1- Type 1 is called European DR options (EDRO). Once the contract is set, both parties (DR 
purchaser and DR aggregator) agree on an expiration time. This expiration time is the only time that 
the agreed DR option can be exercised. Thus, the DR purchaser is not allowed to practice this 
contract at any other time, whether sooner or later than the set time.  
2- In type 2 the DR option can be exercised at any time before the expiration time. This is similar 
to the well-known financial American-based options. Accordingly, we call it the American DR 
option. This adds an extra constraint, shown in (3.2), to the DR option cost formulated above. This 
expression indicates the period horizon (𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑎𝑜) in which the American DR option 𝑎𝑜 can be 
exercised. 
  ....1; 1, 2, ,v t ao Nao ao
t Tao
   

 (3.2) 
 
3- A pool-order DR option is proposed in order to alleviate the risk of normal price fluctuations 
in the pool market. Consequently, risk-averse DR purchasers such as conservative retailers can 
procure part of their energy from DR instead of the uncertain pool market. 
4- The pool market may face price spikes due to some circumstances such as high demand 
requirements on very hot summer days, transmission network congestion and failure in power 
system components. For instance, while the average pool price in the Australian National Electricity 
Market was $43/MWh in 2012, in the worst case of the year the price spiked as high as 
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$2892/MWh [128]. A spike-order option agreement is proposed as a way to limit the huge cost 
faced by DR purchasers, particularly retailers, during high price periods. This option is similar to 
the pool-order option except that the negotiated price is determined according to price spikes. 
3.2.2 Fixed (Forward) DR Contracts 
A fixed contract is an agreement between a buyer and a seller of an asset to be traded in the 
future [129]. Considering this concept, a fixed DR contract is proposed here, through which a DR 
purchaser buys this contract from a DR aggregator. It is assumed that the purchaser directly 
negotiates with the DR aggregator for a mutually attractive deal. Fixed DR contracts are offered in 
various blocks in which each block involves a certain amount of DR and price for a given period.  
      ,
;.
,
.
, ( )
1,..., 1,...,
FDR DR DR
f b f b f b
FDR BDR
C P t t d t
N b N
t
f
  
 
 (3.3) 
      ,   ,,, ,
DR MIN DR DR MAX
f bf b f b
P t P t P t   (3.4) 
Expression (3.3) refers to the cost of the 𝑏th block of fixed DR 𝑓. In addition, the size of each 
contract’s block is restricted by (3.4).  
3.3 Flexible DR Agreements 
Flexible DR agreements give the DR buyer a chance to better utilize DR according to its  
real-time requirement. When the DR buyer and the DR aggregator arrange this contract, they 
negotiate the size, price and the duration of the agreement. However, during the delivery time the 
DR buyer has flexibility to manage the usage distribution of the contracted DR volume in the given 
period. That is, the DR purchaser is able to distribute the DR usage over the contract period to fulfil 
its requirement.  
The cost of the flexible DR agreement is provided in (3.5). 𝑃𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
 𝐷𝑅 (𝑡) and 𝜆𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
 𝐷𝑅 (𝑡) are the power 
and the price of flexible DR 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥, respectively. The size of flexible DR is imposed in (3.6). 
Equation (3.7) is valid during the real time, where it states that the flexible DR volume over the 
contract period (𝑡 → 𝑆𝑃: 𝐸𝑃) must be equal to the agreed volume (𝐸𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑑
) which was negotiated 
once the contract was set. 𝑆𝑃 and 𝐸𝑃 represent the start and the end of the contract period, 
respectively.  
      ( )
1,...,
FlexDR DR DR
flex flex flex
flex
C P t t d t
flex N
t   

 (3.5) 
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      ,   ,DR MIN DR DR MAXflexflex flexP t P t P t   (3.6) 
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P t d t E

   (3.7) 
3.4 The Proposed DR Framework from an Aggregator’s Perspective 
This section analyses the proposed DR framework for a DR aggregator. The DR aggregator 
acquires DR by implementing time-of-use (TOU) and reward-based DR programs with consumers. 
The behaviour of consumers in the TOU program is modelled through elasticity factors, while in the 
reward-based DR it is demonstrated using uncertainty characterization. The obtained DR is then 
sold to purchasers through two proposed contracts, i.e. fixed DR contract and DR options.  
The proposed DR trading framework is given in Figure 3.3. Electricity consumers include 
industrial, commercial and residential sectors. Each sector is offered a unique time-of-use tariff and 
a distinctive reward-based DR. The aggregator trades the DR product with purchasers through fixed 
DR contracts and DR option agreements. Note that double-sided arrows indicate that the energy 
flow can be either from consumers to DR purchasers or in the opposite direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.3. A trading DR framework for a DR aggregator 
 
The following subsections present the given trading framework in detail where the mathematical 
formulations of Time-of-use (TOU) and reward-based programs as well as the overall problem are 
presented. Finally, a case study for the DR aggregator is simulated and the results are analysed. 
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3.4.1 Time-of-Use program 
Time-of-use (TOU) programs are well-known in the power industry. According to this program, 
consumers receive distinct price tariffs for a day, for example peak and off-peak tariffs. 
Consequently they manage their electricity usage depending on how elastic they are to price 
changes. If they are highly elastic, the response is high and vice versa. 
The energy obtained from the TOU program is formulated in (3.8). This energy is achieved from 
implementing the TOU program with consumers (𝑐 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁𝑐) over the given horizon 𝑇. 
   
   
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      
 
 
 
(3.8) 
Based on the difference between 𝜆0(𝑐, 𝑝) (the initial price dedicated to consumer 𝑐 in period 𝑝) 
and 𝜆(𝑐, 𝑝) (the TOU price offered to consumer 𝑐 in period 𝑝) as well as depending on the elasticity 
of consumer 𝑐 during time 𝑡 with regards to the electricity price in period 𝑝 (𝐸(𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑝)), the amount 
of energy obtained from the TOU program is calculated.  
3.4.2 Reward-Based DR 
The reward-based DR is proposed in a stepwise function as shown in Figure 3.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.4. Reward-based DR curve 
 
According to Figure 3.4, the amount of load reduction grows in a stepwise manner as the 
aggregator offers higher rewards. This function is expressed in the following equations: 
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Equation (3.9) indicates the DR volume (𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡)) obtained from the reward-based DR program. 
𝑣𝐷𝑅,𝑗(𝑡) is a binary variable showing the level of the reduced load in the DR curve. This variable is 
determined according to the reward offered by the DR aggregator. That is, if the offered reward is 
within the 𝑗th level of the reward boundary (Equation (3.10)), this level is chosen and consequently 
𝑣𝐷𝑅,𝑗(𝑡) is equal to one. 𝑃𝐹(𝑤, 𝑡) is a scenario-based participation factor which models the 
uncertainty of customers’ behaviour. This factor ranges between 0 and 1, where zero means no 
reward-based DR is attainable and 𝑃𝐹(𝑤, 𝑡) = 1 indicates that the anticipated DR is accessible. 
Finally, 𝜋(𝑤) is the probability of scenario 𝑤.   
Note that the reward offered to consumers (𝑅𝐷𝑅(𝑡)) is calculated as the total rewards of all steps 
lower than or equal to the 𝑗th level (Equation (3.11)). Constraint (3.12) ensures that only one level 
of the stepwise reward-based DR can be selected. 
The cost of the reward-based DR is given in (3.13): 
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 (3.13) 
 
3.4.3 Overall Problem 
The overall problem is formulated as a profit function represented by (3.14). It consists of the 
revenue of selling DR through fixed DR contracts and DR option agreements, as well as the cost of 
the reward-based DR. The last component is Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), which is weighted 
using the risk factor (𝜌).  𝜉 and 𝜂𝑤 are auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR [56]. 𝛽 is the 
confidence level, which usually equals 0.95. Note that the risk level (𝜌 =[0-∞)) represents the trade-
off between the expected profit and the risk. A conservative aggregator willing to minimize the risk 
chooses a large value of the risk level. On the other hand, a risk-taker aggregator prefers higher 
profits and consequently selects a risk factor close to 0. Note that risk-factor throughout the thesis is 
indicated using 𝜌 (Rho). 
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It should be noted that it is assumed consumers have smart meters and therefore the cost of 
installing meters is not included in the profit function.  
 
The profit function is subject to the following constraints: 
1- CVaR constraints 
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( ) 0; w w    (3.16) 
 
2- Power balance equation (3.17): 
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3- Reward-based DR constraints (3.18)-(3.21);  
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4- Fixed DR contract size limitation (3.22) 
      ,   ,,, ,
DR MIN DR DR MAX
f bf b f b
P t P t P t   (3.22) 
 
3.4.4 Case Study  
A) Data 
The highest consumption day of Queensland in 2013 occurred in summer (January 9th). The load 
curve of this day is shown in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure ‎3.5. Load curve of Queensland on 9 January 2013 [128] 
A working day in summer is also considered in this study, which is divided into two periods, 
peak and off-peak. Peak time is between 9am and 10pm, while other times are considered as off-
 Chapter 3. A New Demand Response Framework 
 
31 
 
peak periods. It is assumed that the aggregator buys DR from consumers to sell it to purchasers 
during peak time, while this flow is reversed during off peak periods. Industrial, commercial and 
residential consumers are considered here. TOU prices for each consumer are derived from retail 
tariffs in Queensland, Australia [130] (Table 3.1). The elasticity matrix is also provided in Table 3.2 
[18].  
 
Table ‎3.1. Retail price tariffs in Queensland 
 
Non TOU TOU 
Normal 
Tariff 
Peak 
Off 
Peak 
Residential 29.4 34.6 21.3 
Commercial 33.1 42.4 13.5 
Industrial 25.5 28.1 20.5 
 
Table ‎3.2. Elasticity matrix 
 Peak Off Peak 
Residential 
Peak -0.15 0.05 
Off Peak 0.02 -0.03 
Commercial 
Peak -0.16 0.06 
Off Peak 0.03 -0.04 
Industrial 
Peak -0.2 0.1 
Off Peak 0.07 -0.08 
 
Unique reward-based DR curves involving 25 steps are assumed for each sector. A typical 
reward-based curve used in the peak period is shown in Figure 3.6. Furthermore, a scenario-based 
participation factor is created as follows. For each reward-based DR, 20 scenarios representing 
consumer uncertainties are randomly generated. These scenarios range between zero and one. Zero 
means no DR participation by consumers. However, higher values of scenarios correspond to higher 
participation, where participation factor equal to one indicates the entire anticipated DR is 
attainable.  
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Figure ‎3.6. A typical reward-based curve for the peak period 
A fixed DR contract involving six blocks is considered for each period. The maximum demand 
of each block is 90kW and 30kW during peak and off-peak periods, respectively. In addition, the 
price for each fixed DR block is given in Table 3.3.  
Table ‎3.3. Fixed DR price 
 
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 
Fixed DR 1 36 37 38 39 40 41 
Fixed DR 2 15 16 18 20 21 23 
Four DR option agreements are modelled for each period. The prices and demand volumes for 
each agreement are provided in Table 3.4. Note that the penalty of not exercising each DR option is 
assumed to be 10% of the contract’s value. 
Table ‎3.4. Demand and price of DR options 
 Demand (MW) Price ($/MWh) 
 Peak Off Peak Peak Off Peak 
DR Option 1 50 -50 34 21 
DR Option 2 50 -50 37 20 
DR Option 3 50 -30 36 22 
DR Option 4 50 -25 35 18 
B) Simulation Results 
The problem is formulated in a mixed-integer linear programming approach and is solved for 
different risk levels using CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [131]. Figure 3.7 depicts the TOU outcome. 
It can be seen that consumers reduce their consumption during peak periods, while they use more 
energy during off-peak time. The reduction during peak time is approximately 7% and the load 
growth in off-peak periods is 5.54%. Note that the outcome of the TOU only depends on 
consumers’ elasticity, and it is constant for various risk levels. 
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Figure ‎3.7. TOU results 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the reward-based DR achievements. During the peak period, the risk-
neutral DR aggregator (risk factor equal to 0) has a higher level of involvement in this program, i.e. 
it obtains around 2,700 kWh DR from consumers. However, increasing the risk level leads to a 
declining trend in this program. This is reasonable since this program involves uncertainty and 
hence conservative aggregators prefer to reduce their share from it. This trend is also valid for the 
off-peak period. It should be noted that negative values during off-peak periods mean that the 
aggregator sells the reward-based DR to consumers. In other words, consumers are encouraged to 
consume more energy through this program during off peak. It can be seen that while the risk-
neutral DR aggregator encourages consumers to use just under 1,500 kWh more energy, the share 
of the most risk-averse aggregator (risk factor equal to 2) decreases to just above 1,000 kWh. 
 
Figure ‎3.8. Reward-Based DR results 
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Table 3.5 shows the energy traded in fixed DR contracts. The aggregator sells DR to purchasers 
in the peak period, while it buys energy during off-peak time. It can also be said that the risk-averse 
aggregator (ρ = 2) trades more fixed DR than the risk-neutral one (ρ = 0) in both periods. This is 
because fixed DR contracts involve no risk and thus, risk-averse aggregators prefer to increase their 
DR share from them.  
 
Table ‎3.5. Fixed DR energy (kWh) 
𝝆 Peak Off Peak 
0 4559 -1004 
1 4539 -1004 
2 4735 -1074 
 
Table 3.6 represents the exercised DR options for different risk levels. All DR options are used 
for risk factors 0 and 1. For ρ = 2, DR options (DROP) 1 and 3 are not exercised during peak and 
off-peak periods, respectively. This trend follows the declining tendency of the reward-based DR as 
a result of increasing the risk level. 
 
Table ‎3.6. Exercise of DR options  
𝝆 Peak Off Peak 
0 All All 
1 All All 
2 DROP2-DROP4 DROP1, DROP2, DROP4 
 
Finally, the impact of the unpredictable behaviour of consumers is evaluated here. Two cases are 
considered: Case 1 represents the outcome when the uncertainty is modelled (for the risk-neutral 
aggregators) and case 2 ignores the unpredictable behaviour of customers (𝑃𝐹(𝑤, 𝑡) = 1 in the 
reward-based DR). The amounts of TOU and DR options remain constant in both cases. But the 
reward-based DR and fixed DR contracts change as Figure 3.9. As can be seen, disregarding the 
customers’ behaviour results in a higher reward-based DR outcome and consequently, higher 
amounts of fixed DR. That is, the DR aggregator which assumes all customers will definitely 
participate in the reward-based DR may achieve less DR in practice. This shows how ignoring 
customers’ behaviour may mislead the aggregator in its energy plan. 
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Figure ‎3.9. Impact of uncertain behaviour of consumers on DR outcomes 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the proposed DR framework. To this end, DR is considered as a public 
good, which is traded between DR purchasers and DR aggregators. Various DR contracts are 
proposed for this purpose. Each contract is described and formulated accordingly. In addition, a 
case study from a DR aggregator’s point of view is provided and the results are analysed to show 
the validity of the proposed DR framework.  
The proposed DR framework will be employed in the following chapters and its applications for 
electricity markets are evaluated. In particular, the proposed DR contracts are assessed for wind 
power producers (Chapters 4-6) and electricity retailers (Chapter 7) as two market players on the 
supply and demand sides. In addition, a DR aggregator is considered to be able to participate in the 
reserve market, where its validity is examined in a market analysis from an ISO’s point of view 
(Chapter 8). 
 
3.6 Nomenclature  
A) Indices  
b  Index for blocks of fixed DR ( 1,..., BDRb N ) 
c  Index for customers ( 1,..., cc N ) 
f  Index for fixed DR ( 1,..., FDRf N ) 
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flex  Index for flexible DR ( 1,..., flexflex N ) 
j  Index for intervals of the reward-based DR ( 1,..., jj N ) 
o  Index for DR options ( 1,..., oo N ) 
p  Index for time period in the TOU program ( 1,..., pp N ) 
t  Index for time ( 1,...,t T ) 
w  Index for scenarios ( 1,..., w ww N  ) 
B) Parameters  
 d t  Duration of time period t  
 0 ,D c t  Initial demand of consumer c  in time t  
 , ,E c t p  Elasticity of consumer c  in time t  with respect to price at time p  
EP  End of period for flexible DR flex  
Agrd
flex
E  Energy agreed in step 1 for the flexible DR flex  
 penof t  Penalty of not exercising DR option o  in period t  
  ,,
DR MAX
f b
P t  Maximum fixed DR f  in block b  
  ,,
DR MIN
f b
P t  Minimum fixed DR f  in block b  
  ,DR MAXflexP t  Maximum flexible DR flex  
  ,DR MINflexP t  Minimum flexible DR flex  
 DRjP t  Upper level of the j  interval of the reward-based DR 
 ,PF w t  Scenario-based participation factor 
( )DRjR t  Reward in the j  interval of the reward-based DR curve 
SP  Start of period for flexible DR flex  
 ,c p  Time of use price 
 ,
DR
f b t  Price of fixed DR f  in block b  
 DRflex t  Price of flexible DR flex  
 Chapter 3. A New Demand Response Framework 
 
37 
 
 o t  Price of DR option o  
 0 ,c p  Initial price offered to consumer c  in period p  
 w  Probability of scenario w  
  Risk factor 
C) Variables  
Agrd
flexE  Energy agreed in the first stage of flexible DR flex  
  DRflexP t  Power of flexible DR flex  
  ,
DR
f bP t  Power of fixed DR f  in block b  
 oP t  Power of DR option o  
( )DRjR t  Reward of the jth  interval of the reward-based DR 
 v tao  Binary variable for American DR option ao  
 ,DR jv t  Binary variable for the reward-based DR function 
 ov t  Binary variable for DR option o  
, ( )w   Auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR 
D) Numbers and Sets 
aoN  Number of American DR options 
BDRN  Number of blocks for fixed DR  
cN  Number of consumers 
FDRN  Number of fixed DR  
flexN  Number of flexible DR 
jN  Number of intervals in the reward-based DR 
oN  Number of DR options 
pN  Number of periods 
T  Set of time periods 
aoT  Set of time periods in American DR options 
w  Set of scenarios 
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  Chapter 4
Employing Demand Response by Wind 
Power Producers 
 
4.1. Introduction1 
Wind power is a leading renewable energy resource. Various incentive schemes and policies are 
provided to facilitate the application of wind energy worldwide. The European Union has a target of 
achieving 20% of renewable energy by 2020. The Renewable Energy Target (RET) in Australia sets 
the same requirement by 2020. Different states in the U.S have distinct goals. For instance, 
California is planning to obtain 33% of its energy from renewable technologies by 2020 [101]. 
It is expected that wind power producers could be treated similar to conventional generators in 
the near future. This is currently the case for some wind power producers in Germany [101], 
Western Denmark [12] and Australia, while it is voluntary in other markets such as the Spanish [14] 
and Midwest ISO (MISO) markets [101]. Therefore, wind power producers place their offer in the 
market while they are responsible for their production deviation in real time. Two main practical 
solutions for this issue are presented in literature: Optimal trading strategies and a joint operation 
of wind power producers and easily controllable resources.  
Optimal trading strategies are addressed in some investigations such as [55, 56, 61], where they 
mostly work on the imbalance cost minimization concept. In addition, joint operation strategies are 
                                                          
1
 This chapter covers the following references: 
For the Australian National Electricity Market (Section 4.3): 
1. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, Mehdi Eghbal, “Wind offering strategy in the Australian National Electricity Market: A two-
step plan considering demand response”, Electric Power Systems Research, Volume 119, Feb 2015, Pages 187–198. 
For the Nordic Market (Section 4.4): 
2. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, Mehdi Eghbal, “Wind Power Offering Strategy in Day-Ahead Markets: Employing 
Demand Response in a Two-Stage Plan”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (Accepted 23 August 2014, DOI: 
10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2354571). 
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addressed in [13-15, 67], where the coordination of wind power producers and other resources such 
as storage and hydro units is assessed. Demand response (DR) is another source, which can be used 
in a joint operation with wind power producers. Relevant studies in literature mostly investigate this 
to improve network and market operations [74, 75, 112, 115]. A few papers investigate DR 
applicability from wind power producers’ point of view. For instance, the authors in [76] propose a 
method in which a virtual power plant is modelled to coordinate wind power and demand response. 
In addition, the authors in [132] investigate smart grid roles in activating passive loads to mitigate 
wind power variations.  
This chapter aims at using DR in offering strategies by wind power producers in two well-known 
electricity markets with unique features, i.e. the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) [3, 
128] and the Nordic market [133, 134]. A proper offering plan is proposed for each market, through 
which a wind power producer is able to employ DR from a DR aggregator. For this purpose, the 
proposed DR framework and DR contracts presented in Chapter 3 are used here.  
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the structures of the Australian National Electricity 
Market (NEM) and the Nordic market are addressed. Then, the proposed wind offering strategy for 
the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) is formulated and studied. Finally, this strategy is 
modified for the Nordic market and evaluated based on its structure. Note that all indices, constants 
and variables throughout the chapter are explained in Section 4.6. 
4.2. The Australian National Electricity Market vs. the Nordic market 
A trading day in the Australian NEM  begins at 4:00am and ends at 4:00am of the next day. Each 
trading period represents a half hourly period, which comprises six 5-minute dispatch intervals. 
According to the NEM, generators place their offers at 12:30pm on the day before the energy 
delivery. Then, they are allowed to rebid their energy volume up until five minutes prior to the 
dispatch.  
The Nordic market comprises a day-ahead market, an adjustment (intraday) market and a 
balancing (regulating) market [55]. The day-ahead market closes at 12:00pm the preceding day. 
Additionally, the market involves an adjustment market, called Elbas. This market opens at 15:00 
on the same day and lasts up until one hour prior to the delivery. Finally, the market operator 
guarantees real-time balances through the regulating market which takes place just before the 
energy delivery.  
Accordingly, while the Australian NEM takes preliminary action on the day prior to energy 
delivery and then implements correction actions just before the energy delivery, the Nordic market 
has two settlements, i.e. day-ahead and balancing market floors, where energy can be traded in 
them. 
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4.3. Wind Offering Strategy in the Australian National Electricity Market 
4.3.1. The Proposed Two-Step Plan 
The proposed offering plan is expressed in two steps as shown in Figure 4.1. This plan is 
adjusted to the Australian NEM, where the pre-dispatch process closes at 12:30 pm on the day prior 
to the energy delivery (Step 1) and then, generators are able to change the volume of their offer up 
until 5 minutes before the dispatch (Step 2). Note that Ancillary services markets are not modelled 
here. Therefore, the offering strategy in the Australian NEM consists of a preliminary action which 
takes place on the preceding day and a corrective one which can be made up to 5 minutes before the 
real-time dispatch.  
Preliminary decisions are taken in step 1. For this purpose, a stochastic programming approach is 
formulated through which initial energy offers are decided. In addition, the wind power producer 
negotiates the required DR agreements with a DR aggregator. Three DR contracts are considered 
here: DR options, fixed DR contracts and flexible DR agreements. These decisions are made while 
both market prices and wind power production are uncertain. To model the risk associated with this 
uncertainty, conditional Value-at-risk (CVaR) is used.  
The second step covers the decisions taken at the real-time dispatch. A successive approach is 
applied, which runs for each dispatch interval until all intervals are covered. The volume of energy 
to be offered for each interval is determined. In addition, the wind power producer approves its final 
DR agreements for the relevant interval. Similar to step 1, a stochastic programming problem is 
formulated for this step in which power production and the market price are known for the current 
interval, but they are still uncertain in the remaining intervals. In addition, CVaR is used to assess 
the risk. 
It is assumed that the wind power producer is the price-taker. A further assumption is that the 
wind power producer is treated as similar to conventional power plants, i.e. scheduled generators in 
the NEM, where it is responsible for its bidding strategy and production variations. In addition, this 
work assumes a single-node market in which the transmission network is not modelled. This is a 
common practice in bidding strategy problems investigated in literature [55, 56]. Finally note that 
this study considers DR trading in both directions, i.e. from the DR aggregator to the wind power 
producer and in the opposite direction. Indeed, in the case of a power shortage, the wind power 
producer is a DR buyer while during excess production the producer sells energy to the DR 
aggregator. 
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Figure ‎4.1. The proposed offering plan 
 
4.3.1.1. Step 1: Initial Offering 
This step takes place at 12:30 pm the preceding day. The wind power producer runs a 
preliminary strategy. The producer achieves an initial offering schedule over all periods of the next 
day (𝑡 = {1, 2, … , 𝐹𝐼}). In addition, fixed DR contracts are negotiated. Furthermore, the wind power 
producer determines the periods in which DR options are signed. Finally, flexible DR agreements 
are set. These decisions are taken under the uncertainty of spot prices and wind power production, 
where these parameters are stochastically modelled through a set of scenarios to represent their 
plausible realizations. 
A stochastic profit function is formulated in this step, which consists of the following terms. 
1. The expected revenue obtained from selling energy to the spot market: 
       1 1
1 1
, ,. . ,, .
w s s s s
N FI
SM
w t
ER w d tt w tP w 
 
    (4.1) 
2. The cost of the DR option modelled in step 1: This step determines whether a DR option 
is signed or not. This decision is indicated by a binary variable, i.e. 𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑜(𝑡). Zero 
specifies that the wind power producer does not sign the contract, while 1 means the 
contract is set in this step. 
         , 1 . . . ....... ,. 1 2,...o
DRO S
o o o oC P t t Sgn t d tt o N    (4.2) 
3. The cost of block 𝑏 of fixed DR 𝑓, as given in (4.3); Expression (4.4) shows the margin 
size of each contract’s block. 
- Initial Offering Schedule 
- Fixed DR contracts 
- Signed DR options 
12:30pm 
- Optimal Offering  
- Exercised DR options 
- Employed Flexible DR  
Interval 1: 
4:00am 
Last Interval: 
3:55am 
Interval 2: 
4:05am 
Trading Day 
Step 1 Step 2-iteration 1 Step 2-  
Last iteration 
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        , , , ;....... . 1,..., 1,. .. ..,
FDR DR DR
f b f b f b FDR BDRC P t t d t f N Nt b      (4.3) 
      ,   ,,, ,
DR MIN DR DR MAX
f bf b f b
P t P t P t   (4.4) 
4. The cost of a flexible DR agreement in step 1, as formulated in (4.5); the size of each 
flexible DR is imposed by (4.6).  
        , 1  , 1 ....... . 1,...,FlexDR S DR s DRflex flexflex flexC P t t d t flt ex N    (4.5) 
      ,  , 1  , .... 1,.... .,DR MIN DR s DR MAX flexflex flex flexP t P t P t flex N     (4.6) 
5. The last component is CVaR [56] which is weighted using the risk factor (ρ). Note that 
the risk level (ρ =[0-∞)) represents the trade-off between the expected profit and the risk. 
A risk-averse wind power producer willing to minimize the risk chooses a large value of 
the risk factor. On the other hand, a risk-neutral producer prefers higher profits and 
consequently selects a risk factor close to 0. 
The overall profit function (PF) of step 1 is given in (4.7). Constraints (4.8) and (4.9) impose the 
size limits of power traded in the fixed DR and flexible DR agreements, respectively. Expressions 
(4.10) and (4.11) represent CVaR constraints. These constraints are used to linearize CVaR [56]. 
Finally, the power balance is satisfied in (4.12), where the offered power to the market must be 
equal to the wind power production (𝑃𝑤,𝑠1(𝑡, 𝑤)) plus the power procured from DR. Indeed, this 
constraint ensures that the decisions on the initial wind power offer and DR agreements are valid for 
each power production scenario. 
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 (4.7) 
 
subject to, 
 
      ,   ,,, ,
DR MIN DR DR MAX
f bf b f b
P t P t P t   (4.8) 
      ,  , 1  ,DR MIN DR s DR MAXflex flex flexP t P t P t   (4.9) 
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4.3.1.2. Step 2: Optimal Offering 
Step 2 deals with the actions required to modify the decisions made in the previous step (See 
Figure 4.1). It begins at 4:00am and runs for each 5-minute dispatch interval. This step employs a 
successive algorithm which iterates from interval 1 until the last interval. For each interval, the 
following decisions are made. 1) The optimal offering energy for the current interval is determined. 
2) It is decided whether the signed DR options in step 1 are exercised for that interval. 3) The 
required volume of flexible DR for the relevant interval is decided.  
A new profit function is formulated which is solved for each iteration. This function is given in 
(4.13). 
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FI
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subject to, 
 
      ,  , 2  ,DR MIN DR s DR MAXflex flex flexP t P t P t   (4.17) 
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The profit function comprises three main terms:  
1. The profit obtained in the current interval (𝑡 = 𝐶𝐼). This function is shown in (4.14), where 
it involves the revenue obtained from selling energy into the spot market minus the cost of 
DR options and flexible DR. Note that since the current interval is very close to the real time 
dispatch, the spot price and wind power production are assumed to be deterministic 
parameters here. Thus the obtained profit for the current interval is not associated with 
uncertainty. 
2. The expected profit over the following periods until the final interval (𝑡 = 𝐶𝐼 + 1 → 𝐹𝐼): 
Equation (4.15) provides this function. Since price and wind forecasts for the following 
intervals involve a level of uncertainty, these parameters are illustrated using corresponding 
scenarios. Note that scenarios in step 2 are represented by index 𝑠. 
3. The CVaR risk measure which is shown in (4.16).  
Note that the costs of DR contracts in step 2 are determined as follows. 
1- The cost of DR option in step 2: This step is valid for those DR options signed in the 
previous step, i.e. 𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑜(𝑡) = 1. Indeed, step 2 decides the exercising status of these signed 
contracts. A binary variable 𝑣𝑜(𝑡) is used, which is equal to 1 if the contract is exercised and 
zero if not. 
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2- The cost of flexible DR in step 2: A cost function similar to step 1 is defined for step 2. 
However, an additional constraint is required in step 2, as represented in (4.23). Indeed this 
constraint enforces that the overall volume of each flexible DR used in step 2 must be equal 
to its volume contracted in step 1, i.e. 𝐸𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑑,𝑠1
. Note that 𝑆𝑃 and 𝐸𝑃 represent the start and 
end of the period that flexible DR flex is valid. 
    , 1 , 2 .
EP
Agrd sDR s
flex flex
t SP
P t d t E

  (4.23) 
Note that the fixed DR volume determined in the previous step is used in step 2 without any 
changes. Thus the term indicating the fixed DR cost is not included in the profit function of this 
step.  
The profit function is subject to constraints (4.17)-(4.21). Constraint (4.17) enforces the size 
limitation of each flexible DR. In addition, equation (4.18) indicates that the total energy volume of 
each flexible DR must be equal to the contracted volume (𝐸𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑑,𝑠1
) obtained in step 1. Expressions 
(4.19) and (4.20) show CVaR constraints. Finally, equation (4.21) imposes the power balance. Note 
that in this constraint, wind power production (𝑃𝑤,𝑠2(𝑠, 𝑡)) is known for the current interval. 
However, it is uncertain in the following intervals. In addition, it is important to emphasize the 
necessity of including the fixed DR volume in the power balance constraint of step 2.  
 
4.3.2. Case Study 
4.3.2.1. Data Preparation and Assumptions 
The proposed offering plan is evaluated on a realistic case of the South Australian (SA) 
jurisdiction within the Australian NEM. The available spot price and wind speed are in half-hourly 
resolutions. Hence, it is assumed that each given interval in this study is 30 minutes [128]. 
The spot price and wind power production are uncertain parameters and thus they are 
characterized using proper scenarios. Similar to relevant studies [56], ARIMA models are chosen 
for generating price scenarios. A time series of the spot prices of SA from December 2011 to 
January 2012 is used to generate price scenarios [128]. As a result, 40 price scenarios are generated 
for step 1.  
The wind power producer Lake Bonney 2 is chosen [135]. This producer is located at Mt 
Gambier AERO and its installed capacity is 159MW (53 Vestas 3MW Turbines). In order to 
provide wind power scenarios, first, wind speed scenarios are generated using the ARMA model 
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[66]. Summer season data from 2007-2012 is used as the input time series. Twenty wind speed 
scenarios are generated for step 1. These scenarios are then transformed to power scenarios using 
the Vestas Wind curve [136].  
Note that the adequate number of scenarios is mainly determined using one of the following 
methods.  
1) The first method uses scenario reduction techniques [56]. In this way, the original number of 
scenarios is reduced in such a way that makes the problem tractable while keeping it accurate. Fast-
forward scenario reduction is the most popular method.  
2) The second method follows the same aim, but it targets the objective function. That is, the 
number of scenarios is increased until the expected profit is stabilized [18].  
This study uses the second approach, where altogether 800 scenarios are generated. Figure 4.2 
verifies this number by illustrating the expected profit versus the number of scenarios for the risk-
neutral and risk-averse wind power producers. 
 
Figure  4.2. Expected profit for various number of scenarios  
Figure 4.3 displays the expected values of wind power and spot price scenarios in step 1. It can 
be seen that while the wind power production peak occurs in early intervals, the spot price curve 
sees its peak in the afternoon. 
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Figure  4.3. Expected wind power production and spot prices 
For step 2, the given price and wind scenarios of step 1 are reduced to 20 and 10, respectively. 
For this purpose, those scenarios of step 1 which have a higher level of deviation from the average 
values shown in Figure 4.3 are removed. This is reasonable since step 2 is closer to the trading 
intervals and hence its uncertainty is lower than that of step 1. 
The information of DR contracts is provided in Table 4.1. Since DR contracts data is not 
available, they are assumed here. In order to reasonably model these contracts, two main concepts 
are taken into account: first, the prices considered for DR contracts are chosen in a way that they are 
close to the expected price scenarios shown in Figure 4.3. Secondly, the DR contracts are assigned 
in such a way that when the wind power producer is in its high production periods and market 
prices are low, it most likely sells a part of its energy through DR contracts. On the contrary, when 
the market price is high or there is wind power shortage, the wind power producer is assumed to be 
mostly a DR buyer in order to compensate its deviations during this time. 
Twelve fixed DR contracts are considered. The first three contracts cover the time intervals 
between 3 and 18. According to the above description, the wind power producer sells energy to the 
aggregator in these periods. The other contracts consider the remaining intervals where the wind 
power producer buys fixed DR from the DR aggregator. Six flexible DR agreements are modelled. 
The wind producer is able to sell/buy up to 20 MW flexible DR in each interval. Finally, four DR 
options are taken into account, where the penalty of not exercising each option is assumed to be 
equal to 15% of the contract cost. It is assumed that the wind power producer can sell energy 
through DR options in the first 18 intervals while it is a DR option buyer during the remaining 
periods.  
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Table ‎4.1. DR contracts details 
 Fixed DR Flexible DR DR options 
Intervals 3-48 1-48 1-48 
Price ranges ($/MWh) 24-44 20-40 30-44 
Volume ranges (MW) 
Sell up to 12 
Buy up to 15 
Sell up to 20 
Buy up to 20 
Sell up to 10 
Buy up to 20 
4.3.2.2. Numerical Results 
A) Decisions in step 1 (S1) 
The given problem is mixed-integer linear programming, which is solved using CPLEX 11.1.1 
under GAMS [131]. 
Figure 4.4 displays the expected profit versus the standard deviation for various risk levels. The 
risk-neutral wind power producer obtains around $23,000 while its profit deviation is just under 
$15,000. Increasing the risk level leads to a decrement in both values, where for the most risk-
averse producer the expected profit and the standard deviation decrease to around $21,000 and 
$10,000, respectively. In other words, the risk-neutral wind power producer obtains an almost 10% 
higher profit than the risk-averse producer with the cost of around 45% higher profit deviation. 
 
Figure  4.4. The expected profit vs. standard deviation 
Table 4.2 shows the contracted fixed DR agreements for different levels of risk. A risk-neutral 
wind power producer (𝜌 = 0) sets 8 fixed DR contracts out of 12 existing ones. This number 
declines as the producer becomes more risk averse, where for 𝜌 = 5, only 3 contracts are employed. 
This trend is reasonable as risk-averse producers avoid increasing their risk by purchasing energy 
from resources such as fixed DR and selling it to the spot market.  
Table 4.3 represents the intervals in which DR options (DRO) are contracted in step 1. All four 
DROs are signed for different risk levels. However, the number of signed DR options is reduced as 
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the risk level increases. Indeed, the declining trend follows a similar rule to the fixed DR pattern, 
discussed earlier. In addition, it can be seen that risk-averse producers are generally DR option 
sellers. They mostly sign DR options during intervals 1-18, where DR options are sold to the DR 
aggregator.  
The volume of contracted flexible DR agreements is shown in Table 4.4. The risk-neutral wind 
power producer buys 195MWh flexible DR from the aggregator, where all six given agreements are 
used. Increasing the risk level causes a lower share of flexible DR. This is obvious in ρ=0.5 and 
ρ=1, where only the first three contracts are employed and the share of flexible DR decreases to less 
than half. An interesting result is that the most risk-averse wind power producer (ρ=5) sells around 
175MWh energy to the DR aggregator. This is sensible since the risk-averse producer prefers to 
reduce the risk of the market by selling a portion of its energy through the flexible DR agreement.  
Table  4.2. Fixed DR contracts 
𝛒 Set Contracts 
0 FC2,FC4,FC5,FC6,FC7,FC9,FC11,FC12 
0.5 FC2,FC4,FC5,FC6,FC9,FC12 
1 FC2,FC4,FC5,FC6,FC12 
5 FC5,FC6,FC12 
 
Table  4.3. Signed DR options in step 1 
𝛒 DRO1 DRO2 DRO3 DRO4 
0 8,10-18,31-34,42-44 1-18,29-44,47 15-17,42-44 1,3-9,12,14-15,40-44 
0.5 7,8,10-18,32 1-18,30-34 15-17 1,3-7,12,14,15 
1 7-18 1-18,31-33 15-17 2-5,12,14,15 
5 8,10-18 1,5-16,18,33 4,8,12,14-17 5,7,9 
 
Table  4.4. Contracted flexible DR in step 1(MWh) 
𝛒 Flex1 Flex2 Flex3 Flex4 Flex5 Flex6 Total 
0 20 50 40 20 25 40 195 
0.5 20 50 2.9 0 0 0 72.9 
1 20 50 2.9 0 0 0 72.9 
5 -3.6 -11 -50 -20 -25 -65 -174.6 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the initial bids for various risk levels. It can be seen that all wind power 
producers have lower offers than their expected production in the first 18 intervals, particularly 
between intervals 5 and 18. That is, they prefer to sell a percentage of their expected power through 
DR contracts. However, for the rest of the intervals the trend is as follows. Risk taker producers, 
and ultimately the risk-neutral one (ρ=0), have higher offers than their expected production in 
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intervals after 18. This indicates that they tend to buy DR to resell it to the spot market. However, as 
the wind power producer becomes more risk averse, this tendency decreases. It can be seen that for 
these producers the bid is almost equal to or even lower than the wind power expectation. This is 
correct since risk-averse producers refuse to gain more risk by buying DR and selling it to the spot 
market as a volatile resource. 
 
Figure  4.5. The initial offer curves of step 1 
 
B) Decisions in step 2 (S2) 
This section delivers the results of step 2 for the risk-neutral (ρ = 0) and the most risk-averse 
(ρ = 5) wind power producers. 
Figure 4.6 compares the initial (step 1) and final (step 2) offer curves for the risk-neutral wind 
power producer (ρ = 0). The initial offer curve is modified in almost all intervals in step 2. In the 
final offer curve, more power is sold during the first intervals but the share of the following periods 
decreases. This indeed shows how the risk-neutral producer corrects its initial offers during the real 
time when more accurate power and spot price expectations are available. It is also obvious that 
while the final offer is almost the same as the expected wind power in the first 18 intervals, it is 
higher in the remaining intervals. Indeed, the risk-neutral producer aims to increase its profit though 
buying DR and selling it to the market in the last intervals.  
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Figure  4.6. The initial offer curve (S1) vs. the final offer curve (S2)- 𝜌=0 
The distribution of flexible DR agreements employed by the risk-neutral wind power producer in 
steps 1 and 2 is provided in Figure 4.7. Each sub-figure shows the outcome of one flexible DR 
agreement. Note that X-axis represents the intervals during which each flexible DR agreement is 
valid. The wind power producer changes the usage configurations of flexible DR contracts 1, 2, 3 
and 6 in step 2. Significant modifications are made in contract 2, where the producer applies the 
majority of the contracted volume during intervals 13 and 14. Indeed, it can clearly be seen that 
changes in intervals 13 and 14 have significant impacts on the final offer shown in Figure 4.6. This 
is also obvious for interval 23. Note that the decisions on contracts 4 and 5 remain unchanged as 
step 1. 
 
Figure  4.7. The usage distribution of flexible DR in step 1 and 2- 𝜌=0 
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Figure 4.8 provides the intervals in which the signed DR options in step 1 are not exercised in 
the final offer. As can be seen, most of the DR options (DRO) are not exercised during the last 
intervals. This is more obvious during intervals 42-44, where all four given DRO signed in step 1 
are not applied during the final offer. This means that although these DRO agreements are signed in 
step 1, the wind power producer refuses to use them when the real-time decisions are made. This 
correction action indeed coincides with the falling trend of the final offer curve during periods 37-
48 (See Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure  4.8. DR options not exercised in step 2- 𝜌=0 
The outcomes of the most risk-averse wind power producer are delivered in Figures 4.9 and 
4.10. The initial and final offers are depicted in Figure 4.9. Similar to the risk-neutral wind power 
producer, the risk-averse producer makes corrective actions in such a way to increase its offer in the 
first intervals while reducing it in the last periods. More specifically, the final offer is higher than 
the initial one during intervals 15 to 19. On the other hand, it can be seen that for intervals 20 to 48 
the wind power producer has a lower offer in step 2. Note that the final offer is lower than the 
expected wind power production in the first 18 intervals (due to selling a portion of energy to the 
DR aggregator), while it is almost the same as that in the rest of the intervals. Note also that the 
initial and final offer trends of the risk-averse wind power producer are not much different to the 
case of the risk-neutral one. This actually indicates how the conservative view of the risk-averse 
wind power producer affects its initial decisions in step 1.  
Figure 4.10 represents the modifications of flexible DR usage in step 2 in comparison to that of 
the initial decisions. The wind power producer modifies its initial decisions of all flexible DR 
agreements. This is more obvious in contracts 3 and 4. These modifications are reflected in the final 
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offer (Figure 4.9), where for instance significant drops in intervals 20-24 shown in the final offer 
coincide with the higher sale of the wind power producer through flexible DR 4.  
Finally note that the risk-averse wind power producer finds all signed DR options in step 1 
beneficial and hence exercises them in its final offer. 
 
 
Figure  4.9. The initial offer curve (S1) vs. the final offer curve (S2)- 𝜌=5 
 
 
Figure  4.10. The usage distribution of flexible DR in step 1 and 2- 𝜌=5 
 
In the next section of this chapter, the Nordic market is studied and the proposed wind offering 
strategy for this market is delivered.  
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4.4. The proposed offering strategy for the Nordic Market 
4.4.1. The Proposed Trading Plan 
The proposed offering plan is modified to be applicable to the Nordic market, which is a well-
established day-ahead market. This market involves three floors, called the spot market, Elbas as an 
adjustment market and the regulating market [55]. Elbas is not very active [55] and hence it is not 
modelled here. Therefore, the wind power offering strategy in the Nordic market consists of two 
steps. In the first step the energy traded in the spot (day-ahead) market is decided while in the 
second step the production deviation is compensated in the regulating (balancing) market. The 
proposed offering strategy is illustrated in Figure 4.11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4.11. The proposed wind power offering strategy 
Step 1 
Day D-1 
Day-ahead offers 
Fixed DR contracts 
DR options signs 
Flexible DR agreements 
12pm 
Day D 
Step 2 (Day D) 
Imbalance settlement 
DR options exercise status 
Flexible DR usage pattern 
Period 1 Period 2 
Final 
Period 
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The spot market closes at 12:00pm the preceding day of the energy delivery. Then, offers and 
bids from players are stacked and the market price is derived. The revenue obtained from the day-
ahead (spot) market is formulated in (4.24). 
     ( , )  . , .DA DADAR t w P t t w d t  (4.24) 
The regulating (balancing) market is used to balance between production and consumption. The 
balancing market can be either “short” or “long”. In the short state, there is a lack of energy while 
the long market has excess production [69]. Note that long and short markets are respectively 
known as positive and negative system imbalances in most studies [56], and thereafter we use these 
terms in this chapter. In positive systems, regulation down is activated and generators with excess 
(deficit) generation are paid (charged) at a positive price 𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑝𝑜𝑠 (negative price 𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑛𝑒𝑔). On the 
other hand, in negative system imbalances, regulation up is applied and payments (charges) for 
excess (deficit) generation are settled at 𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑝𝑜𝑠 (𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑛𝑒𝑔). For each regulation type, the 
relationships of 𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑝𝑜𝑠 and 𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑛𝑒𝑔 with the day-ahead market price (𝜆𝐷𝐴) are given in [56] as 
follows. 
 
[𝜆
𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑝𝑜𝑠 ≤ 𝜆𝐷𝐴 𝜆𝐷𝐴
𝜆𝐷𝐴 𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑛𝑒𝑔 ≥ 𝜆𝐷𝐴
] 
An estimation of imbalance payments and charges for the Nordic market is provided in [70]. 
, ( , ) 0.9 ,5 ( )imb pos DAt w t w    (4.25) 
, ( , ) 1.0 ,5 ( )imb neg DAt w t w    (4.26) 
This work further extends the given model in such a way that the uncertainty of the regulating 
market is taken into account: 
, ( , ) ( , )( ).imb pos pos DAS wwt w t   (4.27) 
, ( , ) ( , )( ).imb neg neg DAS wwt w t   (4.28) 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑠(𝑤) ≤ 1 and 𝑆𝑛𝑒𝑔(𝑤) ≥ 1 are the scenario-based factors for positive and negative 
imbalance prices, respectively. Depending on whether the wind power producer has excess or 
deficit production in the balancing market, it earns revenue or incurs cost. The revenue (payment) 
or cost (charge) of the balancing market (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑚𝑏(𝑡, 𝑤)) is then formulated below [56]. 
       
       
Im ( , )  , . , . , .
, . , . , .
pos pos DA
neg neg DA
bRC t w P t w S t w t w d t
P t w S t w t w d t




 (4.29) 
𝝀𝒊𝒎𝒃,𝒑𝒐𝒔                       𝝀𝒊𝒎𝒃,𝒏𝒆𝒈 
Down 
Up 
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To include DR in the proposed wind offering strategy for the Nordic market, fixed DR contracts, 
flexible DR agreements and DR options are taken into account. While fixed DR and flexible DR 
contracts are formulated in a similar way as those used for the Australian NEM, DR options here 
are categorized as follows. 
Similar to financial options, two DR options are introduced. Type one is called European DR 
options (EDRO), which is set in a way that the DR agreement is exercised at the expiration time. 
The expiration time is defined when the contract is arranged. In type 2 however, the DR option can 
be exercised at any time before the expiration time (American DR option).  
DR options in each step are formulated as follows. 
Step 1: this step indicates whether the DR option is signed or not. This is shown by the binary 
variable 𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑜(𝑡) in the cost functions of European DR Option 𝑒𝑜 in (4.30) and 𝑆𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑜(𝑡) in 
American DR option 𝑎𝑜 in (4.31).  
         , 1 . . . , 1,2,...EDRO Seo eo eo eeo oC P t t Sgn t d t eot N    
(4.30) 
 
         , 1 . . . , 1,2,...ADRO Sao ao ao aao oC P t t Sgn t d t aot N    
(4.31) 
 
Subscript 𝑒𝑜 and 𝑎𝑜 denotes European and American DR options, respectively. 
Step 2: this step belongs to the delivery time in which it is decided whether the signed DR option 
in step 1 is exercised in step 2 or not. The exercising status of the DR option is shown by a binary 
variable, where 1 indicates that the contract is applied and zero means that the wind power producer 
disregards the signed DR option. Indeed this binary variable is shown by 𝑣𝑒𝑜(𝑡) in EDRO (4.32) 
and 𝑣𝑎𝑜(𝑡) in ADRO (4.33). 
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Note that American DR options can be exercised at any time before the expiration time. This 
constraint is provided in (4.34). This expression shows the period horizon (𝑡 ∈ 𝑇𝑎𝑜) in which the 
American DR option 𝑎𝑜 can be exercised. 
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4.4.1.1. Step 1: Day-Ahead Clearing 
This step clears on the day-ahead market. The wind power producer decides on day-ahead offers 
for the entire next day. In addition, the volume of fixed DR contracts is negotiated. Furthermore, the 
wind power producer determines the periods in which European DR options are signed. Proper 
American DR options are also signed and the time horizon in which each one can be exercised is 
determined. Finally, the required flexible DR agreements are appointed.  
The above decisions are made while wind power production as well as day-ahead and imbalance 
prices (charges/payments) are uncertain. A stochastic profit function is formulated in which the 
uncertain characteristics of these parameters are taken into account using a set of scenarios. In 
addition, the risk faced with this uncertainty is modelled through CVaR as an appropriate risk 
measure.  
The stochastic profit function is given in (4.35). This function is calculated for the whole day 
(𝑡 → 1: 𝐹𝑃). It consists of the following terms. The expected revenue obtained from selling energy 
through the day-ahead market, the expected revenue/cost of the balancing market, the costs of all 
DR contracts and the weighted CVaR.  
The profit function is subject to the following constraints. The size of fixed DR and flexible DR 
contracts are enforced by (4.36) and (4.37), respectively. The positive and negative imbalance 
offers are limited by (4.38) and (4.39), respectively. The power balance is given in (4.40). In this 
equation, 𝑃𝐼𝑚𝑏(𝑡, 𝑤) and 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝑅(𝑡) represents the imbalance power and total DR volume, where they 
are represented in (4.41) and (4.42), respectively. Finally, expressions (4.43) and (4.44) represent 
CVaR constraints [56], which are derived to linearize this risk measure. Note that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑤) in 
(4.43) indicates the obtained profit in scenario 𝑤 (See Eq. (4.45)). 
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subject to: 
 
      ,   ,,, ,
DR MIN DR DR MAX
f bf b f b
P t P t P t   (4.36) 
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      ,   ,DR MIN DR DR MAXflexflex flexP t P t P t   (4.37) 
 0 , ( , ) ( )pos W TDRP t w P t w P t    (4.38) 
 0 , ( )InstW TDne RgP t w P P t    (4.39) 
     ,  (, )DA Imb W TDRP t P t w P P tt w    (4.40) 
     , , ,Imb pos negP t w P t w P t w   (4.41) 
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 (4.45) 
4.4.1.2. Step 2: Regulating (Balancing) Market 
Step 2 deals with balancing settlements and final DR approvals. This step runs a successive 
approach, which is repeated until all periods are covered. For each period a profit function is 
formulated through which the following decisions are made. The wind power producer decides on 
its energy trading in the balancing market for the current period. At the same time the producer 
determines its optimal share of DR agreements for the relevant period. Indeed, each DR agreement 
that has been set in the previous step is finalized here. The wind power producer decides on the 
optimal usage of flexible DR. The constraint used here is that the total flexible DR usage should not 
exceed the agreed volume in step 1. Furthermore, the wind power producer decides on exercising 
the signed DR options in step 1. In this way, the producer considers that European DR options are 
exercised only at the expiration time while American DR options can be used at any time before the 
deadline. Note that the volume of the contracted fixed DR is predetermined in step 1 and cannot be 
changed in this step. 
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The above decisions are taken while the day-ahead awards (offers) are known. In addition, the 
imbalance price and wind power production for the current period are known, but they are still 
uncertain for the following periods.  
The profit function which runs for each period is shown in (4.46). It consists of three terms: the 
profit obtained from the current period (𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃) (See Eq. (4.47)), the expected profit over the 
following intervals until the final period (𝑡 → (𝐶𝑃 + 1): 𝐹𝑃) (See Eq. (4.48)) and CVaR. Note that 
the main terms (4.47) and (4.48) involve the (expected) revenue/cost of the balancing market as 
well as the costs of DR agreements.  
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(4.48) 
 
The profit function is subject to constraints below. 
 Constraints (4.37)-(4.45). Note that in these constraints the day-ahead awards are known. 
In addition, only those DR agreements set in step 1 are taken into account here. 
 Flexible DR energy constraint: 
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 American DR option constraint (4.34).  
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4.4.2. Case Study 
4.4.2.1. Data Preparation and Assumptions 
The proposed plan is evaluated on a realistic case of the Nordic market. Hourly market prices are 
available [137]. Hence, each period in this section is considered as one hour.  
Price scenarios are characterized using ARIMA models. A time series of the spot prices of the 
Nordic market, spanning January 2012 is used to generate price scenarios [137]. Overall, twenty 
day-ahead price scenarios are generated in step 1. In addition, four positive and negative imbalance 
factors are randomly generated. For positive factors, scenarios range between 0.95 and 1 (0.95 ≤
𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑠(𝑤) ≤ 1), while for negative factors they are between 1 and 1.05 (1 ≤ 𝑆𝑛𝑒𝑔(𝑤) ≤ 1.05). 
The wind power producer Hemmet, located in Denmark, is chosen [138]. The installed capacity 
of this farm is 27MW (Vestas Turbines). Wind speed scenarios are generated using the ARMA 
model, where the available data in 2012 is used as input time series. Fourteen wind speed scenarios 
are generated in step 1. These scenarios are then transformed to power scenarios using the Vestas 
Wind curve [136].  
Overall, the total number of generated scenarios is 1120, which is calculated by the product of 
the numbers for day-ahead prices (20 scenarios), imbalance charges/payments (4 scenario-based 
factors) and wind power production (14 scenarios).  
Figure 4.12 shows the expected day-ahead price and wind power production. The day-ahead 
price involves two peak periods, just before noon and during the evening. Wind power peaks 
however occur around midnight and the afternoon. 
 
Figure  4.12. Average wind power and spot price 
In step 2, the day-ahead prices are known. However, wind power production and imbalance 
prices are still unknown. Wind power scenarios of step 2 are obtained through reducing the number 
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of scenarios generated in step 1 to 7 scenarios. Indeed, those scenarios having higher deviations 
from the expected wind power depicted in Figure 4.12 are removed. This is reasonable as the wind 
uncertainty in step 2 is lower than that of step 1. Imbalance price scenarios in step 2 are considered 
the same as the scenarios in step 1. 
DR information is as follows. Six fixed DR agreements are considered. The first contract covers 
1am to 5am, where the wind power producer sells energy to the DR aggregator. The producer buys 
fixed DR in the next two contracts (6am-12pm). In fixed DR contract 4, the producer again sells 
energy to the DR aggregator (1pm-4pm). In the remaining contracts the wind power producer is a 
fixed DR buyer. Six flexible DR agreements are also modelled. The time horizon for each contract 
is the same as fixed DR contracts. It is assumed that the wind power producer is able to sell/buy up 
to 8 MWh flexible DR in each period. Finally, two American and two European DR options are 
used, where the wind power producer buys these options from the aggregator. The periods in which 
these options are used are 9am-12pm and 5pm-8pm. The maximum available DR and DR price 
ranges are provided in Table 4.5.  
Table  4.5. DR contracts details 
 Fixed DR Flexible DR European DR options American DR options 
Energy 
(MWh) 
Buy up to 10 
Sell up to 5 
Buy/sell up to 8 Buy up to 6 Buy up to 2 
price range 
($/MWh) 
41-58 44-59 55-62 62-63 
 
4.4.2.2. Numerical Results and Discussions 
A) Decisions in step 1  
The given problem is mixed-integer linear programming, which is solved for various risk levels 
using CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [131]. 
The expected profit vs. the standard deviation is displayed in Figure 4.13. It is obvious that while 
the risk-neutral wind power producer gains more profit with the cost of a higher profit deviation, 
risk-averse producers prefer a lower profit deviation and consequently obtain a lower profit.  
Figure 4.14 provides day-ahead offers for various risk levels. The risk-neutral wind power 
producer sells as much as possible in the day-ahead market. This sale however decreases as the risk 
level grows. That is, risk-averse producers refuse to sell the majority of their energy in the day-
ahead market, where they prefer to sell more energy in the balancing market. This is more obvious 
for 𝜌=1, where the wind power producer’s sale in the day ahead market is almost zero in most 
periods. In addition, it can be seen that the offer patterns are very similar in all risk levels. They 
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follow the peak periods of wind production and day-ahead prices. More specifically, the risk-neutral 
producer has more noticeable offers during market price peaks. 
 
Figure  4.13. The expected profit vs. the standard deviation  
 
 
Figure  4.14. The offers in the day-ahead market  
Table 4.6 shows the contracted fixed DR agreements for different levels of the risk. The risk-
neutral wind power producer (𝜌 = 0) sets fixed DR contracts (FC) 2 to 6. However, for the risk 
level of 0.2 and higher, the wind power producer sets FC 2 and FC 4 only. This declining trend is 
reasonable since the producer is a DR buyer in FC 5 and FC 6, and therefore, as the risk level 
increases, it avoids taking more risk by buying energy from these contracts and selling it to the 
volatile day-ahead market.  
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Table 4.7 represents the periods in which European DR Options (EDRO) are signed in step 1. 
The risk-neutral wind power producer uses both EDRO 1 and 2 in all periods. However, risk-averse 
producers refuse to sign EDROs in many periods, where ultimately the most risk-averse producer 
(𝜌 = 1) only signs EDRO 2 at 6pm. With regards to American DR options (ADRO), the results 
indicate that both ADRO 1 and 2 are signed in this step. 
The volume of flexible DR agreements is illustrated in Table 4.8. Results show that all 
agreements are used by 𝜌 = 0.4. However, for higher risk levels, this share decreases where for 
𝜌 = 1, flexible DR 2 is not applied. This decrement indeed follows the same rule as fixed DR and 
DR options. 
Table  4.6. Fixed DR contracts 
𝜌 Set Contracts 
0 FC2,FC4,FC5,FC6 
0.2 FC2,FC4 
0.4 FC2,FC4 
0.7 FC2,FC4 
1 FC2,FC4 
 
Table  4.7. Signed European DR options in step 1 
𝜌 EDRO1 EDRO2 
0 9am-12pm 6pm-8pm 
0.2 9am-12pm 6pm 
0.4 9am 6pm 
0.7 - 6pm 
1 - 6pm 
 
Table  4.8. Contracted flexible DR in step 1(MWh) 
𝜌 Flex1 Flex2 Flex3 Flex
4 
Flex5 Flex6 
0 2.5 3 8 6 8 2 
0.2 2.5 3 8 6 8 2 
0.4 2.5 3 8 6 8 2 
0.7 2.5 3 8 4.8 8 2 
1 2.5 0 8 6 8 2 
 
B) Decisions in step 2  
This section delivers the results of step 2 for the risk-neutral (𝜌 = 0) and the risk-averse (𝜌 = 1) 
wind producers. 
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 depict the offers in the balancing market for 𝜌 = 0 and 𝜌 = 1, 
respectively. The sale by the risk-neutral wind power producer is very low in most periods. There 
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are even some periods in which the producer buys energy from the balancing market. This trend is 
opposite for the risk-averse producer, where a high amount of power is sold in each period. This 
outcome confirms the tendency obtained in the day-ahead market shown in Figure 4.14. That is, 
while the risk-neutral wind power producer is willing to sell more energy in the day-ahead market, 
the risk-averse producer prefers low risks and consequently submits more energy to the balancing 
market, where more precise predictions of power production as well as real-time prices are 
available.   
 
Figure  4.15. Imbalance power for 𝝆 = 𝟎 
 
 
Figure  4.16. Imbalance power for 𝝆 = 𝟏 
Figure 4.17 provides the total sold power for both wind power producers. The volume is 
identical for almost all periods. However, it can be seen that the risk-neutral wind power producer 
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has a higher sale share during the peak periods of the price and wind power production (See Figure 
4.12 and Figure 4.17), where this is more evident at 9am, 3pm and 5-10pm. This result indicates 
that risk-neutral wind power producers have a higher tendency to buy DR than do risk-averse 
producers. 
DR outcomes are as follows. All signed European DR in the first step are exercised in step 2 by 
both risk-neutral and risk-averse wind power producers. This is also the result for American DR 
options. Note that in this step, ADRO 1 and 2 are exercised at 9am and 6pm, respectively. This 
coincides with peak price periods shown in Figure 4.12. 
The usage distributions of all flexible DR agreements, except flexible DR 4, are the same as step 
1 for both risk levels. The distributions of flexible DR 4 (Flex4) in steps 1 and 2 for the risk-neutral 
and the risk-averse wind power producers are delivered in Figures 4.18 and 4.19, respectively. In 
both cases, the wind power producer changes the usage configurations in step 2. It can be seen that 
in this step the whole flexible DR 4 is used in one period. This is at 3pm for 𝜌 = 0 and 1pm for 
𝜌 = 1. These results confirm a significant difference in sale shares of the risk-neutral and risk-
averse wind power producers at relevant hours in Figure 4.17. It can be seen that while the risk-
neutral producer has a much higher sale at 3pm, this happens at 1pm for the risk-averse producer. 
 
Figure  4.17. Total power sold in the market for 𝝆 = 𝟎 and 𝝆 = 𝟏 
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Figure  4.18. The usage distribution of flexible DR 4 in step 1 and 2- 𝝆 = 𝟎 
 
 
Figure  4.19. The usage distribution of flexible DR 4 in step 1 and 2- 𝝆 = 𝟏 
 
 
4.5. Summary 
This chapter presents a new wind offering plan which is adjusted to two different types of 
electricity markets, i.e. the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) and the Nordic market. In 
both plans, a wind power producer is allowed to employ DR to alleviate its production uncertainty 
as well as market price variations. To include DR, the proposed DR framework in Chapter 3 is used 
in which the wind power producer can set various DR agreements, called fixed DR, flexible DR, 
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DR options (in case of the Nordic market, American DR options and European DR options) with 
DR aggregators.  
 
The main findings are as follows.  
a. The proposed two-step plans in both markets allow wind power producers to better place 
their offers in the market. In the Australian NEM, while the decisions made on the 
preceding day are taken under uncertainty, step two allows the producer to take corrective 
actions once uncertain parameters are known. For the Nordic market, risk-neutral and risk-
averse producers can determine the level of their participation in the day-ahead and 
balancing markets. While risk-neutral wind power producers prefer to mostly sell in the 
day-ahead market, risk-averse producers have a higher share in the balancing market.  
b. In the proposed plan, a wind power producer can arrange various DR contracts in step 1 
and then manage them in step 2 to better cope with its uncertainty. In this way, they use 
fixed DR contracts to trade a certain amount of DR. In addition, they benefit from the 
flexibility of flexible DR contracts, which are manageable in real time. Furthermore, DR 
options give them a choice to set the contract and wait until real time for the decision on 
exercising these contracts. 
 
The next chapter will address the behaviour of a DR aggregator in response to energy offering by 
wind power producers. This is modelled in such a way that a wind power producer has to compete 
with other DR purchasers to obtain DR from the DR aggregator. 
 
4.6. Nomenclature 
A) Indices 
b  Index showing fixed DR’s blocks  
f  Index representing fixed DR contracts 
flex  Index representing flexible DR agreements 
ao  Index representing American DR option 
eo  Index representing European DR option 
o  Index representing DR options 
s  Index representing scenarios in step 2 
t  Index representing the time interval 
w  Index representing scenarios in step 1 
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B) Parameters 
 d t  Duration of time interval 𝑡 
FI  Final interval in DR options 
 penaof t  Penalty of not exercising American DR option 𝑎𝑜 
 peneof t  Penalty of not exercising European DR option 𝑒𝑜 
 penof t  Penalty of not exercising DR option 𝑜 
  ,,
DR MAX
f b
P t  Maximum power of fixed DR 𝑓, block 𝑏 
  ,,
DR MIN
f b
P t  Minimum power of fixed DR 𝑓, block 𝑏 
  ,DR MAXflexP t  Maximum power of flexible DR 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 
  ,DR MINflexP t  Minimum power of flexible DR 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 
 aoP t  Power of American DR option 𝑎𝑜 
 eoP t  Power of European DR option 𝑒𝑜 
 oP t  Power of DR option 𝑜 
 , 1 ,w sP t w  Wind power production scenario 𝑤 in step 1 
 , 2 ,w sP t s  Wind power production scenario 𝑠 in step 2 
 ,WP t w  Wind power production scenario 𝑤 for the Nordic market case 
InstWP  Installed wind power capacity for the Nordic market case 
 ,posS t w  scenario-based factors of positive imbalance prices 
 ,negS t w  scenario-based factors of negative imbalance prices 
  Risk level 
  Confidence level (Equal to 0.95) 
 ,DA t w  Day-ahead market price scenario 𝑤 
 ao t  Price of American DR option 𝑎𝑜 
 eo t  Price of European DR option 𝑒𝑜 
 ,
DR
f b t  Price of fixed DR 𝑓, block 𝑏 
 Chapter 4. Employing Demand Response by Wind Power Producers 
 
70 
 
 DRflex t  Price of flexible DR 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 
 , 1 ,s s t w  Spot price scenario 𝑤 in step 1 
 , 2 ,s s t s  Spot price scenario 𝑠 in step 2 
 o t  Price of DR option 𝑜 
 w  Probability of scenario 𝑤 in step 1 (  
1
1
wN
w
w

 ) 
 s  Probability of scenario 𝑠 in step 2 (  
1
1
sN
s
s

 ) 
C) Variables 
, 1Agrd s
flex
E  Contracted energy volume of flexible DR 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 in step 1 
 DAP t  Day-ahead wind power cleared in the Nordic market  
  ,
DR
f bP t  Power of fixed DR 𝑓, block 𝑏  
  , 1DR sflexP t  Power of flexible DR 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 in step 1 
  , 2DR sflexP t  Power of flexible DR 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 in step 2 
 ,posP t w  Positive imbalance wind power 
 ,negP t w  Negative imbalance wind power 
 , 1 ,s sP t w  Initial power offered in the NEM market  
 , 2 ,s sP t s  Final power offered in the NEM market  
 TDRP t  Total DR outcome 
 aoSgn t  Binary variable indicating whether American DR option 𝑎𝑜 is signed or not  
 eoSgn t  Binary variable indicating whether European DR option 𝑒𝑜 is signed or not  
 oSgn t  Binary variable indicating whether DR option 𝑜 is signed or not  
 aov t  Binary variable indicating whether American DR option 𝑎𝑜 is exercised or not  
 eov t  Binary variable indicating whether European DR option 𝑒𝑜 is exercised or not  
 ov t  Binary variable indicating whether DR option 𝑜 is exercised or not  
 , ( )w , ( )s  Auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR  
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D) Numbers and Sets 
aoN  Number of American DR option 
eoN  Number of European DR option 
BDRN  Number of blocks of fixed DR contracts 
FDRN  Number of fixed DR contracts 
flexN  Number of flexible DR agreements 
oN  Number of DR options 
wN  Number of scenarios in step 1 
sN  Number of scenarios in step 2 
aoT  Set of time period for American DR option 
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  Chapter 5
Modelling Demand Response Aggregator 
Behaviour in Wind Power Offering 
Strategy 
5.1. Introduction1 
In Chapter 4, new wind offering strategies were proposed and the effectiveness of the application 
of demand response (DR) by wind power producers was illustrated.   
This chapter assesses the behaviour of a DR aggregator in response to wind power offering 
strategies. An offering strategy is proposed as follows. A wind power producer decides its offer in 
the day-ahead market while setting DR contracts with a DR aggregator. The DR aggregator 
behaviour is modelled through a revenue maximization function in which the aggregator determines 
its DR trading shares with three main resources: the wind power producer in our study, other market 
players interested in DR, and the day-ahead market. A bilevel problem is formulated in which the 
upper-level decision maker (leader) is the wind power producer while the lower-level problem is 
decided by the DR aggregator (follower). The overall problem is then transformed into a single-
level mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) by replacing the lower-level 
problem with its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions [139]. In addition, the 
nonlinearities of the derived MPEC are linearized using the strong duality theorem [139] and the 
technique provided in [140]. A case study of the Nordic market is used to evaluate the validity of 
the proposed offering strategy. Uncertainties in each level are characterized using a set of finite 
scenarios. In addition, the risk is carried out using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR).  
                                                          
1
 This chapter covers the following reference: 
3. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, Mehdi Eghbal, “Modelling Demand Response Aggregator Behavior in Wind 
Power Offering Strategies”, Applied Energy, Volume 133, 15 November 2014, Pages 347–355. 
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 addresses the proposed wind offering 
strategy, where the mathematical formulation of the proposed bilevel problem is described. Then 
the equivalent linear formulation is presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides a case study with 
numerical results. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. Finally, indices, constants and variables are 
described in section 5.6. 
5.2. The Proposed Wind Offering Strategy 
5.2.1. Framework 
The following assumptions are made in the proposed strategy. First, it is assumed that the wind 
power producer makes offers in the day-ahead market while clearing imbalances in the balancing 
(regulating) market. Additionally, the given wind power producer is treated as similar to 
conventional power plants [61], where it is responsible for its bidding strategy and power 
production variation. Moreover, similar to [70], this work determines the optimal offering quantities 
instead of presenting bidding curves which is investigated in [56]. A further assumption is that 
modelling technical DR programs through which a DR aggregator obtains DR from customers is 
not the focus of this study. In addition, for the sake of simplicity this chapter only uses fixed DR as 
a bilateral contract between the wind power producer and the DR aggregator. Finally, note that the 
DR flow can be either from the aggregator to players willing to trade DR or in the opposite 
direction. As a result, the DR aggregator maximizes its revenue when it is a DR seller and 
minimizes its cost when buying energy through DR contracts. 
The proposed bilevel wind offering strategy is illustrated in Figure 5.1. It is considered that the 
DR aggregator can trade DR with the wind power producer (WPP), other competitors that are 
willing to trade DR, and the day-ahead market. While parameters in each level are shown by dash 
line boxes and arrows, decision variables are represented using solid line boxes and arrows. The 
upper-level problem belongs to the wind power producer (WPP), where it aims to maximize its 
profit subject to the given constraints as well as the DR volume. Indeed, the obtained DR volume is 
determined by the DR aggregator in the lower-level problem, where it depends on the price that the 
wind power producer offers to the aggregator. Thus, the links between the upper-level and lower-
level problems are the DR price offered by the wind power producer and consequently, the DR 
share that the aggregator provides to the wind power producer (double lines in Figure 5.1). 
The procedure carried out in this strategy is as follows. The wind power producer determines its 
DR price while taking into account the DR prices offered by other competitors as well as the day-
ahead (DA) market price (refer to the upper-level problem, top right-hand side). Accordingly, the 
DR aggregator decides the share of each resource in the lower-level problem. Consequently, given 
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the DR share obtained by the wind power producer, the producer makes its offer in the day-ahead 
and balancing markets. To this end, besides the price forecasts of DA and Balancing (Bal.) markets, 
the level of risk taken by the producer is needed to be taken into account (refer to the upper-level 
problem, bottom left-hand side). That is, depending on how risk averse the producer is, the energy 
portion to be sold in each market is determined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5.1. The proposed bilevel wind offering strategy 
 
 
WPP 
DA market price 
Competitors’ prices 
Competitors’ price 
Lower-Level Problem 
DA market price 
DR Aggregator 
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DA wind power offers 
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Upper-Level Problem 
DR price by WPP 
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Note that the above decisions are made while the problem is associated with the uncertainty of 
the following parameters: day-ahead market prices, balancing market prices, wind power 
production and the DR price offered by other competitors. These uncertain parameters are 
represented using finite scenarios. Two distinct sets of scenarios are defined in this chapter as 
follows.  
Each upper-level scenario is represented by scenario 𝑤, which comprises the vectors of day-
ahead price (λDA(t,w)), balancing price (𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏(𝑡, 𝑤)) and wind power production 𝑃𝑊(𝑡, 𝑤). 
  , ,.. ( , , ( , ))i WDA mbscenario w t wt w P t w   (5.1) 
The probability of each scenario occurrence equals 𝜋(𝑤), where ∑ 𝜋(𝑤) = 1
𝑁𝑤
𝑤=1 . 
Each lower-level scenario is shown by scenario 𝑠, which involves a vector of other competitors’ 
prices (𝜆𝑐(𝑡, 𝑠)) as well as a day-ahead market price vector (𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡, 𝑠)). 
    . , ,. ,c DAscenario s t s t s   (5.2) 
Similar to the upper-level problem, the probability of each scenario is 𝜋(𝑠), where ∑ 𝜋(𝑠) =
𝑁𝑠
𝑠=1
1. 
5.2.2. Market Model 
The proposed offering plan is applied to the Nordic market.  
The day-ahead (spot) market closes at 12:00pm the preceding day of the energy delivery. Then, 
offers and bids from players are stacked and the day-ahead price is derived. The revenue obtained 
from the day-ahead market is formulated in (5.3). 
     ( , )  . , .DA DADAR t w P t t w d t  (5.3) 
The balancing (regulating) market is used to balance between production and consumption, 
where regulation up or down is usually activated. Thus, imbalance price 𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏(𝑡, 𝑤) is represented 
by a pair of positive and negative imbalance prices, i.e. (𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑝𝑜𝑠(𝑡, 𝑤), 𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑛𝑒𝑔(𝑡, 𝑤)). The 
relationship between imbalance prices (positive (𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑝𝑜𝑠) and negative (𝜆𝑖𝑚𝑏,𝑛𝑒𝑔)) and the day-
ahead price (𝜆𝐷𝐴) during upward and downward regulation is given as follows [56]. 
 
 
[λ
imb,pos ≤ λDA λDA
λDA λimb,neg ≥ λDA
] 
(5.4) 
 
𝝀𝒊𝒎𝒃,𝒑𝒐𝒔                       𝝀𝒊𝒎𝒃,𝒏𝒆𝒈 
Down 
Up 
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An estimation of positive and negative imbalance prices for the Nordic market is provided in 
[70]. 
, ( , ) 0.9 ,5 ( )imb pos DAt w t w    (5.5) 
, ( , ) 1.0 ,5 ( )imb neg DAt w t w    (5.6) 
As discussed in Chapter 4, we further extend the given model in a way that the uncertainty of the 
balancing market is taken into account: 
, ( , ) ( , )( , ).imb pos pos DAS t wt w t w   (5.7) 
, ( , ) ( , )( , ).imb neg neg DAS t wt w t w   (5.8) 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑠(𝑡, 𝑤) ≤ 1 and 𝑆𝑛𝑒𝑔(𝑡, 𝑤) ≥ 1 are the scenario-based factors of positive and negative 
imbalance prices respectively. The revenue/cost of the balancing market is then formulated below 
[56]. 
       
       
Im/ ( , )  , . , . , .
, . , . , .
pos pos DA
neg neg DA
bR C t w P t w S t w t w d t
P t w S t w t w d t




 (5.9) 
5.2.3. Objective Function 
The bilevel problem is formulated as follows: 
  Im
1 1 1 1
 
1
. ( , ) / ( , ) (
...
). ( ) . ( ). ( )
1
w wN NT TDA b DR DR
w t t w
Maximize PF
w R t w R C t w P t t w w     
   

 
            
 
(5.10) 
Subject to  
 0 , ( , ) ( )W Ro Dp sP t w P t w P t    (5.11) 
 0 , ( )InstW Dneg RP t w P P t    (5.12) 
     ,  (, )DA Imb W DRP t P t w P P tt w    (5.13) 
     , , ,Imb pos negP t w P t w P t w   (5.14) 
Profit( ) ( ) 0; 1,..., ww w w N        (5.15) 
( ) 0; 1,..., ww w N     (5.16) 
Im
1 1
Profit( ) ( , ) / ( , ) ( ). ( )
T T
DA b DR DR
t t
w R t w R C t w P t t
 
    
 
 (5.17) 
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,
1
( ) ( ). ( ). ( , )
sNDR DR T w
s
P t C t s sp t s

   (5.18) 
, max, max,( ) ( ). ( ) ( ). ( )DR T s s b bC t P t b t P t b t   (5.19) 
where,  
( , ) arg maximize.. ...wsp t s

 

  
   ,
1 1
( ). ( ). ( , ). ( , ). ( , )( ) ., ,
TCs ND
N
DR T w DA DA c c
s
R
c
s C t sp t s sp tt s sp ts sst t   



 

 (5.20) 
1
...............( , ) ( , .....) ( , ) { ( ) 1 ( ) 1}1 . ). ,: (
TCw DA s
N
c
c bsp t s sp t s sp t s if b t o tb t sr 

      (5.21) 
.. .. ...( , , ( , ) ( , ), ( ,), ( , ) ( , ) 0 , , : ),w DA cw DA csp t s sp t s sp t s t s t s t s t sc     



 (5.22) 
The upper level problem indicates the profit maximization of the wind power producer (Eq. 
(5.10)). This problem involves the expected revenue obtained from the day-ahead market, the 
expected revenue/cost of the balancing market, the cost of DR and the risk measure. 𝛽 is the 
confidence level, which is 0.95. Note that the risk level (𝜌 =[0-∞)) represents a trade-off between 
the expected profit and the risk.  
The profit function is subject to the following constraints. Positive and negative imbalance offers 
are limited by (5.11) and (5.12), respectively. The power balance is given in (5.13). In this equation, 
𝑃𝐼𝑚𝑏(𝑡, 𝑤) is the power traded in the balancing market, which is represented in (5.14). Expressions 
(5.15) and (5.16) represent conditional value at risk (CVaR) constraints [56] which are derived to 
linearize this risk measure. Note that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑤) in (5.17) indicates the obtained profit in scenario 
𝑤. The DR volume is calculated in (5.18). 𝐶𝐷𝑅,𝑇(𝑡) is the total available DR capacity that can be 
traded by the aggregator. As mentioned earlier the DR flow can be either from the DR aggregator to 
the wind power producer or in the reverse direction. Therefore, the DR capacity is the maximum 
DR that the aggregator can either sell (𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑠(𝑡)) or buy (𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑏(𝑡)) (See Eq. (5.19)). 𝑏𝑠(𝑡) and 
𝑏𝑏(𝑡) are binary parameters which respectively indicate whether the DR aggregator is a DR seller 
or buyer in time period t. 
𝑠𝑝𝑤(𝑡, 𝑠) is the DR share percentage that the wind power producer trades with the DR 
aggregator. Indeed, this share is obtained by the lower level problem which is formulated in (5.20)-
(5.22). The revenue maximization problem of the DR aggregator is modelled in (5.20). The DR 
aggregator trades DR with the wind power producer, the day-ahead market and other competitors. 
Note that 𝑠𝑝𝐷𝐴(𝑡, 𝑠) represents the DR share percentage of the day-ahead market and 𝑠𝑝𝑐(𝑡, 𝑠) 
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shows the share of competitor c (𝑐 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑇𝐶). Note also that during periods in which the 
aggregator is a DR buyer, the objective is a cost minimization function. Constraint (5.21) imposes 
that total DR share percentage must be equal to 1. Finally, constraint (5.22) is used for variable 
declarations. Note that dual variables for constraints (5.21) and (5.22) are 𝛾(𝑡, 𝑠), 𝜇𝑤(𝑡, 𝑠), 
𝜇𝐷𝐴(𝑡, 𝑠) and 𝜇𝑐(𝑡, 𝑠), which are indicated following a colon.  
5.3. Linear Formulation 
The given approach is a bilevel programming problem that includes nonlinearity. This section 
provides an equivalent single-level linear problem which is easily solvable by commercially 
available software. The following procedure is applied for this purpose. 
First, the bilevel problem is transformed into a single-level mathematical program with 
equilibrium constraints (MPEC). For this purpose, the lower-level problem is replaced by its first-
order optimality conditions through the KKT conditions [139]. Note that this transformation is valid 
since the lower-level problem is continuous and linear and thus convex. 
To make the lower-level problem in a standard form, we can replace the maximization function 
by a negative minimization function. Then, the Lagrangian function of the lower-level problem is 
given as:  
   
1 1
1
,( ). ( ). ( , ). ( , ). (( ) , ,, ).
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) (
( , ). 1
( , ). ( , ). ( , ).
...
... , )
TC
TC
s NDR
c
N
DR T w DA DA c c
s
w DA c
w D
N
c
w ccADA
L s C t sp t s sp t s sp t s
sp t s sp t
t t s t s
t s
t
s sp t s
sp t s sp t s sp t ss t s t s
  

  

 

    

 
   


 
 
 

 (5.23) 
In this function, 𝛾(𝑡, 𝑠), 𝜇𝑤(𝑡, 𝑠), 𝜇𝐷𝐴(𝑡, 𝑠) and 𝜇𝑐(𝑡, 𝑠) are the relevant Lagrangian multipliers 
of the lower-level constraints. Accordingly, KKT conditions associated with the lower-level 
problem are obtained as follows. 
,( ). ( ).
( , )
( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0
s
DR D
w
wT
s
R t
L
s C t
t s
t t
p
s
s
s  



   

 (5.24) 
 ,( ). ( ) , ( , ) (. )
(
,
, )
0
s
DR T DA
DA
s
DAL s C t
sp t
t s
s
s t s t  

 

   

 (5.25) 
 , , (( ). , ) ( , ) 0 1,.. ..,( ).
( , )
.
s
DR T c
c
c
T
s
Ct s t s t s c N
L
s C t
sp t s
  


       

 (5.26) 
.. .,( , ), ( , ) . ...( , ) 0 , ,w DA ct s t s t s t s c      (5.27) 
( , ) 0( , ). ww sp tt ss   (5.28) 
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( , )( , ). 0A AD Dsp tt ss   (5.29) 
(( , ). 1,.., ) .,.0 .cc TCsp t st s c N     (5.30) 
Note that (5.27)-(5.30) are complementarity conditions. Equations (5.28)-(5.30) make the 
problem nonlinear. The next step is to linearize the nonlinear complimentary conditions resulting 
from applying KKT. 
With the cost of adding extra binary variables, the complementarity slackness conditions can 
easily be linearized as follows [140].  
. )( ) ,, (w s wpsp t s M v t s  (5.31) 
( ( )) . ,,DA s DApsp t s M v t s  (5.32) 
( , ) 1,...,, .( ) . .c s c c
p v tsp t s M s c N   (5.33) 
( , ) (1 ( , ))w wt s M v t s    (5.34) 
( , ) (1 ( , ))DA DAt s M v t s    (5.35) 
( , ) (1 ( , )).. 1,...,c c ct s M v t s c N
      (5.36) 
where 𝑀𝑠𝑝 and 𝑀𝜇 are sufficiently large constants and 𝑣𝑤(𝑡, 𝑠), 𝑣𝐷𝐴(𝑡, 𝑠) and 𝑣𝑐(𝑡, 𝑠) are 
binary variables. 
Finally, we need to derive the linear form of the product of 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) and 𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) in (5.10). For this 
purpose, the strong duality theorem [139] is used here. The dual of the lower-level problem for the 
upper-level variable 𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) is given in (5.37). Note again that we replace the maximization function 
in the lower-level problem by a minus minimization function to have it in a standard form. 
1
( ). ( , )..
sN
s
Maximize s t s 

  (5.37) 
𝛾(𝑠, 𝑡) is the dual variable of the lower-level equality (5.21). According to the strong duality 
theorem, the values of primal objective function (5.20) and the dual function (5.37) must be equal at 
the optimal solution. That is: 
   
1
,
1 1
( ). ( , )
( ). ( ). ( , ). ( , ). ( , )( , .) ,
T
s
s CND
N
s
N
DR T w DA DA c cR
s c
s t s
s C t sp t s sp t s sp tt s st t s 

 


 





  

 (5.38) 
 
Given the above expression and also from (5.18), the product of 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡).𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) is obtained: 
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
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 (5.39) 
This product is now linear and can be used in the equivalent single-level objective function. 
Overall, the equivalent single-level linear program is as:  
 
   
I
1 1
1
,
m
1 1
1
( ). ( , ) ( ). ( , ). ( , ).
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 (5.40) 
subject to  
Constraints (5.11)-(5.19) and (5.21)-(5.22).  
Constraints (5.24)-(5.27).  
Constraints (5.31)-(5.36)  
The derived problem is a mixed-integer linear programming approach.  
 
5.4. Case Study 
5.4.1. Data Preparation and Assumptions 
The proposed offering strategy is assessed on a realistic case of the Nordic market. Since hourly 
market prices are available [137] each period is considered as one hour. Nevertheless, the presented 
strategy is also applicable on shorter time horizons. 
The upper-level scenarios are generated as follows. Ten price scenarios are generated. For this 
purpose, the ARIMA method is used. A time series of spot prices of the Nordic market spanning 
January 2012 are used to generate price scenarios [137]. In addition, four positive and negative 
imbalance factors are randomly generated. For positive factors, scenarios range between 0.95 and 1 
(0.95 ≤ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑠(𝑡, 𝑤) ≤ 1), while for negative factors, they are between 1 and 1.05 (1 ≤
𝑆𝑛𝑒𝑔(𝑡, 𝑤) ≤ 1.05). 
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The wind power producer Hemmet located in Denmark is chosen [138]. The installed capacity of 
this farm is 27MW (Vestas Turbines). Wind speed scenarios are generated using the ARMA model 
where the available data in 2012 is used as an input time series. Accordingly, fourteen wind speed 
scenarios are generated. These scenarios are then transformed into power scenarios using the Vestas 
Wind curve. The overall number of scenarios makes a trade-off between the tractability of the 
problem and the accuracy of the results [93]. Note that using wind speed and market price data for a 
longer period will improve the accuracy of the generated scenarios. However, due to the limited 
access to wind speed data, this study uses short-period data, i.e. January 2012. Note also that for 
making a better correlation between wind power and market price scenarios, the period of price data 
is chosen to be the same as wind speed data. 
Figure 5.2 shows the expected day-ahead price and wind power production. The day-ahead price 
involves two peak periods, just before noon and during the evening. Wind power peaks however, 
occur during midnight and the afternoon. 
 
Figure  5.2. Average wind power and spot price 
 
The lower-level scenarios are generated as follows. Besides the wind power producer, two other 
competitors (C1 and C2) willing to trade DR with the aggregator are considered. Three price 
scenarios are generated for each competitor as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Competitors are indicated 
with “C”, while “S” represents the scenarios. Note that these scenarios are generated in a way that 
they are closed to the day-ahead market price mean shown in Figure 5.2. Indeed, the DR aggregator 
determines the DR share of each individual competitor based on these price scenarios. Note also 
that day-ahead price scenarios for the lower-level problem are the same as those generated in the 
upper-level one. 
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Figure  5.3. Other competitors’ DR price scenarios 
 
This work assumes the DR data as follows. The maximum DR potential that the DR aggregator 
can either buy or sell in each period is assumed to be 10 MW. The aggregator is assumed to be a 
DR buyer from 2am to 5am and a seller from 9am to 12pm and 5pm to 9pm. 
5.4.2. Numerical Results 
The given mixed integer programming approach is solved for various risk levels using CPLEX 
11.1.1 under GAMS [131].  
Figure 5.4 depicts the expected profit versus the standard deviation for the given risk levels. The 
risk-averse wind power producer (ρ = 2) obtains the expected profit of $16,560 with a deviation of 
$7,740. As the producer becomes more of a risk taker (i.e. the risk level decreases), both the 
expected profit and the standard deviation grow. This is more obvious for the risk-neutral wind 
power producer (ρ = 0), where the expected profit and its deviation are $16,713 and $8,000, 
respectively. In other words, the risk-neutral wind power producer obtains 1% higher profit than the 
risk-averse one with a cost of 3.4% higher profit deviation. 
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Figure  5.4. Expected profit vs. standard deviation for various risk levels 
 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the bids placed into the day-ahead market and the power exchanged in 
the balancing market, respectively. While the risk-neutral wind power producer places the majority 
of its energy offer into the day-ahead market (See Figure 5.5), its offer in the balancing market is 
low and even negative in some periods (See Figure 5.6). That is, the risk-neutral producer takes risk 
in some periods to bid higher than its energy production with the hope of buying that amount in the 
balancing market at a cheaper cost. This trend is more obvious at hours 16-18 where at each hour 
the wind power producer has to buy more than 5MW from the balancing market to compensate its 
high offer in the day-ahead market. 
Increasing the risk level causes a significant drop in the day-ahead market bids. For instance, 
while the producer with risk level ρ = 0.5 has a reasonable day-ahead sale share during its peak 
production, the shares of the most risk-averse wind power producers (ρ = 1.5 and ρ = 2) are 
almost negligible in the day-ahead market. Indeed, risk-averse producers sell the majority of their 
energy into the balancing market. This trend is reasonable since the risk-averse producers refuse to 
take more risk by selling their energy into the day-ahead market while their production and also the 
market price are associated with a significant level of uncertainty. Thus they choose the balancing 
market where they are close to real time and have a better forecast of their production as well as the 
market price. 
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Figure  5.5. Day-ahead market bids for the given risk levels 
 
 
Figure  5.6. Balancing market participation for the given risk levels 
 
The DR volumes obtained by the wind power producer in various risk levels are illustrated in 
Figure 5.7. The wind power producer sells DR to the aggregator at 2-5am and buys DR at 9am-
12pm and 5-9pm. Risk taker wind power producers have a high sale share through DR. This is 
particularly evident for the risk-neutral producer, where its DR sales for 3am and 4-5am are 5MW 
and 4MW, respectively. This share however decreases for risk-averse wind power producers. More 
specifically, this falling trend is significant for the risk levels ρ = 1.5 and ρ = 2 during the period 
3-5am. It can be seen that the DR sale decreases to less than 2 MW in these periods. This declining 
trend is sensible since risk-averse producers tend to sell the majority of their energy through the 
 Chapter 5. Modelling Demand Response Aggregator Behaviour in Wind Offering Strategy  
 
86 
 
balancing market where they have a better forecast of their production as well as the market price 
(see Figure 5.6). Hence, selling energy through DR on the day prior to the energy delivery can 
increase their risk as they may face power shortages in the delivery time and consequently not be 
able to meet the sold power through DR.  
During the periods in which the wind power producer is a DR buyer, i.e. 9-12pm and 5-9pm, the 
risk-neutral producer buys more DR than the risk-averse one. It can be seen that during most hours, 
the risk-neutral producer buys around 2 MW DR from the aggregator. However, increasing the risk 
level is followed by a decreasing tendency in most hours. This is more apparent at 10am, 12, 8 and 
9 pm where the share of DR procurement by risk-averse wind power producers, particularly in the 
risk levels ρ = 1.5 and ρ = 2 is almost negligible. This tendency is true since buying energy from 
DR in a fixed cost and selling it into the volatile market increases the risk of risk-averse wind power 
producers and hence, they may avoid this practice. 
 
Figure  5.7. DR obtained by the wind power producer 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the DR prices offered by the wind power producer at various risk levels. In 
addition, DR price scenarios by other competitors (Shown in Figure 5.3) are also depicted in this 
figure to provide a better comparison. Note that competitors are indicated with “C”, while “S” 
represents the scenarios. The risk-neutral wind power producer offers around $1/MWh lower price 
than the risk-averse producers at 3-5am. This lower price indeed resulted in a higher sale share 
shown in Figure 5.7. For the rest of the periods in which the wind power producer buys DR from 
the aggregator this inclination is reversed. Actually, the risk-neutral producer offers higher prices to 
procure more DR as depicted in Figure 5.7. For instance, this producer gives around $1.5/MWh 
higher than risk-averse producers at 10-11am and 8-9pm. In comparison with other competitors, the 
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DR prices given by the wind power producers are low in the first period covering 2-5am. However, 
for the remaining periods, wind power producers offer DR prices close to the other competitors.  
 
 
Figure  5.8. The DR price offered by the wind power producer 
 
Figure 5.9 depicts the total DR share of both competitors together as well as the day-ahead 
market. Note that as mentioned earlier the periods in which DR is traded are as follows. Period 1 is 
2-5am, period 2 represents 9am-12pm and period 3 covers 5-9pm. Obviously there is an opposing 
DR trend as compared to that of the wind power producer. That is, as the risk level increases, 
particularly for ρ = 2, the DR aggregator buys more DR from these resources during the time 
period 2-5am (period 1). In addition, during the periods in which the aggregator is a DR seller, i.e. 
periods 2 and 3, its sale share increases as the risk level grows. This trend is more clarified in Table 
5.1, where the DR volumes (MWh) for each competitor, i.e. C1 and C2, as well as the day-ahead 
market (DA) in risk levels ρ = 0 and ρ = 2 are distinctly provided. It can be seen that in both risk 
levels, the DR share of the day-ahead market is higher than other competitors. In addition, it is 
obvious that while the aggregator refuses to buy DR from C1 and C2 in ρ = 0 at 3-5am, it buys 
more than 1 MW for ρ = 2 at each relevant hour. 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5. Modelling Demand Response Aggregator Behaviour in Wind Offering Strategy  
 
88 
 
 
Figure  5.9. The total DR share traded with other players and the DA market 
 
Table ‎5.1. DR share of other competitors and the DA market (MWh) 
 
𝛒 = 𝟎 𝛒 = 𝟐 
C1 C2 DA C1 C2 DA 
2am -0.8 -0.9 -7 -0.7 -1 -7 
3am 0 0 -5 -1.3 -1.4 -5.4 
4am 0 0 -6 -1 -1.2 -6.4 
5am 0 0 -6 -1.8 -1.1 -6.4 
9am 1.7 1.7 4.4 1.6 1.8 4.4 
10am 1.2 1.6 5 2 2.1 5.4 
11am 1.4 1.33 5.4 1.3 1.4 5.4 
Noon 0.8 0.9 7 1.1 1.6 7 
5pm 1.6 1.2 5.4 1.4 1.3 5.4 
6pm 1.3 1.4 5 1.6 1.2 5 
7pm 2 1.9 3.4 2 1.9 3.9 
8pm 1.6 1.2 5.4 2.1 2 5.4 
9pm 0.9 1.3 6 1.6 2 6.1 
 
5.4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
This section evaluates the impact of power production uncertainty on the proposed strategy.  A 
deterministic case (Case1) is compared with the current study in the chapter (Case2). Indeed, the 
expected wind power production, shown in Figure 5.2, is considered as the wind power input in the 
deterministic case. The day-ahead offers by the risk-neutral and risk-averse wind power producers 
are illustrated in Figures 5.10 and 5.11. Further results are as follows. Both risk-neutral and risk-
averse producers have no participation in the balancing market when their production is known 
(Case1). The risk-neutral producer has exactly the same DR trading in both cases. However, DR 
trading by the risk-averse producer is different in case 1 to case 2 (See Figure 5.12).  
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The main findings from Cases 1 and 2 are as follows. 
1- As can be seen from Figure 5.10, the day-ahead offer by the risk-neutral wind producer 
mostly follows its expected production in Case 1, where the producer perfectly knows its 
production. Indeed, the differences are as a result of DR trading since the producer in Case1 has no 
involvement in the balancing market. On the other hand, it is obvious that when the producer has 
uncertain power production, its day-ahead offer significantly changes due to that uncertainty. 
Actually, the producer has to compensate this deviation in the balancing market (Refer to Figure 
5.6).  
2- An interesting point is interpreted for the risk-averse wind power producer. It can be seen 
from Figure 5.11 that the risk-averse wind power producer mostly prefers to sell through the day-
ahead market if its production is perfectly known (Case1). This is in contrast to Case2, where the 
wind power production is faced with uncertainty and thus, the risk-averse producer mainly prefers 
to participate in the balancing market due to its better production forecast in that market. 
3- The risk-averse wind power producer sells more energy through DR in Case1 than Case2 (See 
period 1 in Figure 5.12). This is reasonable since the power production in Case1 is deterministic and 
therefore, the producer can hedge against the risk of the market by selling a portion of its energy 
through the bilateral DR contract. Note that the producer behaviour in buying DR is arbitrary 
(Periods 2 and 3 in Figure 5.12). This is mainly because of two opposite aims: on one hand, the 
risk-averse producer is not interested in buying DR to sell it in the volatile market; on the other 
hand, the producer may find some periods in which buying DR is beneficial as there may be a 
chance of increasing its profit. This happens in period 3, where the market price is at its peak (See 
the expected day-ahead price in Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure  5.10. Day-ahead offers by the risk-neutral wind power producer: Cases 1 and 2 
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Figure  5.11. Day-ahead offers by the risk-averse wind power producer: Cases 1 and 2 
 
 
 
Figure  5.12. DR trading by the risk-averse wind power producer: Cases 1 and 2 
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5.5. Summary 
This chapter models the DR aggregator behaviour in wind offering strategies. A bilevel problem 
is formulated which is then transformed into a single-level linear programming approach through 
proper techniques in order to make it solvable using commercially available software such as 
GAMS. 
The overall problem is a stochastic programming approach in which the risk is carried out using 
CVaR. A case of the Nordic Market is chosen to assess the validity of the given problem. The main 
findings are as follows.  
1. While risk-neutral wind power producers mostly sell their energy in the day-ahead 
market, risk-averse producers mainly choose the balancing market to participate in.  
2.  The wind power producer can buy DR during the peak price periods to lessen the risk of 
its power production and market price uncertainty. On the other hand, the producer is 
able to sell some portion of its energy through DR contracts with the aggregator during 
off-peak periods.  
3.  While the risk-neutral wind power producer has a higher share in DR trading, either in 
selling or in buying, the risk-averse producers mostly refuse to be involved in DR.  
4.  Modelling the DR aggregator behaviour makes DR trading more competitive since the 
wind power producer is required to compete with other players to offer a reasonable DR 
price to the DR aggregator.  
5.  The uncertainty of wind power production affects day-ahead offers of both risk-neutral 
and risk-averse wind power producers, particularly the latter.   
The next Chapter will further extend the study in this chapter to address the DR application by 
wind power producers with significant wind power production, which are able to exercise market 
power in day-ahead markets.  
 
5.6. Nomenclature 
A) Indices  
c  Index of competitors interested in trading DR 
s  Index of scenario in the lower-level problem 
t  Index representing the time interval 
w  Index of scenario in the upper-level problem 
B) Parameters  
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( )bb t  Binary parameter indicating whether the DR aggregator is a DR buyer  
( )sb t  Binary parameter indicating whether the DR aggregator is a DR seller  
, ( )DR TC t  Available DR capacity (MW) 
 d t  Duration of period t  
 ,c t s  Other competitors’ price for DR 
 ,DA t s  Day-ahead price scenario in the lower-level problem 
 ,DA t w  Day-ahead price scenario in the upper-level problem 
( , )imb t w  Imbalance price scenario 
, ( , )imb neg t w  Negative imbalance price scenario 
, ( , )imb pos t w  Positive imbalance price scenario 
max, ( )bP t  Maximum DR capacity that the DR aggregator can buy 
max, ( )sP t  Maximum DR capacity that the DR aggregator can sell 
InstWP  Installed capacity of the wind power producer 
( , )WP t w  Wind power production scenario 
 ,posS t w  scenario-based factors of positive imbalance prices 
 ,negS t w  scenario-based factors of negative imbalance prices 
( )w , ( )s  Probability of scenario 𝑤/ scenario 𝑠 
C) Variables  
 DAP t  Day-ahead power sold by the wind power producer 
( )DRP t  DR procured by the wind power producer 
 ,posP t w  Positive imbalance wind power 
 ,negP t w  Negative imbalance wind power 
( , )DAsp t s  DR share in the day-ahead market 
( , )csp t s  DR share of competitor c  
( , )wsp t s  DR share percentage by the wind power producer 
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( )DR t  DR price offered by the wind power producer 
,( , ), ( , )
( , ), ( , )
w
DA c
t s t s
t s t s
 
 
 Dual variable relevant to the lower-level problem 
 , ( )w  Auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR  
D) Numbers and Sets 
sN  Number of scenarios in the lower-level problem 
TCN  Number of total consumers 
wN  Number of scenarios in the upper-level problem 
T  Set for time duration 
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  Chapter 6
Demand Response Application by Strategic 
Wind Power Producers  
 
6.1 Introduction1 
Significant wind power penetration brings new challenges into electricity markets. One 
important issue is that a wind power producer with high power production may become dominant in 
the market. In this way, the wind power producer may play strategically to change the market price. 
A few investigations have recently raised this issue. Reference [79] is the most comprehensive one. 
The authors investigate high penetration of a wind producer by modelling it as a strategic player in 
both day-ahead and balancing markets. An equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints 
(EPEC) is formulated. The authors in [12] consider a wind power producer, which is a price maker 
in the day-ahead market and a deviator in the balancing market. Unlike [12], a wind power producer 
in [80] is fully competitive in the day-ahead market while having market power in the balancing 
market. The authors in [81] investigate the effect of a price-maker wind power producer on the 
market price.  
This Chapter studies a strategic wind power producer which is responsible for its participation in 
the market and also uses DR to lessen the risk of its production as well as balancing market price 
uncertainties. An offering strategy for this producer is proposed as follows. The producer offers into 
the day-ahead market. It is assumed that the wind power producer is the only player with market 
power in this market while other participants are fully competitive. Consequently, a day-ahead 
market is cleared through which the wind producer can determine its power level and price in this 
                                                          
1
 This chapter covers the following reference: 
1. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, Mehdi Eghbal, “Demand Response Application by Strategic Wind Power 
Producers”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (second revision submitted 2 Feb 2015). 
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market. In addition, the wind power producer uses DR to alleviate its power production deviation in 
real-time dispatch. To this end, the strategic wind power producer bilaterally sets a DR contract 
with a DR aggregator. The DR aggregator itself seeks to maximize its revenue from selling the DR 
product through three purchasers, namely the wind power producer in this chapter, the day-ahead 
market, and other players willing to purchase DR. The above problem is formulated in a bilevel 
approach, which is then transformed into a single level linear program and solved on a realistic case 
of the Nordic Market. 
The Chapter is structured as follows. First, the proposed offering strategy by a strategic wind 
power producer is discussed. Then, the problem formulation is presented in section 6.3. This 
problem is a bilevel approach which is transformed to a single-level linear problem in the next 
section. Section 6.5 provides the case study and results. Conclusions are drawn in section 6.6. 
Finally, the indices, variables and parameters used in the chapter are explained in the nomenclature 
in the last section. 
6.2 Strategic Wind offering  
6.2.1 Framework 
The following assumptions are considered. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the strategic 
behaviour of a wind power producer in the day-ahead market only. This is reasonable as the 
majority of energy is traded in this market [12]. Note that exercising of market power by power 
plants including wind power producers may happen in any electricity markets. This is due to 
different circumstances, where one reason for exercising market power by wind power producers is 
their high power penetration. For instance, as reported in [134], the Danish Elspot areas, DK1 and 
DK2, had negative prices for 39 and 30 hours respectively in 2013, due to high wind power 
production. In addition, a study on the Nordic market [82] shows that producers with fluctuating 
production such as wind producers may act strategically in their bidding on the spot market due to 
the asymmetric cost of the regulating market. Note also that the assumption of owning high wind 
power production by a wind power producer is realistic as there are some real cases which the 
coordination of several wind farms is recommended as a solution to alleviate their production 
deviation [81, 141]. 
In addition, the transmission network is not modelled in this chapter, which makes the findings 
intuitive. This is a common assumption in wind offering studies such as [14, 56, 66]. Nevertheless, 
network constraints can be modelled in a similar way to [12]. In addition, the balancing market is 
assumed to be settled in a single-price system, which is used in the US, instead of a dual-price 
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scheme. Furthermore, similar to the existing studies, a single one hour period is chosen. However, 
the problem is also valid for multi period problems.  
The proposed problem is depicted in Figure 6.1. Note that parameters in each level are shown by 
dash line boxes and arrows, while the decision variables are represented using solid line boxes and 
arrows. In addition, the links between different levels of the problem are indicated by double lines. 
The procedure carried out in this bilevel problem is as follows. In the upper-level problem, the 
wind power producer (WPP) makes two decisions: D1) the day-ahead offer; D2) the DR price given 
to the DR aggregator. The day-ahead (DA) offer includes the energy volume and price for each 
dispatch interval. This decision is faced with the uncertainty involved in power production and 
imbalance price forecasts. Therefore, plausible realizations of these stochastic parameters are 
required to be taken into account. In addition, the level of the risk taken by the producer affects the 
DA offer decision. That is, the sale share of day-ahead and balancing markets may change in 
various risk levels. The day-ahead energy volume and price as well as the DR share procured by the 
wind power producer are the other factors that affect the DA offer. The former, i.e. the day-ahead 
energy volume and price, is decided in the lower-level problem 1 through a market clearing process. 
Offers from the wind power producer as well as other generators and the DR aggregator are 
stacked. On the other hand, demand bids are also received. Consequently, the day-ahead market 
price and energy volume are determined from the intersection of supply and demand curves (See 
the lower-level problem 1). The latter, i.e. the DR share procured by the wind power producer, is 
decided in the lower-level problem 2. In a revenue maximization problem, the DR aggregator 
determines the DR share to be sold to three DR purchasers: the wind power producer, other DR 
buyers and the day-ahead market. This decision is made according to the prices offered by the DR 
purchasers. Note that the DR price offered by the wind power producer is decided in the upper level 
problem as decision 2 (D2). The wind power producer decides on this price based on the day-ahead 
price (derived in the lower-level problem 1) and an anticipation of DR prices offered by other DR 
purchasers (see the upper-level problem, right-hand side). Note that trading DR through bilateral 
contracts exists in the real case [142]. In addition, DR aggregators can directly participate in some 
markets such as PJM [143].  
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Figure ‎6.1. Strategic wind offering considering the DR aggregator behaviour 
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6.2.2 Uncertainty Characterization 
Each upper-level scenario is represented by scenario 𝑤, which comprises a vector of imbalance 
prices (𝜆𝐼𝑚𝑏(𝑡, 𝑤)) and wind power production 𝑃𝑊𝑃(𝑡, 𝑤). 
 ( , ), (. , ). Imb WPscenario w t w P t w  (6.1) 
The probability of each scenario occurrence equals 𝜋(𝑤), where ∑ 𝜋(𝑤) = 1
𝑁𝑤
𝑤=1 . 
Each scenario in the lower-level problem 2 is illustrated by scenario 𝑠, which involves a vector 
of other competitors’ DR prices (𝜆𝐶(𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑠)). 
  .. , ,Cscenario s c t s  (6.2) 
Similar to the upper-level problem, the probability of each scenario is 𝜋(𝑠),  
where ∑ 𝜋(𝑠) = 1
𝑁𝑠
𝑠=1 . 
Note that the lower-level problem 1 is a deterministic problem and independent of scenarios. 
 
6.3 Problem Formulation  
The bilevel problem is formulated as follows. 
  Im Im
1 1
1
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( , ) ...( , ) ,.
wuN WDA DA DR DR
wu
b b
w P wu t t P t t
P t w t w t w
 





 

 (6.8) 
,
1
( ) ( ). ( ). ..( , ) ,.
sNDR DR T W
s
P t C t s sp t ts

    (6.9) 
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where  a( , ), .. ...( g) rWDA DAP Minimiwu t t t ze   
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 (6.11) 
, ....0 .( , ) ( , ) : ( , ), ( , ),WDA W of Min Max wuP wu t P wu t wu t wu t     (6.12) 
....0 ( , , ) ( , , ) : ( , , ), ( ) ,, ,. , ,G GMax Min MaxP gu b t P gu b t gu b t gu gb t wu u b      (6.13) 
, .....0 ( , ) ( , ) : ( , ), ( , ),DR DA DRMax Min Max druP dru t P dru t dru t dru t     (6.14) 
....0 ( , , ) ( , , ) : (. , , ), ( , ,, ),D DMax Min MaxP du db t P du db t du db t du db dt u db      (6.15) 
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Subject to  
1 1
, 1 :( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , ),....
dru TCW DR D
N N
dr
C
u c
Asp t s sp dru t sp c t t ss s
 
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,.. .. .., : ( , ), ( , ), ( , , ),( , ), ( , ) ( , , ) 0 , ,WW DR DA C DA Ct s dru t c tsp t s sp dru t sp c t s s c drus     
 
(6.18) 
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The upper-level problem is provided in (6.3)-(6.9). The profit function of the wind power 
producer is indicated in (6.3). The first term of this function shows the revenue obtained from 
selling into the day-ahead market. 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑤𝑢, 𝑡) and 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) are decided in the day-ahead market 
clearing process, i.e. the lower-level problem 1 (Eqs. (6.10)-(6.15)). The second term indicates the 
cost of DR. The third term is the revenue achieved from the balancing market. Note that if the wind 
power producer has deficit generation, it has to buy its deviation from the balancing market and 
hence, this term is a cost for the producer. Finally, the last term illustrates CVaR which is weighted 
using the risk factor (𝜌). A risk level (𝜌) close to 0 means that the wind power producer is risk-
neutral while larger risk levels model risk-averse producers.  𝛽 is the confidence level, which is 
0.95. Equation (6.4) enforces the power balance for wind power production. Non-negativity of the 
wind power offer (𝑃𝑊,𝑜𝑓(𝑤𝑢, 𝑡)) in the day-ahead market is represented in (6.5). Expressions (6.6) 
and (6.7) represent CVaR constraints [56], which are derived to linearize this risk measure. Note 
that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑤) in (6.6) indicates the obtained profit for scenario w, as illustrated in (6.8). In (6.9), 
𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) is formulated as a function of the DR percentage (𝑠𝑝𝑊(𝑡, 𝑠)) which the DR aggregator sells 
to the wind power producer. This DR share (𝑠𝑝𝑊(𝑡, 𝑠)) is indeed a variable which is determined by 
the DR aggregator, i.e. lower-level problem 2 (Eqs. (6.16)-(6.18)).  
The lower-level problem 1 is addressed in (6.10)-(6.15). This problem clears the day-ahead 
market. In order to make a canonical representation, minus social welfare (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑊) is used in 
(6.10). The first three terms of this function respectively provide the offers by the wind power 
producer, other generators and the DR aggregator. The last term is the demand offer. The energy 
balance of the day-ahead market is imposed in (6.11). Constraints (6.12)-(6.15) respectively enforce 
the upper and lower limits of power for the wind power producer, other generators, the DR 
aggregator and the demand. Dual variables for each constraint are indicated following a colon.  
As mentioned earlier, the DR percentage procured by the wind power producer (𝑠𝑝𝑊(𝑡, 𝑠)) is 
determined in the lower-level problem 2. This problem is addressed in (6.16)-(6.18). The DR 
aggregator’s objective function is shown in (6.16). Again, minus revenue (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝐷𝑅_𝑅) is used in 
the objective function to make it canonical. The first two terms respectively indicate the expected 
revenues from the wind power producer as well as other players which are interested in buying DR. 
The last term represents the revenue obtained from selling DR to the day-ahead market. Note that 
this term is the product of two variables, i.e. 𝑠𝑝𝐷𝑅,𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡) and 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡). However, since these 
variables are decided in the lower-level problem 1, this product is constant here and we can remove 
it from the objective function. Instead, a new constraint is added to the problem to relate the lower-
level problems 1 and 2: 
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, , ,( , ) ( ). ( , )DR DA DR T DR DAP dru t C t sp dru t  (6.19) 
Constraint (6.17) imposes that total DR share percentage must be equal to 1. Finally, constraint 
(6.18) is used for variable declarations. Again, dual variables for each constraint are indicated 
following a colon. 
It should be emphasized that the variables of the lower-level problem 1 are 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑤𝑢, 𝑡), 
𝑃𝐺(𝑔𝑢, 𝑏, 𝑡), 𝑃𝐷𝑅,𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡), 𝑃𝐷(𝑑𝑢, 𝑑𝑏, 𝑡), plus all dual variables shown in (6.11)-(6.15). 
In addition, the variables of the lower-level problem 2 include: 
 2 ( , ), ( , , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , , )LL W CW C t ssp t s sp c t s c st s t     
Finally, the upper-level variables contain all variables of the lower-level problems 1 and 2 plus 
the following: 
 ,Im ,( ), ( , )( , ), ( , ),DR b WU WofL ofPt P t w w wu t u t    
6.4 Linear Formulation 
The given bilevel programming includes nonlinearity. This section provides an equivalent 
single-level linear problem, which is easily solvable by commercially available software. The 
following procedure is applied to linearize the nonlinear terms. 
First, the bilevel problem is transformed into a single-level MPEC. For this purpose, each lower-
level problem is replaced by its first-order optimality conditions through the KKT conditions [139]. 
Note that this transformation is valid since the lower-level problems are continuous and linear and 
thus convex.  
The Lagrangian function of each lower-level problem is differentiated with respect to the 
relevant variables to derive its KKT optimality conditions. In addition, the complementarity 
slackness conditions obtained from these KKT conditions are linearized using Fortuny-Amat 
approach [140]. Expressions (6.20)-(6.39) show the corresponding derivatives for the lower-level 
problem 1. 
, ( ,( , ) ( ) ) ( , ,. . ,.) 0Max MW f ino DA wu tw wu tu t wu tt         (6.20) 
 , , ( , , )( ) ...( , , ) 0 , ,. ,.G Max MiDA ngu b t gu b t gu b t gu b tt          (6.21) 
, ( , )( , ) .( , ) 0 ,....( ,)DR Max MiA DA nD dru t drudru t t t dru t        (6.22) 
 , , ( , , ) ( , , ) 0( ,) , ,D Max MDA indu db t du db t du db t du tt db           (6.23) 
,max0 ( , ) ( , ), ,Max Max Wwu t M v wu t wu t      (6.24) 
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, ,max0 ( , ) (1 ( , ))( , ,. . ,. .)W of MaW WDA xP wu t M v wu tP wu tt wu       (6.25) 
,min0 ( , ) ( , ,.) ,Min Min Wwu t M v wu t wu t     (6.26) 
,min0 (1 ( , .)) , ,( , ) MinWD WA M vP w u t w tu t w u      (6.27) 
,max0 ( , , ) ( , , ), , ,Max Max Ggu b t M v gu b t gu b t      (6.28) 
,max0 ( , , ) ( , , ) (1 ( , , )), , ,GMax G Max GP gu b t P gu b t M v gu b t gu b t        (6.29) 
,min0 ( , , ) ( , , ), , ,Min Min Wgu b t M v gu b t gu b t      (6.30) 
,min0 ( , , ) (1 ( , , )), , ,G Min GP gu b t M v gu b t gu b t       (6.31) 
,max0 ( , ) ( , ), ,Max Max DRdru t M v dru t dru t     (6.32) 
, ,max0 ( , ) ( , ) (1 ( , )), ,DRMax DR DA Max DRP dru t P dru t M v dru t dru t       (6.33) 
,min0 ( , ) ( , ), ,Min Min DRdru t M v dru t dru t     (6.34) 
, ,min0 ( , ) (1 ( , )), ,DR DA Min DRP dru t M v dru t dru t      (6.35) 
,max ..0 ( , , ) , , ,.( , , )Max Max DRdu db t M v du db t du db t      (6.36) 
,max0 ( , , ) ( , , ) (1 ( , , )), , ,DMax D Max DRP du db t P du db t M v du db t du db t        (6.37) 
,min0 ( , , ) ( , , ) , , ,..Min Min DRdu db t M v du db t du db t      (6.38) 
,min .0 ( , , ) (1 ( , , )) , ,..,D Min DRP du db t M v du db t du db t       (6.39) 
 
The KKT conditions of the lower-level problem 2 are shown in (6.40)-(6.45): 
,
1
( ) ( , ) (( ). ( ). , 0, ,)
sN DDR T R W
s
t ts C st tt s s  

     (6.40) 
 , , , ( ,( ). ( ). ,...) ( , , ,) 0 ,DR T C Cs C t s tc t s t s c t s c         (6.41) 
0 ( , ) . ( , , ,.)W sp Wv t ssp t s M s t     (6.42) 
0 ( , , ) . ,.) .( , , , ,CC spsp c v c st M s tt cs      (6.43) 
( , ) (0 . 1 ( , ,.) ,)W Wt s M v t s s t      (6.44) 
(1 ( , , ))..0 ( , , ) . , , ,CC c t s tM s c sv c t      (6.45) 
Note that 𝑀.(.) parameters in all the above equations are sufficiently large constants and 𝑣 .(. ) 
variables are binary variables. 
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The next step is to linearize the products of 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑤𝑢, 𝑡) × 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) as well as 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) × 𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) 
in (6.3). The strong duality theorem is used to extract the linear formulation of these products. 
According to the strong duality theorem, the values of primal objective function and the dual 
function must be equal at the optimal solution [139].  
Lower-level problem 1: The primal problem (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑊 from Eq. (6.10)) is equal to its dual 
(right hand side) as follows.  
1
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Also, from slackness conditions we can derive: 
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Thus, substituting the above term in the primal problem (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑊) and simplifying it, the 
linear form of the product of 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡) × 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) is given as: 
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Lower-level problem 2: Similarly, we have the primal problem (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝐷𝑅_𝑅 from Eq. (6.16)) 
equal to its dual (right hand side) as follows: 
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Given the above duality and also from Eq. (6.9), the term 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) × 𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) is easily obtained as 
follows. 
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Overall, the equivalent single-level linear problem is as:  
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(6.51) 
subject to  
Constraints (6.4)-(6.9), (6.11)-(6.15), and (6.17)-(6.19); 
Constraints (6.20)-(6.45). 
The derived problem in (6.51) is a mixed-integer linear programming approach. Note that the 
linear equivalent of the product of 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) and 𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) as well as that of 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡) and 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) 
are respectively presented in (6.48) and (6.50). Constraints (6.4)-(6.9), (6.11)-(6.15) and (6.17)-
(6.19) of the original problem are applied here. (6.20)-(6.45) are associated with the KKT 
optimality conditions and the linearized complementarity slackness conditions.  
6.5 Case Study 
6.5.1 Data Preparation and Assumptions 
The proposed offering strategy is assessed on a realistic case of the Nordic market [137]. 
Demand, generators and DR offers are depicted in Table 6.1. The offers for demand and generators 
are taken from the Nordic market at 12 am on the 23th of January 2012. Since the cost offers of 
individual generators as well as demand are not publicly available, this chapter uses the supply and 
demand curves of the aggregated generation and demand offers, which are represented in the 
market clearing price (MCP) model of the Nordic market for the relevant hour. However, DR offers 
are assumed since there is no DR data available. These offers are indeed chosen in such a way as to 
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be close to other generators’ offers. The assumption is reasonable since the DR aggregator needs to 
compete with other power plants to be able to sell its DR product in the market. 
The upper-level scenarios are generated as follows. The wind power producer Hemmet located 
in Denmark is chosen [138]. The installed capacity is 27MW (Vestas Turbines). Wind speed 
scenarios are generated using the ARMA model where the available data in 2012 is used as input 
time series. Ten wind speed scenarios are generated. These scenarios are then transformed into 
power scenarios using the Vestas Wind Curve. Note that in order to make the wind power producer 
influential in the market, we consider a wind farm size 200 times that of the given farm, i.e. 
5400MW capacity. 
In addition, ten imbalance price scenarios are generated. For this purpose, the ARIMA method is 
used. A time series of the prices of the Nordic market in 2012 is used to generate price scenarios.  
In the lower-level problem, the rival DR prices, i.e. the DR price given to the DR aggregator by 
other players interested in DR, are considered to be stochastic. Three players are taken into account. 
In addition, 3 scenarios are generated to represent the uncertainty of each rival competitor.  
Table  6.1. Offers by demand, generators and DR in the day-ahead market 
Demand Offer Generators’ Offer DR Aggregator Offer 
Volume 
(MWh) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Volume 
(MWh) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Volume 
(MWh) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
33662.2 55 25000 21 150 29 
17 49.5 2000 22 150 30 
17 45 2500 24 150 31 
19.9 39.9 700 26 150 32 
115 39.2 1000 31 150 32.5 
57.3 35.31 1800 31.5 150 33.5 
48.8 35 3000 32 
 
23.8 34.2 1000 32.8 
20 34 3000 33 
41.9 33.87 
 
647 33 
12.2 32.64 
8.4 32.51 
17.3 32.3 
44.1 32 
24.7 31.6 
52.1 31.5 
165.1 31.4 
329.3 30 
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6.5.2 Numerical Results 
The proposed problem is solved for two risk levels using CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [131].  
Day-ahead market clearing prices for two risk-levels are shown in Table 6.2. Note that these 
prices are cleared as a result of exercising market power (strategic behaviour) by the wind power 
producer. While the risk-neutral producer fixes the price at $30/MWh, the risk-averse producer 
tends to increase the price to $31/MWh. This is sensible since the risk-neutral producer prefers to 
have a higher sale share in the day-ahead market and therefore keeps the price as low as possible to 
be successful in this market. On the other hand, the risk-averse producer is interested in selling 
more energy in the balancing market, where it has a better forecast of its production. Consequently, 
it increases the day-ahead price to compensate possible fluctuation (losses) in the balancing market. 
 
Table ‎6.2. Day-ahead market clearing price  
 
DA Price ($/MWh) 
𝜌=0 30 
𝜌=10 31 
 
Table 6.3 provides the energy sold to the day-ahead market by the wind power producer (WPP), 
generation companies (GENCOs) and the DR aggregator. An interesting result is that as the risk 
level increases, the wind producer significantly decreases its participation in the day-ahead market. 
This indeed proves the discussion mentioned above. As a result of this declining trend and also 
because of the increased day-ahead price in risk level 10 (See Table 6.2), the shares of other 
generators as well as the DR aggregator grow. Note that the total demand served in both risk levels 
is identical. Indeed, the last demand offer, i.e. (329.3MWh, $30/MWh) is not approved in the day-
ahead market in both risk levels. 
 
Table  6.3. Energy Volume sold to the DA market by the WPP, GENCOs and the DR Aggregator (MWh) 
 
WPP GENCOs DR Aggregator Total 
𝜌=0 4643 30200 150 34993 
𝜌=10 3493 31200 300 34993 
 
Figure 6.2 displays the energy volume traded by the wind power producer in the balancing 
market. The wind power producer in risk level zero has to buy around 370MWh from the balancing 
market to compensate its overbid in the day-ahead market. Actually, the expected production of the 
wind power producer is around 4,280MWh while its power sold in the day-ahead market is 
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4,643MWh. On the other hand, the significant sale share of the risk-averse wind power producer 
(𝜌=10) in the balancing market is obvious here. 
 
Figure  6.2. Wind power participation in the balancing market  
 
The DR volume that the aggregator sells to each DR purchaser is depicted in Figure 6.3. The 
risk-neutral wind power producer has no DR procurement from the DR aggregator while the risk-
averse producer purchases 500MWh. This is reasonable since the risk-averse producer tends to buy 
DR to compensate for its possible deviation in the real time. This tendency is confirmed in Table 
6.4, where the risk-neutral wind power producer offers a DR price of $27.44/MWh while the risk-
averse producer’s price given to the DR aggregator is $31/MWh. It is also obvious from Figure 6.3 
that the DR aggregator sells more DR to the day-ahead market for 𝜌 = 10. This is as a consequence 
of the higher day-ahead price in this risk level compared to the risk level equal to zero (See Table 
6.2). Finally, as a result of the increment in the DR share of the wind power producer and the day-
ahead market, that of other competitors declines in risk level 10. 
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Figure  6.3. DR sold to different DR purchasers 
 
Table  6.4. DR price offered by the wind power producer 
 
Offered Price 
𝜌=0 27.44 
𝜌=10 31 
6.5.3 Imbalance Price Sensitivity Analysis 
This section analyses the impact of the imbalance price on the behaviour models of the strategic 
wind power producer. Three cases are considered. Case 1: the imbalance price is 95% of the 
original price used in the main study; Case 2: the outcomes of the main study; Case 3: the original 
imbalance price is increased by 5%. 
The day-ahead market clearing price is delivered in Table 6.5. In addition, the wind power 
scheduled for different imbalance prices is provided in Figure 6.4. It can be seen that the day-ahead 
price for case 1 in risk level 10 decreases compared to the main case, i.e. Case 2. The strategic wind 
power producer bids in such a way as to reduce the market price and consequently sell a higher 
portion of its production in the day-ahead market (See Figure 6.4). This behaviour results since the 
imbalance price in Case 1 is low and therefore, the producer can easily compensate for its deviation 
from the day-ahead schedule in the balancing market at a low price. On the other hand, in case 3 
where the expected imbalance price is high, both risk-neutral and risk-averse producers tend to 
increase the day-ahead market price. Thus, the risk-neutral can increase its profit in a higher day-
ahead price. In addition, this producer reduces its share in the day-ahead market with the hope of 
selling energy in the balancing market at a higher price (Figure 6.4). However, the risk-averse 
producer does not take the deviation risk in case 3 with high imbalance prices. Therefore, it has no 
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participation in the day-ahead market with the aim of selling in the balancing market with the 
perfect knowledge of the market price as well as its power production. 
 
Table  6.5. Impact of the imbalance price on the DA market price ($/MWh) 
 
0.95% Imb. price Imb. price 1.05% Imb. price 
𝜌=0 30 30 31 
𝜌=10 30 31 32 
 
 
Figure  6.4. Impact of imbalance price on wind power in the DA market 
The participation of the wind power producer in the balancing market for various imbalance 
prices is shown in Table 6.6. The strategic behaviour of the producer is obvious, where in both risk 
levels it has to buy significant energy in case 1 while it has a substantial sales share in case 3. 
 
Table  6.6. Impact of the imbalance price on the wind power participation in the balancing market (MWh) 
 
0.95% Imb. price Imb. price 1.05% Imb. price 
𝜌=0 -696 -366 1283 
𝜌=10 -696 1283 4726 
 
In addition, the total demand cleared in different imbalance prices are shown in Figure 6.5. 
Imbalance prices affect the total demand scheduled in the day-ahead market, where higher 
imbalance prices lead to a falling trend in the demand served. 
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Figure  6.5. Impact of imbalance price on demand scheduled in the DA market 
 
Finally, the impact of imbalance prices on the total DR procurement by the wind power producer 
is given in Table 6.7. The producer in both risk levels for case 1 is not willing to buy DR and thus, 
offers a low DR price to the aggregator (i.e. $27.44/MWh). On the other hand, both risk-neutral and 
risk-averse producers buy significant DR in high imbalance prices to cope with the risk of the 
balancing market (Case 3). Consequently, they offer $31/MWh to the DR aggregator and obtain 500 
and 450 MW DR respectively. 
 
Table  6.7. Impact of the imbalance price on DR procurement by the wind power producer (MW, $/MWh) 
 
0.95% Imb. price Imb. price 1.05% Imb. price 
 Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price 
𝜌=0 0 27.44 0 27.4 500 31 
𝜌=10 0 27.44 500 31 450 31 
 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter proposes a wind offering strategy through which a strategic wind power producer 
purchases demand response (DR) from a DR aggregator. The problem is formulated using a bilevel 
approach, where the upper-level represents the wind producer profit maximization while the lower-
level problems respectively model the day-ahead market clearing process and the DR aggregator 
behaviour. The problem is then transformed into a linear approach through proper techniques. 
The overall problem is solved using stochastic programming in which the risk is carried out 
using CVaR. It is assessed on a case of the Nordic Market. The main findings are as follows.  
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1. A strategic wind power producer affects the market by using its market power to fix the 
market price.  
2. A risk-neutral producer plays strategically to increase its profit in the day-ahead market 
while the risk-averse producer uses its market power in such a way to compensate for 
possible deviations in the balancing market. In addition, the risk-averse producer tends to 
employ more DR for this purpose.  
3.  Imbalance prices have a significant impact on the behaviour of a strategic wind producer 
in the market as well as DR procurement.  
Note that the proposed approach is applicable in electricity markets integrating substantial wind 
power production. Such markets with the mentioned regulatory framework exist in the real world, 
where Western Denmark, Germany and the state of South Australia are leaders. Note also that the 
market regulators are constantly updating the regulatory framework to overcome new issues. With 
regards to wind and renewable resources for instance, they first initiated new policies and incentives 
such as feed-in-tariff (FIT) schemes to grow these resources. However, as these resources became 
significant in some countries such as Denmark and Germany, they changed the rules and policies. 
For instance, Denmark has replaced FIT with a fixed premium payment in 2000, which is paid on 
top of earnings by wind farms in the market [101]. Furthermore, they may need to revise the rules 
and policies due to the significant increase of wind production which may bring several issues such 
as exercising market power. Therefore, the study of a price-maker wind producer may help the 
market regulator to better design rules and policies, which would result in increasing the 
competiveness of the market [79].  
 
The next chapter targets electricity retailers, as active players on the demand side, and presents 
the studies of the application of DR in their energy procurement problems. 
 
6.7 Nomenclature 
A) Indices 
b  Index for block of generators 
c  Index for customers 
db  Index for demand blocks  
dru  Index for DR units 
du  Index for demand units 
gu  Index for generator units 
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s  Index for scenario in the lower-level problem  
t  Index for time 
w  Index for scenarios in the upper-level problem 
wu  Index for wind units 
B) Parameters 
, ( )DR TC t  Total DR capacity 
 ,WPP t w  Wind power production in scenario 𝑤 
, ( , )W ofP wu t  Offered wind power in the DA market  
( , , )DMaxP du db t  Upper level of demand unit 𝑑𝑢, block 𝑑𝑏 
( , )DRMaxP dru t  Upper level of DR unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 
( , , )GMaxP gu b t  Upper level of generation unit 𝑔𝑢, block 𝑔𝑏 
 , ,D du db t  Marginal utility of demand 𝑑𝑢, block 𝑑𝑏 
 , ,C c t s  DR price by competitor 𝑐 in scenario 𝑠 
( )DR t  DR price offered by the wind producer 
, ( , )DR DA dru t  Marginal cost of DR unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 
 , ,G gu b t  Marginal cost of generator 𝑔𝑢, block 𝑏 
Im ( , )b t w  Imbalance price in scenario w 
, ( , )W of wu t  Offer price by the wind producer unit 𝑤𝑢 
( )w , ( )s  Probability of scenario 𝑤/ scenario 𝑠 
 
C) Variables 
( , , )DP du db t  Demand scheduled of unit 𝑑𝑢, block 𝑑𝑏 
( )DRP t  DR obtained by the wind power producer 
, ( , )DR DAP dru t  DR scheduled for aggregator unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 
( , , )GP gu b t  Power scheduled for generator unit 𝑔𝑢, block 𝑏 
Im ( , )bP t w  Imbalance power by the wind producer 
( , )WDAP wu t  Wind power scheduled in the DA market for wind unit 𝑤𝑢 
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( , , )Csp c t s  DR share percentage of competitor 𝑐 in scenario 𝑠 
, ( , )DR DAsp dru t  DR share percentage of the DA market 
( , )Wsp t s  DR share percentage of the wind producer 
( )DA t  DA market price 
 , ( )w  Auxiliary variable for CVaR calculation 
 
D) Numbers and Sets 
bN  Number of generator blocks 
dbN  Number of demand blocks 
druN  Number of DR units 
duN  Number of demand units 
guN  Number of generator units 
sN  Number of scenarios in the lower-level problem 
TCN  Number of customers 
wN  Number of scenarios in the upper-level problem 
wuN  Number of wind power producer units 
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  Chapter 7
Employing Demand Response by 
Electricity Retailers 
 
7.1 Introduction1 
Electricity retailers are intermediary companies, which buy electricity from wholesale markets 
and sell to consumers. Electricity retailers participate in the pool market to procure part of their 
energy. Pool prices are volatile and in some cases see spikes. This imposes on retailers a significant 
level of risk. For instance, the real-time price for the state of Queensland, Australia during January 
2011 is shown in Figure 7.1 [128]. As can be seen, while the price is mostly smooth, it faces huge 
spikes in some periods, which reaches just under $3,000/MWh.  
As a resource to mitigate risk, electricity retailers can employ DR. A few studies in the literature 
address this concept. The authors in [86] use interruptible loads to alleviate the uncertainty of pool 
markets faced by a load serving entity. Two interruptible load contracts, pay-in-advance and pay-as-
you-go, are evaluated in [92] as the supply to retailers. Self-production is also used in [93] to limit 
the risk of cost fluctuations in pool markets. Reference [94] uses interruptible loads as an energy 
resource of distribution companies. A short-term deterministic model is presented in [95] where 
distribution companies can use interruptible loads to bid in the market. Besides interruptible loads, 
                                                          
1
 This chapter covers the following references: 
4. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha, Mehdi Eghbal, “A new demand response scheme for electricity retailers”, 
Electric Power Systems Research, Volume 108, March 2014, Pages 144–152. 
5. Nadali Mahmoudi, Mehdi Eghbal, Tapan K. Saha, “Employing Demand Response in Energy Procurement Plans 
of Electricity Retailers", International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems, Volume 63, December 
2014, Pages 455–460. 
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real-time pricing and time-of-use are also offered by retailers to alter the electricity usage of 
consumers [96].  
Figure ‎7.1. Real-time prices of the Queensland region during January 2011 
This chapter aims at demonstrating the application of DR in the energy procurement problem of 
electricity retailers, where the proposed DR framework in Chapter 3 is employed here. This 
framework allows retailers to decide how to procure various DR agreements from aggregators or 
large consumers in order to manage the risk of pool price fluctuations.  Retailers are able to 
purchase DR through secure contracts (forward DR). They can also set DR option agreements 
(pool-order and spike-order options) which their exercising depends on pool market variations. 
Finally, they can rely on real-time DR (reward-based DR), its outcome being influenced by 
customers’ behaviour. 
The effectiveness of the proposed DR framework is evaluated on an energy procurement 
problem, in which a retailer minimizes its energy cost while maintaining its desired risk level. It is 
assumed that the retailer employs DR in addition to forward contracts and pool markets. A 
stochastic programming approach is formulated, where pool prices and customer’s behaviour are 
uncertain. The risk is modelled by conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). The problem is analysed on a 
realistic case of the Queensland region within the Australian NEM. 
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. DR contracts which are proposed to be 
used by electricity retailers are discussed in section 7.2. After that the wholesale resources, i.e. the 
pool market and forward contracts are explained. The problem formulations and case study come 
next. Sections 7.6 and 7.7 respectively represent the summary and nomenclature parts. 
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7.2 Employing DR by Electricity Retailers  
The proposed DR framework for retailers is shown in Figure 7.2. The retailer can set various DR 
contracts with DR aggregators or even consumers. Each contract is determined with a specific 
volume of DR, a certain price and the period in which the given contract is applied. Each contract 
has unique features which are discussed in this section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  7.2. The DR framework in the energy problem of a retailer 
 
7.2.1 Pool-Order Option 
A retailer may be interested in avoiding pool price fluctuations, even though they are small. In 
this way, it can arrange a pool-order option with a DR aggregator. Indeed, the pool-order option 
price is set in order to cover the possible cost imposed by normal pool price fluctuations. According 
to this contract the retailer has the right but not an obligation to purchase DR in real time. That is, 
the retailer signs this contract at the beginning of the decision time horizon. However, exercising 
the contract at the energy delivery time depends on whether it is profitable or not. If the contract is 
not exercised, the retailer has to pay a predetermined fee to the DR aggregator as the penalty of not 
exercising the contract.  
The cost of pool-order options is mathematically formulated as:  
1 1
( ) ( ). ( ). ( ). ( ) (1 ( )). ( )
poNT
pen
po po po po po
t po
C PO P t t v t d t v t f t
 
    
 
 (7.1) 
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Equation (7.1) represents the cost of the given pool-order option over the considered time 
horizon. It consists of two terms addressing the cost of practicing a pool-order option and the 
penalty of not exercising the agreed contract.  
7.2.2 Spike-Order Option 
A spike-order option agreement is proposed as a way to limit the huge cost faced by retailers 
during price spikes. This option is similar to the pool-order option, in which the retailer has the right 
but not an obligation to buy DR from a DR aggregator. The difference is that spike-order options 
are arranged to be used during periods with a possibility of price spikes. When retailers and DR 
aggregators set this contract they negotiate on a desired price, called a strike price. Considering the 
strike price, the retailer can decide whether or not to exercise the spike-order option at the delivery 
time. Note that similar to the pool-order option, the retailer has to pay a predetermined penalty if the 
contract is not exercised at the clearing time.  
The cost of spike-order options is given in (7.2).  
1 1
( ) ( ). ( ). ( ). ( ) (1 ( )). ( )
soNT Str pen
so so so so so
t so
C SO P t t v t d t v t f t
 
    
 
 (7.2) 
7.2.3 Forward (Fixed) DR 
The retailer buys forward DR from aggregators for a future period. The price of typical forward 
contracts is usually determined in one of the following ways [129]: 
 Over-the-Counter Market: prices are directly negotiated between the buyer and the seller 
of forward contracts.  
 Exchange-Trade Market: this is a market where standardized contracts with given size 
and price are traded. The benefit of this type of trading is that prices are cleared and 
settled through a centralized clearing house. 
Since the proposed DR provides a bilateral trading scheme between retailers and DR providers, 
the over-the-counter market is considered for forward DR agreements.  
Forward DR contracts are offered in various blocks. The cost of forward DR is given as follows.  
, ,
1 1 1
( ) ( ). ( ). ( )
FDR BDRN NT DR DR
f b f b
t f b
C FDR P t t d t
  
     (7.3) 
,
, ,
0 ( ) ( )DR DR MAXf b f bP t P t   (7.4) 
Expressions (7.3) and (7.4) show the cost of forward contracts and the boundary size of each 
contract’s block, respectively.  
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7.2.4 Reward-Based DR 
In addition to the mentioned bilateral DR contracts, a retailer may decide to implement reward-
based DR with consumers. A reward-based DR function is modelled in a stepwise curve as shown 
in Figure 7.3. Based on this function, the volume of load reduction increases in a stepwise trend as 
the retailer offers higher rewards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  7.3. The reward-based DR curve 
In addition, the uncertainty of customers’ behaviour is required to be taken into account. This is 
modelled using a scenario-based participation factor ( ( , )PF w t ). This factor ranges between 0 and 1. 
Zero means that customers do not respond to the reward offered in the proposed reward-based DR. 
As this factor increases the participation rate grows. Finally, the participation factor equal to 1 
indicates that the entire reward-based DR potential is attainable. Note that each participation 
scenario is identified with its own probability, where the summation of all probabilities is equal to 
one.  
The overall reward-based DR is modelled as: 
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Expressions (7.5)-(7.8) represent the total reduced demand by customers as a function of the 
reward offered by the retailer.  
Taking into account the given DR equations (7.5)-(7.8), the expected cost of the reward-based 
DR over all scenarios is: 
           
1 1 1
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 (7.9) 
7.3 Wholesale Market Suppliers 
7.3.1 Pool Market 
The retailer is able to either buy energy from or sell to the pool market. Pool prices are uncertain 
and thus they are modelled using their plausible realizations. As a result, the expected cost of the 
pool market depends on price scenarios and is formulated as follows: 
1 1
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7.3.2 Forward Contracts  
A forward contract is usually set in different blocks, where each block is represented in a specific 
size and price. These blocks are provided in a stepwise manner where the price increases as the 
quantity of energy grows [16].  
The cost of forward contracts is given in (7.11). Each forward agreement is also controlled by a 
minimum and maximum demand in (7.12). 
, ,
1 1 1
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7.4 Problem Formulation 
The proposed cost function (CF) consists of the cost terms as well as the risk measure (see 7.13). 
The first two terms respectively represent the costs of the pool market and forward contracts. The 
next four components address the costs of DR, where they are respectively the cost of reward-based 
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DR, pool-order options, spike-order options and fixed (forward) DR contracts. The last term 
indicates the CVaR which is weighted using the risk factor. The risk level (𝜌 =[0- )) represents 
the trade-off between the expected cost and risk. A conservative retailer willing to minimize the risk 
chooses a large value of the risk factor. On the other hand, a risk-neutral retailer prefers lower costs 
and consequently selects a risk factor close to 0. 
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The cost function is subject to the following constraints: 
 Expression (7.4) as the boundary limit of forward DR; 
 Equations (7.5)-(7.8), indicating the reward-based DR model; 
 The forward contracts enforcement (7.12); 
 CVaR constraints: 
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( ) 0;w w    (7.15) 
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 The power balance equation: 
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    
 (7.16) 
 
7.5 Case Study 
7.5.1 Decision Time Horizon 
The proposed problem is evaluated on the peak periods of summer and winter seasons in 
Queensland. The time horizon is divided into 32 periods, where each period corresponds to the peak 
times of one week. These periods consist of 12 weeks of January-March, 17 weeks of June-
September and 3 weeks of December. Note that the peak period of summer days is from 11am to 
9pm while those of winter days are from 6am to 10am and 4pm to 10pm. Note also that the values 
of demand and price for each period are taken by averaging their values in the peak times of 
Monday-Friday in each week.  
A new factor, called the peak-to-average-ratio (PAR) is introduced in [23]. This ratio for daily 
load profiles is: 
24
1
( )
1
)
..
(
24 t
Max L t
PAR
L t



 
(7.17) 
Where ( )L t is the demand at hour t . This concept is used here to evaluate the chosen peak 
periods. 
First, the PAR is calculated for the annual load curve of Queensland in 2012. The peak demand 
in 2012 is 8,706MW and the average value is 5,826MW. Hence, the PAR is approximately equal to 
1.49.  
Then the PAR is calculated in a way that instead of the maximum demand in the numerator, the 
average of the peak demand in the chosen peak periods is used. This value over the considered 32 
periods is around 6,654MW. Therefore, the value of the PAR is 1.14. It can be said that the PAR 
calculated based on the chosen periods (1.14) is around 24% lower than the annual PAR (1.49). 
Since the denominators in both calculated PARs are the same (both denominators are the average 
value of annual demand) it can be said that the chosen periods cover approximately the top 24% of 
the peak load in 2012.  
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Decisions on the given energy resources are made as follows. The retailer signs long-term 
derivatives, i.e. forward, pool-order options, spike-order options and forward DR at the beginning 
of the decision horizon. Throughout the time frame, decisions on 1) the execution of pool-order and 
spike-order options, 2) energy procurement from the pool market and 3) the energy obtained from 
reward-based DR, are taken. 
7.5.2 Data Preparation and Assumptions 
There are various retailers active in the Queensland region where the largest company provides 
around 50% of the total demand [144]. Thus the demand of the given retailer in this study is 
assumed to be equal to 50% of the Queensland demand for each period in 2012 [128]. Note that the 
demand of each period is calculated by averaging the peak periods of working days in the 
considered week.  
The pool price is an uncertain input, which needs to be modelled stochastically. This is 
characterized using proper scenarios. An ARIMA model is applied here. ARIMA models are not 
very accurate for capturing the nonlinearity and volatility of price data. However, this study 
considers weekly prices, which obviously have a lower level of variability. Hence, the ARIMA 
model provides results with an acceptable accuracy for this case study. In order to prove this 
statement, the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) index is calculated here, which is equal to 
8.38%. Comparing this MAPE with other methods [145], the ARIMA outcome is reasonable.  
A series of pool prices for Queensland from 2006-2012 is used to generate price scenarios [128]. 
This work uses the ARIMA model. A standard form of the ARIMA model is as follows. 
 
1 1
1 1 1
QP di i
i t i t
i i
B B y B 
 
  
      
   
 (7.18) 
where φ1, … , φ𝑃 and θ1, … , θ𝑄 are 𝑃 autoregressive and 𝑄 moving average parameters, 
respectively. 𝐵𝑖 is the weight of each parameters and ϵt stands for an uncorrelated normal stochastic 
process with mean zero and variance σt
2 and is referred to as white noise, innovation term, or error 
term. yt is the stochastic process. B is the backshift operator and d represents the difference order. 
The ARIMA model with its estimated parameters using Queensland prices from 2006-2012 is 
shown in (7.19). The first bracketed term indicates the autoregressive parameters. The second 
bracketed term represents the seasonality of the price data which is for each of 32 periods. The third 
bracketed term differentiates the process to make it stable in terms of the mean value. The logarithm 
function is also applied to stabilize the variance of prices. The right hand side of the equation states 
the moving average parameters. ( )t  refers to the white noise or error term. 
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 (7.19) 
The standard deviation of the error is 0.586. Using the given ARIMA model, 150 sets of price 
scenarios are randomly generated for each period.  
In addition, the behaviour of customers in reward-based DR is another source of uncertainty. For 
this purpose, five scenarios, ranging between 0 and 1 are randomly generated. These scenarios 
represent the participation factor in the reward-based cost function. Furthermore, five demand 
scenarios are generated to address the uncertainty of customers’ demand.  
Forward contracts span each quarter of a year in the NEM. Therefore, three contracts (F1-F3) are 
considered here. F1 spans the periods of quarter 1, F2 covers the 17 weeks of winter and F3 relates 
to the December period. It is assumed that each forward contract involves six blocks, where each 
block is defined with a certain price and a maximum demand size. The forward prices of the 
Queensland region for each quarter of 2012 are used here [144]. Note that the maximum demand of 
each block in each period is 450MW. 
Four pool-order and five spike-order options are taken into account. Each agreement involves a 
specific volume of demand and a negotiated price. The maximum demand quantities of each pool-
order and spike-order option are 50 and 75MW respectively. The penalty of not exercising each 
option by the retailer is equal to 15% of the contract cost value. This penalty depends on the size of 
the contracted option and also the period in which the given option is set. 
It is assumed that each forward DR contract is signed for a period of one month. Hence, eight 
forward DR agreements are provided covering eight given months of the planning horizon. Similar 
to forward contracts, each forward DR involves six blocks where the maximum contracted demand 
for each block is 75MW. 
With regards to the reward-based DR, 21 successive steps are considered in the presented 
stepwise function.  
The total potential of the given DR is around 30% of the entire demand. This potential is derived 
based on the trial DR potential carried out in Australia [146]. Figures 7.4-7.6 and Tables 7.1-7.2 
illustrate the aforementioned input data. 
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Figure  7.4. The expected demand required by the retailer 
 
 
 
Figure  7.5. Pool-order option prices 
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Figure  7.6. Spike-order option prices 
 
Table ‎7.1. Forward prices ($/MWh) 
 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
F1 40 45 50 55 60 65 
F2 38 42 46 50 54 58 
F3 39 44 49 54 59 64 
 
Table  7.2. Forward DR prices ($/MWh) 
 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
FDR1 35 37 39 41 43 45 
FDR2 32 34 36 38 40 42 
FDR3 29 31 33 35 37 39 
FDR4 33 35 37 39 41 43 
FDR5 45 47 49 51 53 55 
FDR6 51 53 55 57 59 61 
FDR7 56 58 60 62 64 66 
FDR8 69 71 73 75 77 79 
 
7.5.3 Numerical Results and Discussions 
The given problem is mixed-integer linear programming, which is solved using CPLEX 11.1.1 
under GAMS [131]. 
The expected cost versus standard deviation for various risk levels is shown in Figure 7.7. While 
a risk-neutral retailer (ρ=0) spends around $4.72 million, the energy cost of the most conservative 
retailer (ρ=5) is $5.3 million. On the other hand, the values of standard deviations for the risky and 
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conservative retailers are approximately $2.08 million and $333,000 respectively. This means that 
the risk-neutral retailer obtains an 11% reduction in the expected cost compared to the conservative 
one. However, this retailer expects about 83% higher cost deviation. In other words, risk-neutral 
retailers are expected to buy their energy at lower costs while facing much higher cost fluctuations.  
 
Figure  7.7. The expected cost vs. standard deviation 
 
Figure 7.8 depicts the share of each resource in the total required energy by the retailer. The 
significant results are as follows. 
 As the risk factor increases the share of DR resources grows. This is more obvious from ρ=0 to 
ρ=0.2, where the DR share increases more than twice. For larger risk levels by ρ=5 the DR 
contribution slightly increases to around 25%. This increment rate illustrates that the proposed 
DR agreements are more beneficial to conservative retailers than risky ones. This is reasonable 
since the given DR, particularly the long-term agreements are reliable resources. 
 Since the pool market is a volatile resource, its energy share significantly drops once the risk 
factor rises. This trend is reversed for forward contracts. 
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Figure  7.8. The share of each resource in total required energy by the retailer 
 
Table 7.3 provides the percentage of each DR resource in the energy share of the retailer. As the 
retailer becomes more risk-averse, the share of all DR programs increases. This increment is 
significant in forward DR, where the DR share is around 4% for the risk-neutral retailer and around 
14% for the most risk-averse one, i.e. 10% increment. The growth rate of pool-order and spike order 
options as well as reward-based DR is around 2%. 
 
Table  7.3. The percentage of each DR in total energy (%) 
𝜌 
Forward 
DR 
Pool-Order 
Option 
Spike-Order 
Option 
Reward-
based DR 
Total 
0 3.96 3.02 2.26 0.61 9.86 
0.2 12.55 3.63 2.55 1.40 20.13 
0.5 13.58 4.38 3.68 1.87 23.51 
0.7 13.58 4.71 3.82 1.98 24.09 
1 13.58 4.71 3.82 2.05 24.16 
5 13.58 4.81 4.17 2.20 24.76 
 
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 provide the percentage of each resource in summer and winter seasons 
respectively. The main results interpreted from these Figures are listed below.  
 Though the proportions of DR resources in summer and winter increase as the retailer 
becomes more risk averse, this growth rate is higher in summer than winter. For instance, 
for ρ=5 DR programs account for around 26% of the summer share compared to 23% of 
winter energy. Additionally, it can be seen that more pool-order and spike-order options are 
exercised in summer than in winter.  
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 Conservative retailers prefer to sell energy to the pool market in winter. This is more 
obvious from ρ=0.2 to ρ=0.5, where the sold energy to the pool market becomes almost 
double. 
 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 respectively represent the periods in which pool-order (PO) and spike-order 
(SO) options are exercised.  
From Table 7.4 it can be seen that a risk-neutral retailer only practices PO1 and PO2. For ρ=0.2, 
PO3 is also applied. For higher values of risk PO4 is also used in some periods. Similar to pool-
order options, more spike-order options are utilized once the risk level increases (Table 7.5). The 
risk-neutral retailer uses only SO1. For ρ=0.2, SO2 is also applied in some periods. SO3 is 
exercised for the risk value of 0.5 and higher than that. SO4 is practiced for ρ=1 and ρ=5. Note that 
SO5 is not used in this case. 
 
Figure  7.9. The percentage of energy procured from each resource in summer 
 
 Chapter 7. Employing Demand Response by Electricity Retailers  
 
130 
 
 
Figure  7.10. The percentage of energy procured from each resource in winter 
 
Table  7.4. Exercised periods of pool-order options 
𝜌 PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4 
0 1--32 1--32 Not Employed (NE) NE 
0.2 1--32 1--32 5,7,10,21,24-32 NE 
0.5 1--32 1--32 1-3,5-8,10,11,17-32 5,7,26,30 
0.7 1--32 1--32 1-8,10,11,13,17-32 5-8,10,11,24,26,30 
1 1--32 1--32 1-11,13,17-32 5-8,10,11,30,32 
5 1--32 1--32 1-13,17-21,23-26,28-32 1-3,5-8,10,11,30,32 
 
 
Table  7.5. Exercised periods of spike-order options 
𝜌 SO1 SO2 SO3 SO4 SO5 
0 1--32 Not Employed (NE) NE NE NE 
0.2 1--32 5,7,10,11 NE NE NE 
0.5 1--32 1-13,19,20,24,28,29 5,7 NE NE 
0.7 1--32 1-13,19,20,23,24,28,29 5,7,11 NE NE 
1 1--32 1-13,15,1719,20,23,24,29 5,7 NE NE 
5 1--32 1-15,17,19,20,24,29 5-8,10,11 7 NE 
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7.6 Summary 
This chapter employs the proposed DR framework for electricity retailers. Various long-term and 
real-time DR contracts including pool-order options, spike-order options, forward DR and reward-
based DR are used. These resources are applied as energy suppliers of a retailer in addition to the 
forward contracts and the pool market. A stochastic energy procurement problem is formulated 
where pool prices and customers’ enrolment in the reward-based DR are uncertain. The proposed 
scheme is evaluated on a realistic case of the Australian NEM for different risk levels. The main 
outcomes are as follows.  
 The case study shows the feasibility of the proposed DR framework for retailers. The 
scheme allows retailers to procure their energy from various DR contracts. 
 Depending on the risk level, retailers change their energy share from the proposed DR 
agreements. The risk-neutral retailer obtains around 10% of its energy from the given DR 
agreements. This share for the most conservative retailer (ρ=5) increases to around 25%. 
Forward DR agreements play a significant role in this increment with about 10% growth.  
 The DR framework is employed in summer and winter. However, the usage rate in summer 
is higher than that in winter. This higher percentage is mostly due to the increasing usage of 
DR options.  
 
The next chapter will study a market with high penetration of wind and PV power and proposes a 
co-optimization problem for ISOs in which they encourage DR aggregators to participate in reserve 
markets to alleviate renewable resources uncertainty. 
 
7.7 Nomenclature 
A) Indices 
b  Index for blocks in forward contracts  
f  Index for forward contracts  
i  Index for ARIMA parameters’ order  
j  Index for intervals in reward-based DR  
po  Index for pool-order options  
so  Index for spike-order options  
t  Index for time  
w  Index for scenarios  
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B) Parameters 
B  Backshift operator in ARIMA models 
iB  ARIMA parameters’ weight 
d  The difference order in ARIMA models 
( )d t  Duration of period t  
( )penpof t  Penalty of not exercising pool-order option po  during period t  
( )pensof t  Penalty of not exercising spike-order option so  during period t  
( )L t  Load demand at hour t  
,
,
( )DR MAX
f b
P t  Upper limit of demand in the bth  block of forward DR f  during period t  
( )DRjP t  Demand of the jth  step of stepwise DR 
, ( )
MAX
f bP t  
Upper limit of demand in the bth  block of forward contract f  during 
period t  
( )poP t  Power bought from pool-order po  in period t  
( )soP t  Power bought from spike-order so  in period t  
( , )reqP t w  Required power by the retailer in period t  
( , )PF w t  Scenario-based participation factor 
( )DRjR t  Upper limit of the jth  interval of stepwise DR 
ty  Stochastic process in ARIMA models 
  Confidence level 
  Risk level 
( )po t  Price of pool-order option po  during period t  
, ( )
DR
f b t  Price of the bth  block of forward DR f  during period t  
, ( )
F
f b t  Price of the bth  block of forward f  during period t  
( , )p t w  Pool-price scenario w  during period t  
( )Strso t  Strike price of spike-order so  during period t  
i  Autoregressive parameter i  in ARIMA models 
i  Moving average parameter i  in ARIMA models 
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( )w  Probability of scenario w  
C) Variables 
( )DRP t  Power bought from reward-based DR in period t  
, ( )
DR
f bP t  
Power bought from the bth  block of forward DR f  
, ( )
F
f bP t  
Power bought from the bth  block of forward f  
( , )pP t w  Power traded in the pool in period t and scenario w  
( )DRR t  Reward offered by the retailer in period t  
( )DRjR t  
Reward of the jth  interval of stepwise DR  
, ( )DR jv t  Binary variable indicating if the jth  interval of reward-based DR is applied in 
period t  
( )pov t  Binary variable indicating if pool-order option po  is exercised in period t  
( )sov t  Binary variable indicating if spike-order option so  is exercised in period t  
( )w  Auxiliary variable for calculating CVaR 
  Auxiliary variable for calculating CVaR 
D) Numbers and Sets 
BDRN  Number of given blocks in forward DR 
FN  Number of forward contracts 
FBN  Number of forward contract’s blocks 
FDRN  Number of forward DR contracts 
JN  Number of intervals in the reward-based DR 
poN  Number of pool-order options 
soN  Number of spike-order options 
wN  Number of scenarios 
P  Set for autoregressive parameters in ARIMA models 
Q  Set for moving average parameters in ARIMA models 
T  Set for time period 
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  Chapter 8
Demand Response Application in an 
Electricity Market Integrating Wind and 
PV Resources 
 
8.1 Introduction1 
High penetration of renewable resources brings some challenges to electricity markets. Wind 
power, usually in a large scale, is uncertain and non-dispatchable. The good thing however is that as 
wind penetration becomes significant, it is expected to be treated similar to conventional power 
plants. This observation is not valid for PV power, where it is usually on the demand side. Indeed, 
PV power imposes uncertainty to demand, which causes more difficulties in market dispatch carried 
out by ISOs.  
Investigations are underway to resolve the above issues. A review of the literature indicates the 
majority of work is dedicated to wind related problems and their proposed solutions. Wind 
integration from an ISO point of view is modelled in some studies as in [102, 103, 108, 114]. The 
studies on PV are not as many as that of wind incorporation. A solar-powered micro-gird is studied 
in [147] where its pricing mechanism is proposed. A model for participating concentrating solar 
power in the market is proposed in [122], where the unit can use storage to increase its revenue. 
Economic impacts of solar power on the PJM electricity market are analysed in [123].  
                                                          
1
 This chapter covers the following reference: 
6. Nadali Mahmoudi, Tapan K. Saha “Demand Response Application in an Electricity Market Integrating Wind 
and PV resources”, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grids (Submitted, 12 Feb. 2015). 
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There is no investigation which explicitly studies a system integrating both PV (small units) and 
wind power production while employing DR for easing their intermittency. This chapter studies an 
electricity market integrating wind and solar power. A single-period auction including energy and 
reserve markets is taken into account. In this context, wind power producers operate like 
conventional power plants, with the exception that they may only be capable of doing reserve down 
in the market. Additionally, plausible realizations of wind power production are taken into account 
to address wind power uncertainty. Load comprises three parts. The majority of the load is 
considered as an inelastic demand to be supplied in the energy market. In addition, PV power 
production is presented as a negative load deducted from the original load. PV power is variable, 
which is modelled as an uncertainty of the demand side. Finally, a limited specific portion of the 
load is considered to be elastic. A DR aggregator is proposed, which is responsible for this elastic 
load. The DR aggregator indeed enrols in the reserve market as a regulation up/down provider. The 
overall problem is formulated as a stochastic market dispatch problem carried out by an ISO. The 
problem is evaluated on a test case and also the IEEE RTS 24 bus system [103]. PV and wind 
power for this system are modelled from the Australian NEM realistic data. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 discusses the proposed market clearing model 
from an ISO’s point of view. The case study is presented in the next section. The summary of the 
chapter and the nomenclature are explained in sections 8.4 and 8.5, respectively. 
8.2 The Proposed Model 
The proposed model studies a single-period market, which is more similar to the market dispatch 
presented in [103] than the security constrained unit commitment analysed in [148]. The model 
decides on the energy dispatch and reserve deployment. Indeed, energy decisions are made on the 
day prior to the market dispatch while those of the reserve market are cleared in real time. The 
following procedure is used in the proposed model.  
Conventional power plants place their offer in the market while determining the maximum ramp 
up and ramp down that they can provide in the reserve market. The spinning reserve market is only 
modelled in this work. Nevertheless, non-spinning reserves can be included in the model with some 
modification. The cost associated with these power plants is given in (8.1). In addition, the size 
limit of the scheduled power of the generating unit 𝑔 in the day-ahead market is enforced in (8.2). 
This limit for upward and downward regulation is posed in (8.3) and (8.4), respectively. Finally, 
constraint (8.5) ensures the total participation of the power plant does not exceed its maximum 
capacity.  
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Wind power producers are also able to offer their energy in the market. However, these 
producers can only make regulation down in the reserve market. This is the current practice for 
some semi-scheduled wind power producers in the Australian National Electricity Market [128]. In 
addition, similar to [103] the cost of downward regulation is assumed to be identical to the cost 
offer of the producer in the market . The cost function corresponding to the offer of wind power 
producer 𝑤𝑝 is calculated as follows. 
,( ).
S r
wp wwp p wPC P   (8.6) 
 
The wind spillage (downward regulation reserve by the wind power producer) is: 
, , ,
r total S spill
wp w wp w wp wp wP PP P    (8.7) 
 
Substituting (8.7) in (8.6), and since the term 𝐶𝑤𝑝𝑃𝑤𝑝,𝑤
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is constant, the cost term of (8.6) can be 
simplified as follows.  
,.
spill
wp wwpC P  (8.8) 
0 S Expecwp wpP P   (8.9) 
,0
spill S
wp w wpP P   (8.10) 
 
Constraints (8.9) and (8.10) respectively impose the power scheduled in the day-ahead market 
and the spilled wind power in real time.  
On the other hand, demand is considered to be mainly inelastic. Small-scale PV systems such as 
roof-top PV are taken into account as negative load. These systems have widely been used in 
Australia, particularly in the states of Queensland and South Australia. Some serious issues they 
have brought to the power system are voltage fluctuations, power quality problems and market 
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clearing issues. Of course, this chapter’s concern is on market related problems. Figure 8.1 indicates 
a typical weekly load profile of South Australia (SA) for a summer season (14-20 Jan 2013). It is 
obvious how PV production affects the load shape during the day. Additionally, the uncertainty of 
PV is noticeable, where for instance PV production in some periods such as the first day is 
significant while in others like the fourth day is small. This change and uncertainty may cause the 
shutdown of some power plants and in the worst case, wind power spillage. This is an obvious 
disadvantage since huge subsidies are spent in increasing wind power penetration while the market 
operator has to spill part of wind power as a result of PV production. For this reason, demand 
response (DR) is included as a solution. Therefore, DR aggregators are allowed to enrol in the 
reserve market. They can provide both types of reserves, i.e. upward and downward. Indeed, in the 
upward regulation they ask their customers to reduce their load while in the downward regulation 
they encourage consumers to consume more energy.  
Overall the load model is formulated in (8.11). 
,
,
l w
OrglNet PV
l wl
L L P   (8.11) 
 
Figure  8.1. Original vs. net load profile (SA, 14-22 Jan 2013) 
 
We assume that the part of the load which is inelastic has to be scheduled in the day-ahead 
market and it is derived as follows. 
,
1
( ).
wNOrglS PV
l l wl
w
L L w P

    (8.12) 
Thus, the cost term in the proposed market dispatch is indeed the cost of load shedding, shown in 
(8.13). The maximum load shedding is constrained in (8.14). 
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Finally, the cost related to the participation of DR in the reserve market is illustrated in (8.15). In 
addition, the sizes of regulation up and down are restricted in (8.16) and (8.17), respectively. 
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The ISO aims at maximizing social welfare or minimizing the system cost. Since this study 
assumes that the majority of load is inelastic, the latter objective is used here. 
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0 0.( ) Linenr n r nrB C    (8.21) 
.( ) Linenr n r nrB C    (8.22) 
 
Constraints for generators: (8.2)-(8.5) 
 
Constraints for wind power producers: (8.9)-(8.10)  
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Constraint for load shedding: (8.14)  
Constraints for demand response: (8.16)-(8.17)  
 
The objective function comprises the expected cost of conventional power plants in both energy 
and reserve markets, and the expected cost of demand response, wind spillage and load shedding, 
all in the reserve market. Constraint (8.19) represents the power balance in the day-ahead market 
dispatch at each node. Note that the network losses are disregarded here while the model considers 
a power flow. Constraint (8.20) indicates the power balance enforcement in the reserve market. 
Note that ( , )M g n  in constraints (8.19) and (8.20) shows whether generator g  is connected to bus 
n . The same definition is also valid for other connections in these constraints. 
Constraints (8.21) and (8.22) impose the line capacity limit. The remaining constraints were 
explained earlier. The overall problem is a stochastic mixed-integer programming approach. 
CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [131] is used to solve this problem. 
 
8.3 Case Study 
8.3.1 Three Bus System 
A three-bus system is considered to assess the proposed problem. The information of this system 
is as follows [103]. The data for conventional power plants and demand response is provided in 
Table 8.1. It is assumed that the cost of reserve by conventional power plants is identical to the cost 
of their power production [103]. In addition, the uncertainty of wind and PV power is represented 
by three scenarios each, overall 9 scenarios (Table 8.2). The capacity of each line is limited by 
100MW while the line reactance is 0.13 p.u. Note that for the sake of simplicity, network losses are 
neglected here. The original load located at bus 3 is 200 MW with the assumed VOLL of $1000. In 
addition, we assume that the wind power producer places its offer price at zero. Moreover, the 
maximum wind offer in the market is restricted by the expected wind power scenarios in Table 8.2, 
i.e. 30.5MW. Finally, the amount of load to be scheduled in the day-ahead market is obtained from 
Eq. (8.12). 
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Table ‎8.1. Generator data 
 
Max Power 
(MW) 
Offer  
Cost ($/MWh) 
Upward Cost 
($/MWh) 
Downward Cost 
($/MWh) 
Max 
Upward 
Power (MW) 
Max Downward 
Power  
(MW) 
G1 100 20 20 20 0 0 
G2 50 25 25 25 20 20 
G3 100 30 30 30 30 30 
DR - - 30 30 20 20 
 
 
 
Table  8.2. Wind and PV power scenarios (MW) 
Scenario w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
PV 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30 
Wind 10 10 10 35 35 35 50 50 50 
Probability 
of each 
scenario 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.067 0.067 0.067 
 
 
G
G
G
Bus1 Bus2
Bus3
DR
 
Figure ‎8.2. Three bus system 
 
The DR capacity (Table 8.1) as well as PV and wind power production in Table 8.2 is considered 
as the base case. Consequently, six distinct cases are determined according to the base case (see 
Table 8.3). Note that the values represented for each resource, i.e. DR, PV and wind, indicate the 
percentage of the base case. Note also that the maximum wind offer also changes accordingly. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the uncertainty of PV and wind power increases as the level of 
their penetration grows in the given cases.  
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Table  8.3. Studied cases with various resources integration (%) 
  DR PV Wind 
C0 C0-1 0 0 0 
C1 
C1-1 0 100 100 
C1-2 0 150 100 
C1-3 0 200 100 
C1-4 0 250 100 
C1-5 0 300 100 
C2 
C2-1 100 100 100 
C2-2 100 150 100 
C2-3 100 200 100 
C2-4 100 250 100 
C2-5 100 300 100 
C3 
C3-1 0 150 150 
C3-2 0 200 200 
C3-3 0 250 250 
C3-4 0 300 300 
C4 
C4-1 100 150 150 
C4-2 100 200 200 
C4-3 100 250 250 
C4-4 100 300 300 
C5 
C5-1 200 200 200 
C5-2 200 250 250 
C5-3 200 300 300 
 
The cases provided in Table 8.3 are as follows. 
 C0: the system integrates neither DR nor renewable energy resources. 
 C1: the system only has PV and wind. While wind production is identical to the base 
case, the PV penetration increases up to three times the base PV production. 
 C2: this case is similar to C1, but it includes DR as well. 
 C3: this case simultaneously studies the high penetration of wind and PV production 
while no DR is modelled. 
 C4: C3 is studied while DR is added to the system. 
 C5: this case is similar to C4, but it models the impact of an increasing DR penetration 
level.  
Figure 8.3 displays the cost of the system for different cases. The following observations are 
made from the cost trend. First, it is obvious that integrating wind and PV resources reduces the 
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cost of the system (C0 vs. C1). In addition, introducing a higher penetration level of PV in the 
demand side leads to a decreasing cost of the system (See C1). This reduction is even higher with 
the application of demand response along with using PV (C2). One interesting result is that 
increasing the level of both wind and PV production is costly for the system (C3). In the worst case, 
the cost of the system in comparison with the base case increases by around 40% when the wind 
and PV penetration is three times more than the base case. This cost is alleviated when DR is used 
in the system (See C4). However, there is still an increasing trend for the system cost with regards 
to high levels of PV and wind production. This issue could be resolved when the DR capacity 
increases (C5). The reasons behind all changing trends are discussed in the following by giving 
more results. 
 
Figure  8.3. The cost of the system for various cases 
The amount of load shedding in cases C3, C4 and C5 are delivered in Figure 8.4. The load 
shedding occurs in scenarios 1 and 2 (w1 and w2) only. Note that the load is entirely supplied in 
other cases. The results indicate that load shedding in C3-2 is around 11 MW (only w1), while it is 
approximately 27 and 53 MW for C3-3 and C3-4, respectively. Applying the probability of these 
scenarios, i.e. 0.1, these values respectively come to 1.1, 2.7 and 5.3 MW load shedding in the 
mentioned cases. Indeed, these amounts of load shedding bring a high cost to the system as shown 
in Figure 8.3. Case 4 illustrates that employing DR by the ISO lessens the severity of load shedding. 
C4-2 has no load shedding while C4-3 and C4-4 still suffer from around 0.5 and 2 MW of the load 
that is not supplied. Consider that the DR potential in case 4 is limited by 20 MW and thus it cannot 
help the system to eliminate all the load shortage. This potential is doubled in case 5. Consequently, 
there is almost no load shedding in this case. In addition, the cost of the system significantly drops 
(Figure 8.3). 
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Figure  8.4. Load shedding in various cases 
 
Table 8.4 compares the wind spillage in different cases for individual scenarios. No wind 
spillage is observed in the first four scenarios. These scenarios coincide with low and partly 
medium wind power scenarios in Table 8.2. The main findings from Table 8.4 are as follows. The 
increasing penetration of PV production in the demand side causes more wind spillage. Ultimately, 
in C1-5 where PV production is three times larger, wind is spilled 14.5 and 29.5 MW in scenarios 6 
and 9, respectively. That means the overall spillage of around 4.4 MW in C1-5. The ISO can reduce 
this cut using DR (C2). However, there still exists wind spillage in scenario 9 of C2-4 and C2-5, 
where the PV penetration is considerably high. It is obvious that increasing wind and PV 
penetration simultaneously leads to higher wind spillage (C3). C3-4, where there is the highest wind 
and PV integration, a 21 MW wind cut results. This is just under five times greater than wind 
spillage in C1-5, where the wind penetration is one third. That is, the wind spillage does not follow 
a linear proportion to wind production. Similar to case 2, introducing DR eases the wind spillage 
and increasing its potential can even help more to this end (C2 & C5).  
Table 8.5 illustrates how DR is able to facilitate both load shedding and wind spillage. Note that, 
regulations up and down are shown by ‘U’ and ‘D’, respectively. Note also that regulation up means 
that the DR aggregator exercises load reduction programs while in regulation down it encourages 
consumers to consume more energy. Consider scenarios 1 and 2 (w1 and w2) which coincide with 
the load shedding shown in Figure 8.4. The ISO accepts downward regulation from the DR 
aggregator in low penetration of PV. However, as the penetration of both PV and wind production 
grows, upward regulation is requested from the DR aggregator. In this way, the ISO is able to 
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manage load shedding by using DR (see Figure 8.4, C4 vs. C5). With regards to scenarios 5-9, 
where wind spillage occurs, it can be seen that the DR aggregator only provides downward 
regulation to compensate for this spillage.  
 
Table  8.4. Wind spillage in different scenarios for the given cases (MW)  
Case w1-w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
C0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C1-1 0 0 0 0 0 9.5 
C1-2 0 0 0 0 0 14.5 
C1-3 0 0 4.5 0 0 19.5 
C1-4 0 0 9.5 0 0 24.5 
C1-5 0 0 14.5 0 0 29.5 
C2-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C2-2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C2-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C2-4 0 0 0 0 0 5 
C2-5 0 0 0 0 0 15 
C3-1 0 0 1.75 0 9.25 24.25 
C3-2 0 9 29 19 39 59 
C3-3 0 11.25 36.25 23.75 48.75 73.75 
C3-4 0 13.5 43.5 28.5 58.5 88.5 
C4-1 0 0 0 0 0 4.25 
C4-2 0 0 9 0 19 39 
C4-3 0 0 16.25 11.9 28.75 53.75 
C4-4 0 0 23.5 24.25 38.5 68.5 
C5-1 0 0 0 0 0 19 
C5-2 0 0 0 11.88 11.875 33.75 
C5-3 0 0 3.5 24.25 24.25 48.5 
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Table  8.5. Demand response in different scenarios for the given cases (MW)  
 Reg. w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
C2-1 
U 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 10 0 20 5 20 10 20 20 
C2-2 
U 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 5 20 5 20 15 20 15 20 20 
C2-3 
U 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 9.5 20 19.5 20 20 20 19.5 20 20 
C2-4 
U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 4.5 20 20 20 20 20 14.5 20 20 
C2-5 
U 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 20 20 20 20 20 9.5 20 20 
C4-1 
U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 4.25 19.25 4.25 20 20 20 15 20 20 
C4-2 
U 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 9 0 20 20 20 19.5 20 20 
C4-3 
U 20 1.25 6.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 20 20 20 11.88 20 20 
C4-4 
U 20 11.5 11.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 20 20 20 4.25 20 20 
C5-1 
U 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 9 0 39 29 40 19.5 40 40 
C5-2 
U 26.25 1.25 6.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 36.25 31.25 40 11.88 40 40 
C5-3 
U 40 11.5 11.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 33.5 33.5 40 1.25 40 40 
The wind power scheduled in the energy market is illustrated in Table 8.6. The ISO dispatches 
the maximum expected power of the wind power producer. This is sensible since the energy offer 
price of wind power is placed at zero. 
Table  8.6. Wind power scheduled in the energy market (MW)  
Case Wind 
Power C1, C2 30.5 
C3-1, C4-1 45.75 
C3-2, C4-2, C5-
1 
61 
C3-3, C4-3, C5-
2 
76.25 
C3-4, C4-4, C5-
3 
91.5 
The amount of power scheduled for conventional power plants is shown in Figure 8.5. The 
results obviously indicate a decreasing trend in the accepted offers of generators when the 
penetration of PV and wind production increases. This is reasonable since on one hand PV 
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integration reduces the net load while on the other hand, wind production is cheap and thus the ISO 
can reduce the system cost by using this resource. Another observation interpreted from Figure 8.5 
is that DR slightly changes (small reduction) the scheduled power of conventional power plants.  
 
Figure  8.5. The scheduled power for power plants in the day-ahead market 
Since the main changes are in scenarios 1-2 and 5-9, Figure 8.6 and Table 8.7 study the upward 
and downward reserve for conventional power plants in these scenarios. Figure 8.6 shows the 
upward reserve in scenarios 1 and 2 for generators 2 and 3. It is obvious that increasing wind and 
PV production is followed by a higher upward reserve requirement from conventional power pants. 
This is sensible since wind power production in these scenarios is lower than the expected 
production. Thus, the ISO calls for conventional power plants to compensate for this deviation. 
 
Figure  8.6. The upward reserve for conventional power plants  
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Table 8.7 represents the downward reserve deployed from generator 2 in scenarios 5-9 (w5-w9). 
Note that no downward reserve is procured from generator 3. The ISO does not require this reserve 
when there is no renewable production (C0). However, the integration of PV and wind urges the 
deployment of the downward reserve from generator 2. This is mainly because of the fluctuation 
between the values of the dispatched wind power and load scheduled in the day-ahead market and 
their real-time amounts. The results also illustrate that the need for downward reserve decreases as 
DR is introduced into the system (See C2 and C5). In addition, higher wind production results in the 
same need (C2 vs. C4). 
Table  8.7. Downward reserve from generator 2 (MW)  
Upward w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
C0-1 0 0 0 0 0 
C1-1 4.5 14.5 9.5 19.5 20 
C1-2 4.5 19.5 4.5 19.5 20 
C1-3 4.5 20 0 19.5 20 
C1-4 4.5 20 0 19.5 20 
C1-5 4.5 20 0 19.5 20 
C2-1 0 0 0 0 9.5 
C2-2 0 0 0 0 14.5 
C2-3 0 4.5 0 0 19.5 
C2-4 0 9.5 0 0 19.5 
C2-5 0 14.5 0 0 14.5 
C3-1 6.75 20 14.25 20 20 
C3-2 0 0 0 0 0 
C3-3 0 0 0 0 0 
C3-4 0 0 0 0 0 
C4-1 0 1.75 0 9.25 20 
C4-2 0 0 0 0 0 
C4-3 0 0 0 0 0 
C4-4 0 0 0 0 0 
C5-1 0 0 0 0 0 
C5-2 0 0 0 0 0 
C5-3 0 0 0 0 0 
 
8.3.2 A Case Study with the IEEE RTS System 
The proposed problem is also studied for the IEEE 24-bus system [149] (Figure 8.7). The 
simulation is done for one period, i.e. 12pm. Two wind power producers are considered at buses 6 
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and 8. Each wind power producer is considered the size of three times the following wind farm. The 
wind farm Lake Bonney 2 in South Australia is chosen [135]. This wind farm is located at Mt 
Gambier AERO and its installed capacity is 159MW (53 Vestas 3MW Turbines). Wind speed 
scenarios are generated using the ARMA model where the summer season data from 2007-2012 is 
used as input time series. Twenty wind speed scenarios are generated for each site. The median 
wind power for this wind farm is 45 MW. Five PV units are considered at buses 5, 6, 8, 15, 18, 20. 
Ten PV power scenarios are considered where each scenario coincides with PV production in South 
Australia at 12pm. Overall 200 scenarios are generated with an identical probability. Note that PV 
production is rescaled based on the IEEE system to represent 10% of the total load at the relevant 
buses. DR aggregators are assumed to present their offers at buses 5, 6, 8, 15, 18. The cost offers of 
the DR aggregators are chosen in such a way that they are close to the power plants at or near their 
corresponding buses. Note also that the above PV and wind production is considered as the base 
case here. Four main cases are designed accordingly (Table 8.8).  
 
Figure  8.7. IEEE 24-bus System 
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Table  8.8. Cases considered for study on the IEEE RTS 24-bus system  
Case DR PV Wind 
C0 C0-1 0 0 0 
C1 
C1-1 0 200 200 
C1-2 0 300 200 
C2 
C2-1 100 200 200 
C2-2 100 300 200 
C3 C3-1 200 300 200 
 
The cost of the system for various cases is depicted in Figure 8.8. The declining trend with 
respect to the higher integration of wind and PV power as well as the DR capacity confirms the 
results obtained from the 3-bus test case in Figure 8.3. Note that the system has no load shedding in 
the studied cases and thus it is not faced with the cost spikes shown in the previous section. 
 
Figure  8.8. The cost of the IEEE 24-bus system 
 
Power spillages for wind power producers 1 and 2 (WP1 & WP2) are provided in Table 8.9. The 
wind power spilled from the WP1 is significant while that of WP2 is low. In addition, it is obvious 
that integrating more PV leads to a higher level of wind spillage. This clearly shows the impact of 
PV and its production uncertainty on wind spillage in the market (Consider that there is no PV at 
WP2’s bus). Another observation is the impact of DR on the wind spillage. The results here also 
confirm the findings of the 3-bus case studied earlier. 
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Table  8.9. Wind spillage for the IEEE RTS 24-bus system  
 
WP1 WP2 
C0-1 0 0 
C1-1 49.5 1.85 
C1-2 58.2 4.4 
C2-1 38.5 0 
C2-2 43.1 0.2 
C3-1 33.4 0 
 
Finally, the demand response deployed in the reserve market is displayed in Table 8.10. The 
results summarize the overall scenarios. Indeed, there are some scenarios in which upward reserve 
is required while for others DR is called for downward reserve. In addition, it is obvious that DR is 
mostly required to provide downward regulations at the buses which integrate wind power (dru2 
and dru3). This is more apparent for dru3, where it provides downward reserve only.  
Table  8.10. DR deployed in the reserve market for the IEEE RTS 24-bus system  
 Reserve dru1 dru2 dru3 dru4 dru5 
C2-1 
Upward 4.8 7.1 0 0 7.1 
Downward 13.5 12.5 20 19.7 1.4 
C2-2 
Upward 7.1 7.1 0 7.1 15.9 
Downward 12.7 12.7 20 12.1 1.3 
C3-1 
Upward 13.3 15.3 0 11.4 35.7 
Downward 12.9 24 40 24.7 0 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter presents a market model for an ISO, which integrates high wind and PV power. DR 
is considered as a solution to resolving the issue related to the high level of wind and PV 
production. A DR aggregator is modelled, which is able to participate in the reserve market. The 
problem is formulated in a stochastic cost minimization from the ISO’s point of view. Plausible 
realizations of wind and PV power production are applied to represent their uncertainty. The 
proposed method is solved in a test case and also the IEEE 24-bus system using CPLEX 11.1.1 
under GAMS. The main findings are as follows. 
 Integrating wind and PV production reduces the cost of the system. However, higher 
levels of penetration may pose a high cost to the system. This is mainly due to the 
fluctuation of renewable resources, which causes load shedding in some cases. 
 Employing DR can reduce the cost of the system. In addition, it may lessen the severity 
of load shedding as a result of high renewable power penetration. Furthermore, DR is 
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able to encourage consumers to consume more energy and consequently reduce the wind 
spillage. 
 Increasing DR capacity for the systems with significant levels of renewable energy 
resources has a major impact on controlling these resources fluctuations as well as 
reducing the cost of the system.  
8.5 Nomenclature 
A) Indices 
dru  Index for DR units  
g  Index for generator  
l  Index for loads  
n , r  Index for bus 
w  Index for scenarios  
wp  Index for wind producers  
B) Parameters 
nrB  Susceptance of line 𝑛𝑟 
,D DR
dru
C  Cost offer of demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 for downward regulation 
,U DR
dru
C  Cost offer of demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 for upward regulation 
gC  Cost offer of generator 𝑔 
D
gC  Cost offer of generator 𝑔 for downward regulation 
U
gC  Cost offer of generator 𝑔 for upward regulation 
Line
nrC  Line 𝑛𝑟 capacity limit 
wpC  Cost offer of wind producer 𝑤𝑝 
,l w
NetL  Net demand of load 𝑙 in scenario 𝑤 
Orgl
l
L  Original demand of load 𝑙 without PV integration 
S
lL  Load scheduled in the day-ahead market 
Max
gp  Maximum power of generator 𝑔 
,
PV
l wP  PV production at load point 𝑙 in scenario 𝑤 
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Expec
wpP  Forecast power of wind producer 𝑤𝑝 
,
total
wp wP  Total power of wind producer 𝑤𝑝 in scenario 𝑤 
,D DRMax
dru
R  Maximum downward reserve by demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢  
,U DRMax
dru
R  Maximum upward reserve by demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢  
,D Max
gR  Maximum downward reserve by generator 𝑔 
,U Max
gR  Maximum upward reserve by generator 𝑔 
lVoll  Value of lost load 𝑙 
( )w  Probability of scenario 𝑤 
C) Variables 
,
Shed
l wL  Load shedding for load 𝑙 
gP  Power scheduled for generator 𝑔 
,
r
wp wP  Reserve power by wind producer 𝑤𝑝 
S
wpP  Power scheduled for wind producer 𝑤𝑝 
,
spill
wp wP  Wind spillage of wind producer 𝑤𝑝 in scenario 𝑤 
,
,
D DR
dru w
r  Downward reserve by demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 in scenario 𝑤 
,
,
U DR
dru w
r  Upward reserve by demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 in scenario 𝑤 
,
D
g wr  Downward reserve by generator 𝑔 in scenario 𝑤 
,
U
g wr  Upward reserve by generator 𝑔 in scenario 𝑤 
n  Locational marginal price at node 𝑛 
0
n  Voltage angle at node 𝑛 in the day-ahead market dispatch 
nw  Voltage angle at node 𝑛 in the reserve market in scenario 𝑤  
D) Numbers and Sets 
druN  Number of DR units 
gN  Number of generator  
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lN  Number of load  
wN  Number of scenarios 
wpN  Number of wind power producers  
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  Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
9.1 Summary 
A demand response framework is presented in this thesis through which DR purchasers are able 
to bilaterally buy DR from a DR aggregator. The proposed DR framework includes various DR 
contracts, namely fixed DR, flexible DR and DR options. Each DR contract is described and 
formulated with unique features, which provides mutually attractive DR deals between a DR buyer 
and a DR aggregator.  
 
The proposed DR framework is first applied to an offering strategy by wind power producers. 
Wind offering strategies for the Australian NEM and the Nordic market are proposed and 
formulated. These strategies allow a wind power producer to employ the proposed DR contracts in a 
two-step plan. The problem is further extended in which the DR aggregator behaviour is modelled 
in DR employment by wind power producers. In this way, a wind power producer has to compete 
with other players as well as electricity markets to obtain DR from the aggregator. Lastly, the 
application of DR by a strategic wind power producer, being able to exercise market power, is 
studied.  
The proposed DR framework is also evaluated for retailers which are the main players in retail 
markets. A retailer is considered in such a way that it buys energy mainly from pool markets and 
forward contracts. In addition, the retailer is able to procure DR to lessen the risk of facing volatile 
pool prices. To this end, the retailer sets various DR contracts with a DR aggregator or directly 
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implements incentive-based DR programs with consumers. A reward-based DR is proposed for this 
purpose, where the uncertainty of consumers’ behaviour in responding to the reward offered by the 
retailer is modelled using a scenario-based participation factor.  
Finally, the application of DR by an ISO is evaluated. A market with high penetration of wind 
power on the supply side and PV power on the demand side is modelled. The ISO seeks to balance 
the market at the real-time dispatch and hence, allows DR aggregators to participate in the reserve 
market in order to cope with the uncertainty of wind power and roof-top PV power.  
The above problems are properly formulated using stochastic programming. All problems are 
rendered to linear programming, which is solvable using GAMS as commercially available 
software. The uncertain parameters such as wind power production, electricity market prices, 
consumers’ behaviour, rival DR purchasers’ actions and PV power are characterized using their 
plausible scenarios and the risk of these uncertain inputs are carried out using CVaR.  
9.2 Main Findings and Contributions 
The main conclusions of the proposed DR framework are outlined below. 
 
1.  The proposed DR framework helps a DR aggregator to become more active in the DR 
market. The aggregator is able to sell its DR product directly to the market or to DR 
purchasers through the proposed bilateral contracts. 
2.  In this DR framework the aggregator can provide a bidirectional energy flow between 
consumers and DR purchasers. 
3.  Time of Use programs depend on the elasticity of consumers while reward-based DR is 
mainly affected by the behaviour of consumers in responding to the offered incentives. 
Disregarding this uncertain behaviour may mislead the DR aggregator from its expected 
DR outcome in its reward-based DR strategy. 
 
The main findings of the application of DR by wind power producers are as follows.  
 
1.  The proposed two-step plans for both the Australian and Nordic markets allow wind 
power producers to better offer in the market. In the Australian NEM, while the first-step 
decisions made on the preceding day are taken under uncertainty, step two allows the 
producer to take corrective actions once uncertain parameters are known. For the Nordic 
market, risk-neutral and risk-averse producers can determine the level of their 
participation in the day-ahead and balancing markets. While risk-neutral wind power 
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producers prefer to mostly sell in the day-ahead market, risk-averse producers have the 
higher share in a balancing market.  
2.  In the proposed plan, wind power producers arrange various DR contracts in step 1 (day 
ahead) and then manage them in step 2 (real time) to better cope with its uncertainty. 
They use fixed DR contracts to trade a certain amount of DR. In addition, they use 
flexible DR contracts, of which their usage distribution is manageable in real time. 
Furthermore, DR options give them a choice to set the contract and wait until real time to 
decide whether to exercise these contracts. 
3.  A wind power producer can buy DR during the peak price periods to lessen the risk of its 
power production and market price uncertainty. On the other hand, the producer is able to 
sell some portion of its energy through DR contracts during off-peak periods.  
4.  Modelling the DR aggregator behaviour makes DR trading more competitive since a 
wind power producer is required to compete with other players to offer reasonable DR 
prices to a DR aggregator.  
5.  A strategic wind power producer affects a market by using its market power to set market 
prices.  
6.  A risk-neutral strategic wind power producer tries to increase its profit in the day-ahead 
market while a risk-averse strategic producer uses its market power to compensate for 
possible deviations in the balancing market. In addition, the risk-averse producer tends to 
employ more DR for this purpose.  
7.   Imbalance prices have a significant impact on the behaviour of a strategic wind producer 
in the market as well as DR procurement.  
 
The main outcomes in the application of DR by electricity retailers are given as follows. 
 
1.  The case study shows the feasibility of the proposed DR framework for retailers, where it 
allows retailers to procure their energy from various DR contracts and reward-based DR. 
2.  Depending on the risk level, retailers change their energy share from the proposed DR 
agreements. A risk-neutral retailer obtains a lower share of its energy from the given DR 
agreements. This share for a risk-averse retailer increases significantly, where fixed DR 
agreements play a significant role in this increment.  
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The main findings of employing DR by an ISO are listed below. 
 
1.  Integrating wind and PV production reduces the cost of the system. However, higher 
levels of penetration may pose a high cost to the system. This is mainly due to the 
fluctuation of renewable resources, which causes load shedding in some cases. 
2.  Employing DR can reduce the cost of the system. It is also useful for alleviating the 
severity of load shedding as a result of high renewable power penetration. Furthermore, a 
DR aggregator is able to encourage consumers to consume more energy and 
consequently reduce wind spillage. 
3.  Increasing DR capacity for systems with significant levels of renewable energy resources 
has a major impact on controlling these resources fluctuations as well as reducing the 
cost of the system.  
 
9.3 Future Research 
This thesis research can be further extended in the following areas: 
 
1.  The thesis focus is not on how a DR aggregator obtains DR from consumers. Modelling 
various DR programs to be implemented with consumers is a big area of research which 
can be studied as future work. For this purpose, the potential of each DR program, the 
periods in which each program is available, the consumers’ behaviour in detail, and 
various incentive and pricing schemes are required to be investigated. 
2.  The proposed wind offering strategy can be further extended in such a way that 
transmission networks are modelled. In this way, locational marginal prices are taken into 
account. In addition, a wind power producer needs to study how it can benefit from DR 
bought from DR aggregators in different locations than the one in which the wind power 
producer is located. 
3.  The ability of participating wind power producers in ancillary services markets needs 
additional research. 
4.  The behaviour of rival competitors in buying DR from a DR aggregator can be better 
modelled if there is realistic data available. 
5.  The ability of exercising market power is investigated in a market where there is only one 
player capable of this action. This study can be modified to cover oligopolistic markets, 
where more players behave strategically. 
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6.  The problem of electricity retailers is extendable in such a way that consumers’ demand 
is explicitly modelled considering uncertainty. In addition, how a retailer attracts more 
consumers to sell energy to them may affect the problem. Furthermore, a mixed DR 
framework can be proposed, which allows a retailer to determine its DR share either 
directly from consumers or from a DR aggregator. 
4.  The problem of an ISO can be further investigated to consider a realistic system such as 
the South Australian system, where there is high penetration of wind and PV power. In 
addition, various DR products such as capacity and emergency DR can be defined to help 
the ISO better employ DR from DR aggregators. Furthermore, modelling a security-
constrained unit commitment covering the whole 24 hours of the day of energy delivery 
makes our case stronger, where all technical aspects of power plants as well as load and 
DR are properly modelled. 
7.  The uncertain parameters throughout the thesis are mostly addressed using ARIMA 
models. This can be further enhanced by using more accurate forecasting models. This is 
particularly the case for wind power and price spike forecasts. 
8.  This thesis is focused on current electricity markets mostly at the transmission level. 
Future micro-grid markets are envisaged for distributing networks as the penetration of 
distributed generations and renewable sources increases. Further investigations are 
required to modify the presented concept to be applied to micro-gird markets, where 
stakeholders are residential customers, DR aggregators, retailers and micro-grid 
operators.  
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Wind Power Offering Strategy in Day-Ahead
Markets: Employing Demand Response
in a Two-Stage Plan
Nadali Mahmoudi, Student Member, IEEE, Tapan K. Saha, Senior Member, IEEE, and Mehdi Eghbal, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper deals with wind power offering strategies
in day-ahead markets. A new plan is proposed in which a wind
power producer participates in the day-ahead market while em-
ploying demand response (DR) to smooth its power variations. In
this context, a newDR scheme is presented through which the wind
power producer is able to achieve DR by establishing various DR
agreements with DR aggregators. The proposed offering plan in-
volves two stages: the first stage clears on the day-ahead market.
The wind power producer decides on day-ahead offers as well as
DR agreements with the aggregator. The second stage takes place
on the balancing market. In a successive approach, the wind power
producer determines its energy trading for each period until the
whole day is covered. Additionally, proper DR agreements for each
period are confirmed here. The proposed plan is formulated in a
stochastic programming approach, where its validity is assessed on
a case of the Nordic market.
Index Terms—Day-ahead market, demand response (DR)
scheme, DR options, fixed DR, flexible DR, stochastic program-
ming, two-stage wind offering plan.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IND energy has been a rapidly growing renewable re-source in the past few years. This development is facil-
itated via various subsidies and supportive policies to achieve
individual goals worldwide. The European Union and Australia
have an identical target of achieving 20% of renewable energy
by 2020. U.S. states have distinct goals. For instance, California
is targeting 33% renewable by 2020.
The power production uncertainty is a significant challenge
for wind power producers. Three main practical solutions are
provided to cope with this issue: increasing the wind power fore-
casting accuracy, optimal wind trading strategies in short-term
markets and a joint operation of wind power producers and
easily controllable resources. This paper however focuses on
the last two solutions.
Optimal trading strategies in short-term markets are ad-
dressed in some investigations. Authors in [1] and [2] determine
the energy level contracted in a short-term market in order to
minimize imbalance costs. Paper [3] proposes a short-term
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trading strategy, which involves various trading floors, namely
day-ahead, adjustment and balancing markets. Authors in [4]
recommend the coalition of wind power producers to alleviate
the wind uncertainty. Authors in [5] evaluate the offering
strategy by price-maker wind power producers.
With regards to joint operation strategies, [6] illustrates the
coordination of wind and pumped-storage units. A joint plan-
ning and operation strategy of wind power producers and hydro
power plants is provided in [7] and [8]. Facilitating wind power
production with battery storage systems is described in [9]. Fi-
nally, the coordination of wind power producers and thermal
plants is addressed in [10]. Demand response (DR) is another
source, which can be used in a joint operation with wind power
producers. However, relevant studies in literature mostly pro-
vide the coordination of DR and wind power producers to im-
prove network and market operations [11]–[13].
This paper investigates a two-stage offering plan in which
a wind power producer uses demand response (DR) as a joint
operation resource. In the first stage, the wind power producer
places its offer on the day-ahead market and simultaneously de-
termines the contribution of DR agreements. These decisions
are made while the following two points are taken into account:
1) wind power forecast for the coming day is not perfect and
involves a significant level of uncertainty; 2) day-ahead prices
and imbalance charges/payments are also uncertain parameters.
A stochastic profit function is formulated where the decisions
are taken based on the plausible realizations of the above sto-
chastic parameters. To this end, for each uncertain parameter, a
set of scenarios are generated by applying ARIMA models to
the historical data. The risk is also carried out using conditional
value-at-risk.
The second stage is dedicated to correction actions made
on the balancing (regulating) market. A consecutive approach
is proposed where the wind power producer settles its power
trading in the balancing market for each period. At the same
time, the wind power producer approves its required DR
agreements with the DR aggregator. These decisions are taken
while imbalance prices (charges/payments) and wind power
are known for the current period but they are still uncertain
for the following intervals. Again a stochastic profit function
is formulated in this stage, which runs for each period. This
process is repeated until all periods of the day are cleared.
In order to model DR in the proposed offering plan, a new
scheme is presented through which a wind power producer can
arrange various DR agreements with a DR aggregator. The wind
power producer can set a fixed DR contract, which is traded in a
0885-8950 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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Fig. 1. Proposed DR scheme.
certain volume and price for a given period. In addition, a flex-
ible DR is formulated, where it gives the wind power producer a
chance to modify the usage pattern of the contracted DR during
real-time usage. Furthermore, by adapting the financial option
concept [14], new DR options are proposed here.
The proposed DR scheme is new as there is no such work
in literature addressing a similar model. The majority of DR
studies investigate the basic concept [15], [16], technical aspects
[17] and DR formulations [18], [19]. Only authors in [20] and
[21] study a mechanism through which DR is traded as a com-
modity. However, their method considers a pool-based DR ex-
change rather than bilateral contracts.
Overall, the contributions of the paper are as follows.
1) A two-stage offering plan in the day-ahead market is pro-
posed in which wind power producers can benefit from DR
in a joint operation.
2) A new DR scheme is proposed where DR can be traded
as a public good between wind power producers and DR
aggregators. For this purpose, various DR agreements with
distinct features are proposed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II dis-
cusses the given DR scheme with a detailed description of each
DR agreement. The proposed plan is explained in Section III.
Section IV provides a case study with numerical results. The
last section concludes the paper.
II. COMPREHENSIVE DR SCHEME
The proposed DR scheme arranges mutually attractive deals
between a wind power producer and a DR aggregator. It is as-
sumed that the DR aggregator is willing to bilaterally trade DR
with wind power producers. Indeed, the aggregator makes con-
tracts with customers and implements technical DR programs to
trade it with wind power producers (DR purchasers). A similar
real case exists, where EnerNOC [22] plays an arbitrator role
between customers and DR purchasers.
The proposed DR scheme is depicted in Fig. 1. As can be
seen, DR is traded through three main contracts: DR options,
fixed DR contracts and flexible DR agreements. Note that the
double ended arrow indicates that the DR flow can be either
from the aggregator to the wind producer or in the opposite di-
rection. That is, the DR aggregator is also able to buy energy
from the wind power producer through DR agreements, where
in this situation it encourages customers to consume more en-
ergy. This usually happens during off-peak periods.
A. DR Options
A wind power producer can arrange DR options with DR ag-
gregators. According to this contract the wind power producer
has a right but not an obligation to purchase DR. This means
that the wind power producer signs this contract at the begin-
ning of the decision time horizon, i.e., Stage 1. However, exer-
cising the contract at the energy delivery time (Stage 2) depends
on whether it is profitable or not. Each DR option is determined
with a specific offer including a certain volume and price for a
given period. Thus, when the DR option is set in stage 1, the
decision on whether signing this contract or not is made with
perfect knowledge about the contract details. This decision is
called here-and-now in stochastic programming, which is mod-
elled as independent of scenarios [6]. In stage 2, the producer
decides on exercising the DR options signed in stage 1. If the
contract is executed in stage 2, the wind power producer pays
its cost to the DR aggregator. Otherwise, the producer has to
pay the predefined penalty. Note that this decision is also in-
dependent of scenarios since it is made while the wind power
producer perfectly knows its production and the market price in
the real-time dispatch.
Similar to financial options, two DR options are introduced.
Type one is called EuropeanDR options (EDRO), which is set in
a way that the DR agreement is exercised at the expiration time.
The expiration time is defined when the contract is arranged.
In type 2 however, the DR option can be exercised at any time
before the expiration time (American DR option).
DR options in each stage are formulated as follows.
Stage 1: this stage indicates whether the DR option
is signed or not. This is shown by the binary variable
in the cost functions of European DR Option
in (1a) and in American DR option in (1b):
(1a)
(1b)
Subscripts and denote European and American DR
options, respectively. ( ) and ( )
are the power traded in European DR option (American
DR option ) and its price during time . shows the
duration of time period (Note that since market dispatch
intervals are identical, is the same for all periods). Fi-
nally, ( ) represents the number of European DR
options (American DR options).
Stage 2: this stage belongs to the delivery time in which
it is decided that whether the signed DR option in stage 1
is exercised in stage 2 or not. The exercising status of the
DR option is shown by a , where
1 indicates that the contract is applied and zero means that
the wind power producer disregards the signed DR option.
Indeed this binary variable is shown by in EDRO
(2a) and in ADRO (2b):
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(2a)
(2b)
( ) is the penalty of not exercising the
EDRO (ADRO) during time interval .
Note that American DR options can be exercised at any
time before the expiration time. This constraint is provided
in (3). This expression shows the period horizon ( )
in which the American DR option can be exercised:
(3)
B. Fixed DR Contracts
A fixed contract is an agreement between a buyer and a seller
of an asset to be traded at a future time [14]. Considering this
concept, a fixed DR contract is proposed here, through which a
wind power producer buys this contract from a DR aggregator.
It is assumed that the wind power producer directly negotiates
with the DR aggregator for a mutually attractive deal. Fixed
DR contracts are offered in various blocks in which each block
involves a certain amount of DR and price for a given period:
(4)
(5)
Expressions (4) and (5) show the cost of the fixed DR and the
margin size of each contract’s block, respectively. and
are the power and the price of the th block of fixed DR
. The number of contracts is given by and the number
of contract blocks is represented by .
C. Flexible DR Agreement
Flexible DR agreements give the wind power producer a
chance to better cope with the uncertainty of its power pro-
duction as well as market price violations. When both parties
(wind power producer and DR aggregator) set this contract
(Stage 1), they negotiate the size, the price and the duration
of the agreement. However, during the delivery time (Stage
2) the wind power producer is flexible to manage the usage
distribution of the contracted DR volume in the given period.
That is, the wind power producer has the right to distribute the
DR usage over the contract period to cope with its uncertainty.
The cost of the flexible DR agreement is provided in (6).
and are the power and the price of flexible
DR . is a binary variable indicating whether the
flexible DR is used in period . is the number of
flexible DR contracts. The size of flexible DR is imposed in (7).
Equation (8) is valid in stage 2, where it states that the flexible
DR volume over the contract period ( ) must be
equal to the agreed volume ( ) which is negotiated in stage
1. and represent the start and the end of the contract pe-
riod, respectively:
(6)
(7)
(8)
III. PROPOSED TRADING PLAN
The proposed offering plan is applied on the Nordic market,
which is a well-established day-ahead market. This market in-
volves three floors, called the spot market, Elbas as an adjust-
ment market and the regulating market [1]. Elbas is not very
active [1] and hence it is not modeled here.
The spot market closes at 12:00 pm the preceding day of the
energy delivery. Then, offers and bids from players are stacked
and the market price is derived. The revenue obtained from the
day-ahead market is formulated in (9):
(9)
is the offered power in the day-ahead market during
period . represents the price of the day-ahead
market in scenario during time period .
The regulating (balancing) market is used to balance between
production and consumption. The balancing market can be ei-
ther “short” or “long”. In the short state, there is lack of en-
ergy while the long market has excess production [8]. Note that
long and short markets are respectively known as positive and
negative system imbalances in most studies [3], and thereafter
we use these terms in the paper. In positive systems, regulation
down is activated and generators with excess (deficit) genera-
tion are paid (charged) at a positive price (negative
price ). On the other hand, in negative system imbal-
ances, regulation up is applied and payments (charges) for ex-
cess (deficit) generation are settled at ( ). For
each regulation type, the relationships of and
with the day-ahead market price ( ) are given in [3] as fol-
lows:
An estimation of imbalance payments and charges for the
Nordic is provided in [8]:
(10)
(11)
This paper further extends the given model in a way that the
uncertainty of the regulating market is taken into account:
(12)
(13)
where and are the scenario-based
factors of positive and negative imbalance prices, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Proposed wind power offering strategy.
Depending on whether the wind power producer has excess or
deficit production in the balancing market, it earns revenue or
incurs cost. The revenue (payment) or cost (charge) of the bal-
ancing market ( ) is then formulated as follows [3]:
(14)
where and are the positive and negative
imbalance power volumes in scenario and time period .
The proposed offering strategy is illustrated in Fig. 2. It is
assumed that the wind power producer is a price-taker in the
market. A further assumption is that the wind power producer
is treated as similar to conventional power plants [23], where
it is responsible for its bidding strategy and power production
variation. Note that this producer acts as a balance responsible
player in the Nordic market, where it is responsible for its im-
balance charges/payments. In addition, similar to [8] this paper
aims to determine the optimal offering quantities instead of pre-
senting bidding curves which is investigated in [3].
A. Stage 1: Day-Ahead Clearing
This stage clears on the day-ahead market. The wind power
producer decides on day-ahead offers for the entire next day. In
addition, the volume of fixed DR contracts is negotiated. Fur-
thermore, the wind power producer determines the periods in
which European DR options are signed. Proper American DR
options are also signed and the time horizon in which each one
can be exercised is determined. Finally, the required flexible DR
agreements are appointed.
The above decisions are made while wind power production
as well as day-ahead and imbalance prices (charges/payments)
are uncertain. A stochastic profit function is formulated in which
the uncertain characteristics of these parameters are taken into
account using a set of scenarios. In addition, the risk faced with
this uncertainty is modeled though CVaR as an appropriate risk
measure.
The profit function is given in (15). This function is calcu-
lated for the whole day ( ). It consists of the
following terms. The expected revenue obtained from selling
power through the day-ahead market, the expected revenue/cost
of the balancing market, the costs of all DR contracts and the
weighted CVaR. Note that is the probability of scenario
. and are auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR [3],
and is the confidence level, which is 0.95. Note also that the
risk level ( ) represents the trade-off between the
expected profit and the risk. A risk-averse wind power producer
willing to minimize the risk chooses a large value of the risk.
On the other hand, a risk-neutral wind power producer prefers
higher profits and consequently selects a risk factor close to 0.
The profit function is subject to the following constraints.
The size of fixed DR and flexible DR contracts are enforced
by (16) and (17), respectively. Furthermore, the positive and
negative imbalance offers are limited by (18) and (19) respec-
tively. is wind power production in scenario and
time . is the installed capacity of the wind power pro-
ducer. The power balance is given in (20). In this equation,
and represents the imbalance power and
total DR volume, where they are represented in (21) and (22),
respectively. Finally, expressions (23) and (24) represent CVaR
constraints [3], which are derived to linearize this risk measure.
Note that in (23) indicates the obtained profit in sce-
nario [see (25)]:
(15)
subject to
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
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(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
B. Stage 2: Regulating (Balancing) Market
Stage 2 deals with balancing settlements and final DR
approvals. This stage runs a successive approach, which is
repeated until all periods are covered. For each period a profit
function is formulated through which the following decisions
are made. The wind power producer decides on its energy
trading in the balancing market for the current period. At the
same time the producer determines its optimal share of DR
agreements for the relevant period. Indeed, each DR agreement
that has been set in the previous stage is finalized here. The
wind power producer decides on the optimal usage of flexible
DR. The constraint used here is that the total flexible DR usage
should not exceed the agreed volume in stage 1 [see (8)].
Furthermore, the wind power producer decides on exercising
the signed DR options in stage 1. In this way, the producer
considers that European DR options are exercised only at the
expiration time, while American DR options can be used at any
time before the deadline. Note that the volume of the contracted
fixed DR is predetermined in stage 1 and cannot be changed in
this stage.
The above decisions are taken while the day-ahead awards
(offers) are known. In addition, the imbalance price and wind
power production for the current period are known, but they are
still uncertain for the following periods.
The profit function which is formulated for each period is
shown in (26). It consists of three terms: the profit obtained
from the current period ( ) [see (27)], the expected
profit over the following intervals until the final period (
) [see (28)] and CVaR. Note that the main terms
(27) and (28) involve the (expected) revenue/cost of the bal-
ancing market as well as the costs of DR agreements. Note also
that the binary variable states whether the th
block of fixed DR is set in stage 1. A similar variable is also
used for the flexible DR status ( ):
(26)
where
(27)
(28)
The profit function is subject to the following constraints.
• Constraints (17)–(25). Note that in these constraints, the
day-ahead awards are known. In addition, only those DR
agreements set in stage 1 are taken into account here.
• Flexible DR energy constraint:
(29)
• American DR option constraint (3).
IV. CASE STUDY
A. Data Preparation and Assumptions
The proposed plan is evaluated on a realistic case of the
Nordic market. Hourly market prices are available [24]. Hence,
each period in this paper is considered as one hour. Neverthe-
less, note that the proposed method is also applicable on shorter
time horizons.
Similar to leading studies in this area [1], [3], price and wind
power scenarios are characterized using ARIMA models. A
time series of the spot prices of the Nordic market, spanning
January 2012 is used to generate price scenarios [24]. Overall,
20 day-ahead price scenarios are generated in stage 1. In addi-
tion, four positive and negative imbalance factors are randomly
generated. For positive factors, scenarios range between 0.95
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Fig. 3. Average wind power and spot price.
and 1 ( ), while for negative factors they
are between 1 and 1.05 ( ).
The wind power producer Hemmet, located in Denmark,
is chosen [25]. The installed capacity of this farm is 27 MW
(Vestas Turbines). Wind speed scenarios are generated using
the ARMA model where the available data in 2012 is used
as input time series. 14 wind speed scenarios are generated
in stage 1. These scenarios are then transformed to power
scenarios using the Vestas Wind curve [26].
Overall, the total number of generated scenarios is 1120,
which is calculated by the product of the numbers for day-ahead
prices (20 scenarios), imbalance charges/payments (4 sce-
nario-based factors) and wind power production (14 scenarios).
This is derived using the method presented in [27]. To this end,
the number of scenarios is increased until the objective function
is stabilized. In this way a tradeoff between the tractability
of the problem and the accuracy of the results is taken into
account.
Fig. 3 shows the expected day-ahead price and wind power
production. The day-ahead price involves two peak periods, just
before Noon and during the evening. Wind power peaks how-
ever occur around midnight and the afternoon.
In stage 2, the day-ahead prices are known. However, wind
power production and imbalance prices are still unknown.Wind
power scenarios of stage 2 are obtained through reducing the
number of scenarios generated in stage 1 to 7 scenarios. In-
deed, those scenarios having higher deviations from the ex-
pected wind power depicted in Fig. 3 are removed. This is rea-
sonable as the wind uncertainty in stage 2 is lower than that of
stage 1. Imbalance price scenarios in stage 2 are considered the
same as scenarios in stage 1.
DR information is as follows. Since DR contract data are not
available, their details are assumed in this paper. However, in
order to reasonably model these contracts, two main points are
taken into account: first, the prices considered for DR contracts
are chosen in a way that they are close to the average of market
prices, shown in Fig. 3. Secondly, the DR contracts are assigned
in such a way that when the wind power producer is in its high
production periods and market prices are low, it most likely sells
a part of its energy through DR contracts. On the other hand,
TABLE I
DR CONTRACTS DETAILS
Fig. 4. Expected profit versus the standard deviation.
when the market price is high, the wind power producer is as-
sumed to be mostly a DR buyer in order to compensate its devia-
tions during this time. Six fixed DR agreements are considered.
The first contract covers 1 am to 5 am, where the wind power
producer sells energy to the aggregator. The producer buys fixed
DR in the next two contracts (6 am–12 pm). In fixed DR con-
tract 4, the producer again sells energy to the DR aggregator (1
pm–4 pm). In the remaining contracts the wind power producer
is a fixed DR buyer. Six flexible DR agreements are also mod-
eled. Time horizon for each contract is the same as fixed DR
contracts. It is assumed that the wind power producer is able to
sell/buy up to 8-MWh flexible DR in each period. Finally, two
American and two European DR options are used, where the
wind power producer buys these options from the aggregator.
The periods in which these options are used are 9 am–12 pm
and 5 pm–8 pm. Note that the penalty of not exercising each
option is assumed to be equal to 10% of the contract cost. The
maximum available DR and DR price ranges are provided in
Table I.
B. Numerical Results and Discussions
1) Decisions in Stage 1: The given problem is mixed-in-
teger linear programming, which is solved for various risk levels
using CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [28].
The expected profit vs. the standard deviation is displayed in
Fig. 4. It is obvious that while the risk-neutral wind power pro-
ducer gains more profit with the cost of a higher profit deviation,
risk-averse producers prefer a lower profit deviation and conse-
quently obtain a lower profit.
Fig. 5 provides day-ahead offers for various risk levels. The
risk-neutral wind power producers sell as much as possible in
the day-ahead market. This sale however decreases as the risk
level grows. That is, risk-averse producers refuse to sell the ma-
jority of their power in the day-ahead market, where they prefer
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Fig. 5. Offers in the day-ahead market.
TABLE II
FIXED DR CONTRACTS
TABLE III
SIGNED EUROPEAN DR OPTIONS IN STAGE 1
to sell more energy in the balancing market. This is more ob-
vious for , where the wind power producer’s sale in the
day ahead market is almost zero in most periods. In addition,
it can be seen that the offer patterns are very similar in all risk
levels. They follow the peak periods of wind production and
day-ahead prices. More specifically, the risk-neutral producer
has more noticeable offers during market price peaks.
Table II shows the contracted fixed DR agreements for dif-
ferent levels of the risk. The risk-neutral wind power producer
( ) sets fixed DR contracts (FC) 2 to 6. However, for the
risk level of 0.2 and higher, the wind power producer sets FC 2
and FC 4 only. This declining trend is reasonable since the pro-
ducer is a DR buyer in FC 5 and FC 6, and therefore, as the risk
level increases, it avoids takingmore risk by buying energy from
these contracts and selling it to the volatile day-ahead market.
Table III represents the periods in which European DR Op-
tions (EDRO) are signed in stage 1. The risk-neutral wind power
producer uses both EDRO 1 and 2 in all periods. However,
risk-averse producers refuse to sign EDROs in many periods,
where ultimately the most risk-averse producer ( ) only
signs EDRO 2 at 6 pm. With regards to American DR options
(ADRO), the results indicate that both ADRO 1 and 2 are signed
in this stage.
The volume of flexible DR agreements is illustrated in
Table IV. Results show that all agreements are used by .
TABLE IV
CONTRACTED FLEXIBLE DR IN STAGE 1(MWh)
Fig. 6. Imbalance power for .
However, for higher risk levels, this share decreases where for
, flexible DR 2 is not applied. This decrement indeed
follows the same rule as fixed DR and DR options.
2) Decisions in Stage 2: This section delivers the results of
stage 2 for the risk-neutral ( ) and the risk-averse ( )
wind producers.
Figs. 6 and 7 depict the offers in the balancing market for
and , respectively. The sale by the risk-neutral
wind power producer is very low in most periods. There are
even some periods in which the producer buys energy from the
balancing market. This trend is opposite for the risk-averse pro-
ducer, where a high amount of power is sold in each period.
This outcome confirms the tendency obtained in the day-ahead
market shown in Fig. 5. That is, while the risk-neutral wind
power producer is willing to sell more energy in the day-ahead
market, the risk-averse producer prefers low risks and conse-
quently submits more energy to the balancing market, where
more precise predictions of power production as well as real-
time prices are available.
Fig. 8 provides the total sold power of both wind power pro-
ducers. The volume is identical for almost all periods. However,
it can be seen that the risk-neutral wind power producer has a
higher sale share during the peak periods of the price and wind
power production (See Figs. 3 and 8), where this is more evident
at 9 am, 3 pm and 5–10 pm. This result indicates that risk-neu-
tral wind power producers have a higher tendency to buy DR
than do risk-averse producers.
DR outcomes are as follows. All signed European DR in
the first stage are exercised in stage 2 by both risk-neutral and
risk-averse wind power producers. This is also the result for
American DR options. Note that in this stage, ADRO 1 and 2
are exercised at 9 am and 6 pm, respectively. This indeed coin-
cides with peak price periods shown in Fig. 3.
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
Fig. 7. Imbalance power for .
Fig. 8. Total power sold in the market for and .
The usage distributions of all flexible DR agreements, except
flexible DR 4, are the same as stage 1 for both risk levels. The
distributions of flexible DR 4 (Flex4) in stages 1 and 2 for the
risk-neutral and the risk-averse wind power producers are de-
livered in Figs. 9 and 10, respectively. In both cases, the wind
power producer changes the usage configurations in stage 2. It
can be seen that in this stage the whole flexible DR 4 is used
in one period. This is at 3 pm for and 1 pm for .
These results confirm a significant difference in sale shares of
the risk-neutral and risk-averse wind power producers at rele-
vant hours in Fig. 8. It can be seen that while the risk-neutral
producer has a much higher sale at 3 pm, this happens at 1 pm
for the risk-averse producer.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a newwind offering plan in the day-ahead
market. This plan includes two stages in which a wind power
producer employs DR to alleviate its production uncertainty as
well as market price violations. The first stage takes place on
the day-ahead market, where the producer determines its offer
in this market and simultaneously arranges various DR contracts
with DR aggregators. The second stage is a successive process
which is held right before each dispatch period. In this stage the
wind power producer participates in the balancing market. The
offer in this market is obtained while at the same time proper
DR agreements are finalized. To include DR, a new scheme is
Fig. 9. Usage distribution of flexible DR 4 in stage 1 and 2— .
Fig. 10. Usage distribution of flexible DR 4 in stage 1 and 2— .
proposed in which the wind power producer can set various DR
agreements, called fixed DR, flexible DR, American DR options
and European DR options with DR aggregators.
The proposed plan is evaluated on a case of the Nordic
Market. A stochastic mixed-integer profit function is proposed
for each stage which is solved using GAMS. The main findings
are as follows. 1) The proposed two-stage plan allows wind
power producers to better participate in both day-ahead and
balancing markets. 2) While risk-neutral wind power producers
prefer to sell most of their energy in the day-ahead market,
risk-averse producers have a higher share in the balancing
market. 3) In the proposed plan, a wind power producer can
arrange various DR contracts in stage 1 and then manage them
in stage 2 to better cope with its uncertainty.
Finally, we should emphasize that this paper models the bi-
lateral DR contracts rather than a pool-based exchange. Indeed,
the pool-based exchange is still not applicable in many markets
since there are various barriers making DR providers reluctant
to directly participate in the market. However, setting bilateral
contracts with DR purchasers is more practical as there are real
cases in Australia, Canada and the USA [22]. Note that by the
enough growth of the DR market, it is expected that both bilat-
eral and pool-based DR markets become active. To this end, the
level of the risk taken by the wind power producer is the matter
of concern. That is, if the producer is risk-neutral, it prefers to
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trade more in the pool-based market. However, as it becomes
more risk averse, the share of bilateral contracts increases.
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This paper  proposes  an energy  offering  strategy  for wind  power  producers.  A new  trading  plan
is  presented  through  which  a  wind  power  producer  can  employ  demand  response  (DR)  to maxi-
mize  its  profit.  To  consider  DR,  a  new DR  scheme  is  developed  here.  The proposed  plan  includes
two  steps:  The  first  step  takes  place  on a day-ahead  basis.  The  corresponding  decisions  involve  an
initial  offering  schedule  and preliminary  DR  arrangements  for the  following  day.  The  second  step
coincides  with  the day  of the  energy  delivery.  A consecutive  approach  is proposed  in which  theustralian NEM
emand response
ixed DR
lexible DR
R option
wo-step wind offering strategy
wind  power  producer  determines  its  final  energy  offer during  each  trading  interval.  Simultaneously,
the  required  DR  agreements  for  that  interval  are  also  confirmed.  This  approach  is  repeated  until
all  periods  of the  day  are  covered.  The proposed  plan  is formulated  as  a stochastic  programming
approach,  where  its feasibility  is evaluated  on a  case  of the  Australian  National  Electricity  Market
(NEM).
©  2014  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.. Introduction
.1. Literature review, contributions and approach
Wind power is identified as a leading renewable energy
esource. Various incentive schemes and policies are provided to
acilitate the application of wind energy worldwide. The European
nion has a target of achieving 20% of renewable energy by 2020.
he Renewable Energy Target (RET) in Australia also sets the same
equirement by 2020. U.S states have distinct goals. For instance,
alifornia is planning to obtain 33% of its energy from renewable
echnologies by 2020 [1].
It is expected that wind power producers could be treated as
imilar to conventional generators in the near future. This is cur-
ently valid for some wind power producers in Germany [1], while
t is voluntary in some markets such as the Spanish [2] and Mid-
est ISO (MISO) markets [1]. In this way, wind power producers
re responsible for their production deviation in the market. Two
ain practical solutions for this issue are presented in some stud-
es: Optimal trading strategies and a joint operation of wind power
roducers and easily controllable resources.
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378-7796/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Optimal trading strategies are addressed in some investiga-
tions such as [3–7]. Authors in [3,4] determine the energy level
contracted in a short-term market in order to minimize imbalance
costs. Authors in [5,6] propose a new short-term trading strategy
which includes various trading floors. Finally, authors in [7] eval-
uate the offering strategy of a price-maker wind power producer
in balancing markets.
With regards to joint operation strategies, Ref. [2] illustrates the
coordination of wind power producers and pumped-storage units.
A joint planning and operation strategy of wind power producers
and hydro power plants is provided in [8–10]. The coordination of
wind producers and storage systems is described in [11]. Finally,
the cooperation of wind power producers and thermal plants is
addressed in [12]. Demand response (DR) is another source, which
can be used in a joint operation with wind power producers. Rele-
vant studies in literature mostly provide the joint operation of DR
and wind power producers to improve network and market oper-
ations [13–17]. Few papers investigate DR applicability from wind
power producers’ point of view. For instance, authors in [18] inves-
tigate smart grid roles in activating passive loads to mitigate wind
power variations.
This paper explores both aforementioned areas for wind power
producers in the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) con-
text. A two-step offering strategy is proposed, which allows wind
power producers to decide how to trade their production in the
market while employing demand response (DR).
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Preliminary decisions are taken on the day prior to the energy
elivery (step 1). To this end, a stochastic programming approach
s formulated through which initial energy offers and DR agree-
ents are obtained. These decisions are made while both market
rices and wind power production are uncertain. To model the risk
ssociated with this uncertainty, conditional Value-at-risk (CVaR)
s used.
The second step covers the decisions taken at the real-time
ispatch. A successive approach is applied, which runs for each dis-
atch interval until all intervals are covered. The volume of energy
o be offered for each interval is determined. In addition, the wind
ower producer approves its final DR agreements for the relevant
nterval. Again, a stochastic programming problem is formulated
or this step in which the power production and market price are
nown for the current interval, but they are still uncertain in the
emaining intervals. Similar to step 1, CVaR is used here to assess
he risk.
In order to include DR in the given offering plan, a new scheme is
roposed in which DR is treated as a public good. Wind power pro-
ucers are able to trade DR with DR aggregators through various
greements: Fixed DR contracts are proposed, which allow wind
ower producers to trade a certain DR volume for a given price
uring a specific period. Flexible DR agreements are formulated in
 way that wind power producers set the contract in step 1 and still
ave flexibility to manage the contract in the real-time usage, i.e.
tep 2. Finally, by adapting the well-known financial options con-
ept [19,20], a new type of contract, called DR options, is proposed
ere.
The given DR arrangement is a new scheme as there is no such
ork in literature addressing a similar model. The majority of DR
tudies focus on the basic concept [21,22], technical aspects [23],
ncentive-based DR programs [24,25] and price-based DR actions
26]. Only authors in [27,28] investigate a mechanism through
hich DR is traded as a commodity. However, their method con-
iders a pool-based DR exchange rather than bilateral contracts.
ndeed, pool-based exchange is still not applicable in most mar-
ets including Australia, since there are various barriers making DR
roviders reluctant to directly participate in the market. However,
etting bilateral contracts with DR purchasers is more practical as
here are real cases in Australia, Canada and the USA [29]. Note
hat by enough growth in the DR market, it is expected that both
ilateral and pool-based DR markets become active. To this end,
he level of risk taken by the wind power producer is a matter
f concern. That is, if the producer is risk-neutral, it prefers to
rade more in the pool-based DR market. However, as it becomes
ore risk averse, the share of bilateral contracts increases. Indeed,
nhancing both bilateral contracts and pool-based DR market will
esult in a competitive DR market, which leads reasonable DR
rices.
Considering the above overview, the contributions of this paper
re as follows.
. A short-term energy strategy is proposed, which allows a wind
power producer to maximize its profit by employing DR agree-
ments in a two-step offering plan.
. A new DR scheme involving distinct DR derivatives is proposed.
Each DR is introduced with unique features and formulated using
proper mathematical equations.
.2. Australian National Electricity Market vs. other marketsA trading day in the Australian NEM [30] begins at 4:00 am and
nds at 4:00 am of the next day. Each trading period represents a
alf hourly period, which comprises six 5-min dispatch intervals.
ccording to the NEM, generators place their bid at 12:30 pm onms Research 119 (2015) 187–198
the day before the energy delivery. Then, they are allowed to rebid
their energy volume up until 5 min  prior to the dispatch.
On the other hand, pool markets such as the Nordic, German
and Spanish markets mostly comprise a day-ahead market, adjust-
ment (intraday) markets and a balancing (regulating) market. In the
Nordic [3], for instance, the day-ahead market is closed at 12:00 pm
the preceding day. Additionally, the market involves an adjustment
market, called Elbas. This market opens at 15:00 on the same day
and lasts up until 1 h prior to the delivery. Finally, the market oper-
ator guarantees real-time balances through the regulating market
which takes place just before the delivery.
From the above background, it can be emphasized that the pro-
posed plan in this paper is well suited to the Australian NEM.
Nevertheless with some modifications, this plan can be generalized
to suit other markets. A brief description on this issue is addressed
in the conclusion section while the formulations and results will be
presented in our future work.
1.3. Paper organization
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, the proposed
DR scheme is presented in section 2, where each DR contract is
introduced and formulated. Then, Section 3 explains the proposed
two-step trading plan, where relevant mathematical formulations
for each step are provided. Section 4 presents the input data and
analyzes the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. The last section
(Appendix) provides CVaR descriptions.
2. Comprehensive DR scheme
The following assumptions are considered in the proposed
DR scheme. This paper assumes a DR aggregator which is willing
to bilaterally trade DR with a wind power producer. It is also
assumed that the wind power producer is not involved in the
technical aspects of DR. In fact, the DR aggregator is responsible
of obtaining DR from consumers. A similar case exists in Australia,
where TransGrid buys DR from EnerNOC [29] without concerning
the details of DR.
The following DR contracts are formulated in the proposed DR
scheme:
2.1. DR option
A wind power producer can arrange a DR option contract with
a DR aggregator. Each DR option is determined with a certain DR
volume and price for a given period. This agreement gives the pro-
ducer a right but not an obligation to purchase DR. That is, the wind
power producer signs this contract in step 1. However, exercising
the contract at energy delivery time (step 2) depends on whether
it is profitable or not. If the contract is not carried through in step
2, the wind power producer has to pay a predetermined fee to the
DR aggregator as the penalty of not exercising the contract. Fig. 1
shows the structure of a typical DR option.
The cost function of the DR option (DRO) for each step is for-
mulated as follows. Note that all variables and parameters for
mathematical formulations throughout the paper are defined in
the nomenclature.
Step 1: This step determines whether DR option is signed or not.
This decision is indicated by the binary variable Sgno(t) ∈ {0, 1}. Zero
specifies that the wind power producer does not sign the contract,
while 1 means the contract is set in this step.CDRO,S1o (t) = Po(t) · o(t) · Sgno(t) · d(t) ∀o = 1, 2, . . .No (1)
Step 2: This step is valid for those DR options signed in the pre-
vious step, i.e. Sgno(t) = 1. Indeed, step 2 decides the exercising
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problem in our future work. Finally note that this paper considers
DR trading in both directions, i.e. from the DR aggregator to the
wind power producer and in the opposite direction. To this end,
in case of power shortage, the wind power producer can be a DR
- Init ial Offering  Schedul e 
- Fixed  DR  contracts 
12: 30pm 
- Optima l Offer ing  
- Exe rcised DR  options 
Int 1:  
4:0 0am  
Int N: 
3:5 5am  
Int 2:  
4:0 5am  
Tradin g Day Fig. 1. The structure of a typical DR option.
tatus of these signed contracts. To this end, the binary variable
o(t) is used, which is equal to 1 if the contract is exercised and
ero if not.
DRO,S2
o (t) = Sgno(t) · [Po(t) · o(t) · vo(t) · d(t) + (1 − vo(t)) · f peno (t)]
∀o = 1, 2, . . .,  No (2)
.2. Fixed DR
A fixed contract is an agreement between a buyer and a seller of
n asset which is traded in the future [19]. Considering this concept,
 fixed DR contract is proposed here through which the wind power
roducer buys this contract from DR aggregators. It is assumed that
he producer directly negotiates with aggregators for a mutually
ttractive deal.
Fixed DR contracts are offered in various blocks, where each
lock is defined with a specific energy volume and price. The cost
f block b of fixed DR f is given in (3). Expression (4) shows the
argin size of each contract’s block.
FDR
f,b (t) = PDRf,b (t).DRf,b (t) · d(t) ∀f = 1, . . .,  NFDR; ∀b = 1, . . ., NBDR
(3)
DR,MIN
f,b
(t) ≤ PDRf,b (t) ≤ P
DR,MAX
f,b
(t) (4)
Note that once the wind power producer set a fixed DR contract
n step 1, it has to apply it during real time. That is, the volume of
he contract set in step 1 remains constant in the next step.
.3. Flexible DR agreement
Flexible DR agreements are proposed to give the wind power
roducer a chance to better cope with the uncertainty of its power
roduction as well as spot price violations. When both parties (wind
ower producer and DR aggregator) set this contract in step 1,
hey negotiate on the energy volume, price and duration of the
greement. However, during the delivery time (step 2) the wind
ower producer is able to change the usage distribution of the con-
racted DR volume during the contract period. That is, the wind
ower producer is able to distribute the DR usage over the con-
ract period to cope with its uncertainty and achieve a higher
rofit.
The cost of the flexible DR agreement in step 1 is formulated in
5). Note that UPDRflex(t) is a binary parameter indicating the periodsms Research 119 (2015) 187–198 189
in which the flexible DR flex is valid. The size of each flexible DR is
imposed by (6).
CflexDR,S1flex (t) = P
DR,S1
flex (t) · DRflex(t) · UPDRflex(t) · d(t) ∀flex = 1, . . .,  Nflex
(5)
PDR,MINflex (t) ≤ P
DR,S1
flex (t) ≤ P
DR,MAX
flex (t) ∀flex = 1, . . .,  Nflex (6)
A similar cost function is defined for step 2 where symbol S1 is
replaced by S2 to represent the relevant formulations for that step.
However, an additional constraint is required in step 2, as rep-
resented in (7). Indeed this constraint enforces that the overall
volume of each flexible DR used in step 2 must be equal to its vol-
ume  contracted in step 1 (EAgrd,S1flex ). Note that SP and EP represent
the start and end of the period that flexible DR flex is valid.
EP∑
t=SP
PDR,S2flex (t) · d(t) = E
Agrd,S1
flex (7)
3. The proposed trading plan
The proposed offering plan is expressed in two steps as shown
in Fig. 2. This plan is adjusted to the Australian NEM, where the pre-
dispatch process closes at 12:30 pm on the day prior to the energy
delivery (step 1) and then, generators are able to change the volume
of their offer up until 5 min  before the dispatch (step 2). Note that
Ancillary services markets are not modeled here. It is assumed that
the wind power producer is price-taker in the market. In addition,
although other resources such as conventional power plant can be
useful for compensating wind power uncertainty, our focus is on
using DR for this purpose. Note that DR takes an advantage over the
conventional plants in that its response is fast. Nevertheless, it is
obvious that DR prices need to be as competitive as other resources
to be employed by the wind power producer. A further assumption
is that the wind power producer is treated as similar to conven-
tional power plants (scheduled generators in the NEM) [31], where
it is responsible for its bidding strategy and production variations.
In addition, similar to [4] this paper aims to determine the opti-
mal  offering quantities instead of presenting bidding curves which
is investigated in [5]. Moreover, this paper assumes a single-node
market in which transmission networks are not modeled. This is
a common practice in bidding strategy problems investigated in
the literature [2,5,32]. Note that modeling transmission networks
needs a bilevel problem formulation through which the upper-level
problem represents the wind power producer objective, while the
lower-level model addresses the security-constraint unit commit-
ment represented by the ISO [33,34]. We will indeed study this- Sig ned DR  options  
- Flexible DR Arrangement 
- Employe d Flex ible DR   
Fig. 2. The proposed offering plan.
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uyer while during excess production, the producer can sell energy
o the DR aggregator.
.1. Step 1: initial offering
This step takes place at 12:30 pm the preceding day. The wind
ower producer runs a preliminary strategy here. The producer
chieves the initial offering schedule over all periods of the next day
t = 1{1, 2, . . .,  FI}). In addition, fixed DR contracts are negotiated.
urthermore, the wind power producer determines the periods in
hich DR options are signed. Finally, flexible DR agreements are
et. These decisions are taken under the uncertainty of spot prices
nd wind power production. Indeed, these parameters are stochas-
ically modeled through a set of scenarios which represent their
lausible realizations.
The profit function (PF) formulated for step 1 is given in (8).
he first term of the profit function shows the expected revenue
btained from selling energy to the spot market. The next three
erms indicate the cost of the proposed DR agreements. The last
omponent is CVaR [35] which is weighted using the risk factor
) (See a detailed description of CVaR in Appendix). Note that
he risk level ( = [0 − ∞))  represents the trade-off between the
xpected profit and the risk. A risk-averse wind power producer
illing to minimize the risk chooses a large value of the risk. On
he other hand, a risk-neutral producer prefers higher profits and
onsequently selects a risk factor close to 0. Note also that although
R contracts are represented as cost terms in the objective func-
ion, they may  have revenue components when the wind power
roducer sells energy to the DR aggregator.
Constraints (9) and (10) impose the size limits of power traded
n fixed DR and flexible DR agreements, respectively. Expressions
11) and (12) represent the CVaR constraints. These constraints are
sed to linearize CVaR [35]. Finally, power balance is satisfied in
13), where the offered power to the market must be equal to the
ind power production (Pw,S1(t, w)) plus the power procured from
R. Indeed, this constraint ensures that the decisions on initial wind
ower offer and DR agreements are valid for each power production
cenario.
aximize PF =
Nw∑
w=1
(w) ·
FI∑
t=1
Ps,S1(t, w).s,S1(t, w)  · d(t)
−
FI∑
t=1
No∑
0=1
CDRO,S1o (t) −
FI∑
t=1
NFDR∑
f =1
NBDR∑
b=1
CFDRf,b (t)
−
FI∑
t=1
Nflex∑
flex=1
CflexDR,S1flex (t)
+  ·
(
 − 1
1 − ˇ
Nw∑
w=1
(w) · (w)
)
(8)
ubject to,
DR,MIN
f,b
(t) ≤ PDRf,b (t) ≤ P
DR,MAX
f,b
(t) (9)
DR,MIN
flex (t) ≤ P
DR,s1
flex (t) ≤ P
DR,MAX
flex
(t) (10)
−
FI∑
t=1
Ps,S1(t, w) · s,S1(t, w) · d(t) +
FI∑
t=1
No∑
0=1
CDRO,S1o (t)
N N N
]+
FI∑
t=1
FDR∑
f =1
BDR∑
b=1
CFDR
f,b
(t) +
FI∑
t=1
flex∑
flex=1
CflexDR,S1
flex
(t)
+  − (w) ≤ 0 ∀w = 1, 2, . . .Nw (11)ms Research 119 (2015) 187–198
(w)≥0; ∀w = 1, 2, . . .Nw (12)
Ps,S1(t, w) = Pw,S1(t, w) +
NFDR∑
f =1
NBDR∑
b=1
PDRf,b (t) +
No∑
o=1
Po(t) · Sgno(t)
+
Nflex∑
flex=1
PDR,S1flex (t).UP
DR
flex(t) ∀t = 1, . . .,  FI (13)
3.2. Step 2: optimal offering
Step 2 deals with the actions required to modify the decisions
made in the previous step (see Fig. 2). It begins from 4:00 am and
runs for each 5-min dispatch interval. We  assume that the wind
power offer in this step is accepted by the market operator. This is
reasonable since wind power producers usually place their offer in
low prices.
This step employs a successive algorithm which iterates from
interval 1 to the final interval. For each interval, the following deci-
sions are made. (1) The optimal offering energy for the current
interval is determined. (2) It is decided whether the signed DR
options in step 1 are exercised for that interval. (3) The required
volume of flexible DR for the relevant interval is decided.
To this end, a new profit function is formulated which is solved
for each iteration.
Maximize PF = Prof(t)|t=CI + EProf(t) | +  · CVaR (14)
where,
Prof(t)|t=CI =
[
Ps,S2(CI).s,S2(CI, s).d(CI)
−
No∑
o=1
CDRO,S2o (CI) −
Nflex∑
flex=1
CflexDR,S2flex (CI)
]
(15)
EProf(t) | =
Ns∑
s=1
(s).
FI∑
t=CI+1
Ps,S2(t, s).s,S2(t, s).d(t)
−
FI∑
t=CI+1
No∑
o=1
CDRO,S2o (t) −
FI∑
t=CI+1
Nflex∑
flex=1
CflexDR,S2flex (t) (16)
CVaR =  − 1
1 − ˇ
Ns∑
s=1
(s) · (s) (17)
subject to,
PDR,MINflex (t) ≤ P
DR,S2
flex (t) ≤ P
DR,MAX
flex (t) (18)
EP∑
t=SP
PDR,S2flex (t) · d(t) = E
Agrd,S1
flex ∀flex = 1, . . .,  Nflex (19)
[
−
FI∑
t=1
Ps,S2(t, s) · s,S2(t, s) · d(t) +
FI∑
t=1
No∑
0=1
CDRO,S2o (t)+
∑
t=1
∑
flex=1
CflexDR,S2flex (t) +  − (s) ≤ 0 ∀s = 1, 2, . . .Ns (20)
(s)≥0; ∀s = 1, 2, . . .Ns (21)
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s,S2(t, s) = Pw,S2(t, s) +
NFDR∑
f =1
NBDR∑
b=1
PDRf,b (t) +
No∑
o=1
Po(t) · Sgno(t) · vo(t)
+
Nflex∑
flex=1
PDR,S2flex (t) · UPDRflex(t) (22)
he given profit function comprises three main terms:
. The profit obtained in the current interval (t = CI). This function
is shown in (15), where it involves the revenue obtained from
selling energy into the spot market minus the cost of DR options
and flexible DR. Note that since the current interval is very close
to the real time dispatch, the spot price and wind power pro-
duction are assumed to be deterministic parameters here. Thus
the obtained profit for the current interval is not associated with
uncertainty.
. The expected profit over the following periods until the final
interval (t = CI+ → FI). Eq. (16) provides this function. The price
and wind forecasts for the following intervals involve a level
of uncertainty. Therefore, these parameters are illustrated using
generated scenarios.
. The CVaR risk measure which is shown in (17).
Note that the fixed DR volume determined in the previous step
s used in step 2 without any changes. Thus it is not included in the
rofit function in this step.
The profit function is subject to constraints (18)–(22). Constraint
18) enforces the size limitation of each flexible DR. In addition,
q. (19) indicates that the total energy volume of each flexible DR
ust be equal to the contracted volume (EAgrd,S1flex ) obtained in step
. Expressions (20) and (21) show CVaR constraints. Finally, Eq.
22) imposes the power balance. Note that in this constraint, wind
ower production (Pw,S2(s, t)) is known for the current interval.
owever, it is uncertain in the following intervals. In addition, it
s important to emphasize the necessity of including the fixed DR
olume in the power balance constraint in step 2.
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4. Case study
4.1. Data preparation and assumptions
The proposed offering plan is evaluated on a realistic case of the
South Australian (SA) jurisdiction within the Australian NEM. The
available spot price and wind speed data are half-hourly resolution.
Hence, it is assumed that each given interval in this paper is 30 min
[36].
The spot price and wind power production are uncertain param-
eters and thus they are characterized using proper scenarios.
Similar to the relevant studies [5], ARIMA models are chosen for
generating price scenarios. A time series of the spot prices of SA
from December 2011 to January 2012 is used to generate price
scenarios [36]. As a result, 40 price scenarios are generated for
step 1.
The wind power producer Lake Bonney 2 is chosen [37]. This
producer is located at Mt  Gambier AERO and its installed capac-
ity is 159 MW (53 of Vestas 3 MW Turbines). In order to provide
wind power scenarios, first, wind speed scenarios are generated
using the ARMA model [5,32,38]. To this end, the summer season
data from 2007 to 2012 is used as the input time series. 20 wind
speed scenarios are generated for step 1. These scenarios are then
transformed to power scenarios using the Vestas Wind curve.
Note that the proper number of scenarios is usually determined
by one of the following methods. (1) The first method uses sce-
nario reductions techniques [35]. To this end, the original number
of scenarios is reduced in a way  that makes the problem tractable
while keeping it accurate. Fast-forward scenario reduction is the
most popular one. (2) The second method follows the same aim,
but it targets the objective function. That is, the number of sce-
narios is increased until the expected profit is stabilized [39]. This
paper uses this method, where altogether 800 scenarios are gener-
ated. Fig. 3 verifies this number by illustrating the expected profit
versus the number of scenarios for the risk-neutral and risk-averse
wind power producers.Fig. 4 displays the expected values of wind power and spot price
scenarios in step 1. It can be seen that while the wind power pro-
duction peak occurs during the first intervals, spot prices see their
peak in the afternoon.
us number of scenarios.
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Table 1
DR contracts details.
Fixed DR Flexible DR DR  options
Intervals 3–48 1–48 1–48Fig. 4. Expected wind pow
With regards to step 2, the given price and wind scenarios of
tep 1 are reduced to 20 and 10, respectively. For this purpose, those
cenarios of step 1 which have higher levels of deviations from the
verage values shown in Fig. 4 are removed. This is reasonable since
tep 2 is closer to the trading intervals and hence its uncertainty is
ower than that of step 1.
The information of DR contracts is provided in Table 1. Since
R contract data are not available, their details are thoughtfully
ssumed in this paper. In order to reasonably model these contracts,
wo main points are taken into account: first, the prices consid-
red for DR contracts are chosen in a way that they are close to
he expected price scenarios, which is shown in Fig. 4. Secondly,
he DR contracts are assigned in such a way that when the wind
Fig. 5. The expected profit vPrice ranges ($/MWh) 24–44 20–40 30–44
Volume ranges (MW)
Sell up to 12 Sell up to 20 Sell up to 10
Buy up to 15 Buy up to 20 Buy up to 20
power producer is in its high production periods and market prices
are low, it most likely sells a part of its energy through DR con-
tracts. On the contrary, when the market price is high, the wind
power producer is assumed to be mostly a DR buyer in order to
compensate its deviations during this time.
s. standard deviation.
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Fig. 6. The initial offer curves of step 1.
Table 2
Fixed DR contracts.
 Set contracts
0 FC2, FC4, FC5, FC6, FC7, FC9, FC11, FC12
0.5 FC2, FC4, FC5, FC6, FC9, FC12
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Table 4
Contracted Flexible DR in step 1 (MWh).
 Flex1 Flex2 Flex3 Flex4 Flex5 Flex6 Total
0 20 50 40 20 25 40 195
0.5  20 50 2.9 0 0 0 72.9
T
S1  FC2, FC4, FC5, FC6, FC12
5  FC5, FC6, FC12
Twelve fixed DR contracts are considered. The first three con-
racts cover the time intervals between 3 and 18. According to the
bove description, the wind power producer can sell energy to
he aggregator in these periods. The other contracts consider the
emaining intervals where the wind power producer buys fixed DR
rom the DR aggregator. Six flexible DR agreements are modeled.
he wind producer is able to sell/buy up to 20 MW flexible DR in
ach interval. Finally, four DR options are taken into account, where
he penalty of not exercising each option is assumed to be equal to
5% of the contract cost. Note that this penalty is derived according
o the common fee used in financial markets [19]. It is assumed that
he wind power producer can sell energy through DR options in the
rst 18 intervals while it is a DR option buyer during the following
eriods.
.2. Numerical results
.. Decisions on step 1 (S1)
The given problem is mixed-integer linear programming which
s solved using CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [40].
Fig. 5 displays the expected profit versus the standard devia-
ion for various risk levels. The risk-neutral wind power producer
btains around $23,000 while its profit deviation is just under
15,000. Increasing the risk level leads to a decrement in both
able 3
igned DR options in step 1.
 DRO1 DRO2 
0 8, 10–18, 31–34, 42–44 1–18, 29–44, 47 
0.5  7, 8, 10–18, 32 1–18, 30–34 
1  7–18 1–18, 31–33 
5  8, 10–18 1, 5–16, 18, 33 1  20 50 2.9 0 0 0 72.9
5  −3.6 −11 −50 −20 −25 −65 −174.6
values, where for the most risk-averse producer the expected
profit and the standard deviation decrease to around $21,000 and
$10,000, respectively. In other words, the risk-neutral wind power
producer obtains almost 10% higher profit than the risk-averse one
with the cost of around 45% higher profit deviation.
Table 2 shows the contracted fixed DR agreements for different
levels of the risk. A risk-neutral wind power producer ( = 0) sets
8 fixed DR contracts out of 12 existing ones. This number declines
as the producer becomes more risk averse, where for  = 5, only
3 contracts are employed. This trend is reasonable as risk-averse
producers avoid increasing their risk by purchasing energy from
resources such as fixed DR and selling it in the spot market.
Table 3 represents the intervals in which DR options (DRO) are
contracted in step 1. All four DROs are signed for different risk lev-
els. However, the number of signed DR options is reduced as the
risk level increases. Indeed, the declining trend follows the simi-
lar rule as the fixed DR pattern, discussed above. In addition, it can
be seen that risk-averse producers are generally DR option sellers,
where they sign DR options mostly during intervals 1–18.
The volume of contracted flexible DR agreements is shown in
Table 4. The risk-neutral wind power producer buys 195 MWh  flex-
ible DR from the aggregator, where all six given agreements are
used. Increasing the risk level leads a lower share of flexible DR. This
is obvious in  = 0.5 and  = 1, where only the first three contracts
DRO3 DRO4
15–17, 42–44 1, 3–9, 12, 14–15, 40–44
15–17 1, 3–7, 12, 14, 15
15–17 2–5, 12, 14, 15
4, 8, 12, 14–17 5, 7, 9
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tFig. 7. The initial offer curve (S1
re employed and the share of flexible DR decreases to less than
alf. An interesting point is that the most risk-averse wind power
roducer ( = 5) sells around 175 MWh  energy to the DR aggrega-
or. This is sensible since the risk-averse producer can reduce the
isk of the spot market by selling a portion of its energy through
he reliable flexible DR agreement.
Fig. 6 shows the initial bids for various risk levels. It can be seen
hat all wind power producers have lower offers than their expected
roduction in the first 18 intervals, particularly between intervals
 and 18. That is, they prefer to sell a percentage of their expected
ower through DR contracts. However, for the rest of the intervals
he trend is as follows. Risk taker producers, and ultimately the
Fig. 8. The usage distribution of flexihe final offer curve (S2)-Rho = 0.
risk-neutral one ( = 0), have higher offers than their expected pro-
duction in intervals after 18. This indicates that they tend to buy DR
to resell it to the spot market. However, as the wind power producer
becomes more risk averse, this tendency decreases. It can be seen
that for these producers the bid is almost equal to or even lower
than the wind power expectation. This is sensible since risk-averse
producers refuse to have more risk by buying DR and selling it to
the spot market as a volatile resource.B. Decisions on step 2 (S2)
This section delivers the results of step 2 for the risk-neutral
( = 0) and the most risk-averse ( = 5) wind power producers.
ble DR in steps 1 and 2-Rho = 0.
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tFig. 9. DR options not
Fig. 7 compares the initial (step 1) and final (step 2) offer curves
or the risk-neutral wind power producer ( = 0). The initial offer
urve is modified in almost all intervals in step 2. In the final offer
urve, more power is sold during the first intervals but the share
f the following periods decreases. This indeed shows how the
isk-neutral producer corrects its initial offers during the real time
hen more accurate power and spot price expectations are avail-
ble. It is also obvious that the final offer is almost the same as the
xpected wind power in the first 18 intervals, while it is higher in
he remaining intervals. Indeed, the risk-neutral producer aims to
Fig. 10. The initial offer curve (S1) vs. tised in step 2-Rho = 0.
increase its profit though buying DR and selling it to the market in
the last intervals.
The distributions of flexible DR employed by the risk-neutral
wind power producer in steps 1 and 2 are provided in Fig. 8. Each
sub-figure shows the outcome of one flexible DR  agreement. Note
that X-axis represents the intervals during which each flexible DR
agreement is valid. The wind power producer changes the usage
configurations of flexible DR contracts 1, 2, 3 and 6 in step 2. Sig-
nificant modifications are made in contract 2, where the producer
applies the majority of the contracted volume during intervals
he final offer curve (S2)-Rho = 5.
196 N. Mahmoudi et al. / Electric Power Systems Research 119 (2015) 187–198
f flex
1
i
s
d
s
t
T
D
m
t
d
t
F
d
i
a
o
s
v
2
t
t
t
i
a
o
t
d
2
m
m
r
d
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3 and 14. Indeed, it can clearly be seen that changes in
ntervals 13 and 14 have significant impacts on the final offer curve
hown in Fig. 7. This is also obvious for interval 23. Note that the
ecisions made on contracts 4 and 5 remain the same as step 1.
Fig. 9 provides the intervals in which the signed DR options in
tep 1 are not exercised in the final offer. As can be seen, most of
he DR options (DRO) are not exercised during the last intervals.
his is more obvious during intervals 42–44, where all four given
RO signed in step 1 are not applied during the final offer. This
eans that although these DRO agreements are signed in step 1,
he wind power producer refuses to use them when the real-time
ecisions are made. This correction action indeed coincides with
he falling trend of the final offer curve during periods 37–48 (See
ig. 7).
The outcomes of the most risk-averse wind power producer are
elivered in Figs. 10 and 11. The initial and final offers are depicted
n Fig. 10. Similar to the risk-neutral wind power producer, the risk-
verse producer makes correction actions in a way to increase its
ffer in the first intervals while reducing it in the last periods. More
pecifically, the final offer is higher than the initial one during inter-
als 15–19. On the other hand, it can be seen that for the intervals
0–48 the wind power producer has a lower offer in step 2. Note
hat the final offer is lower than the expected wind power produc-
ion in the first 18 intervals (due to selling a portion of energy to
he DR aggregator), while it is almost the same as that in the rest
ntervals. Note also that the initial and final offer trends of the risk-
verse wind power producer are not as much different as the case
f the risk-neutral one. This actually indicates how the conserva-
ive view of the risk-averse wind power producer affects its initial
ecisions in step 1.
Fig. 11 represents the modifications of flexible DR usage in step
 in comparison to that of initial offers. The wind power producer
odifies its initial decisions in all flexible DR agreements. This is
ore obvious in contracts 3 and 4. These modifications are indeed
eflected in the final offer (Fig. 10), where for instance significant
rops in intervals 20–24 in the final offer coincide with the higher
ale of the wind power producer through flexible DR 4.ible DR in steps 1 and 2-Rho = 5.
Finally note that the risk-averse wind power producer finds all
signed DR options in step 1 beneficial and hence exercises them in
its final offer.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a new offering strategy for wind power pro-
ducers, which includes two  steps. The first step takes place on the
day prior to the energy delivery in which the initial strategies are
implemented. The second step is a successive process which is held
right before each dispatch interval. In this step the wind power
producer modifies its initial decisions to maximize its profit. This
strategy allows wind power producers to employ DR. To this end,
a new DR scheme is presented through which the wind power
producer can buy DR from DR aggregators through various DR
agreements.
The proposed plan is evaluated on the Australian National
Electricity Market. A stochastic mixed-integer profit function is
proposed for each step which is solved using GAMS. The main find-
ings are as follows. (1) The proposed plan is beneficial to wind
power producers to cope with their production uncertainty as well
as spot market violations. While the decisions made on the preced-
ing day are taken under uncertainty, step two  allows the producer
to take corrective actions once uncertain parameters are known. (2)
The proposed strategy helps wind power producers to benefit from
DR agreements. Risk-neutral wind power producers place initial
offers in a way to follow both the peak of their power production
and spot prices. However, risk-averse producers prefer an offering
trend similar to their production pattern. (3) Both risk-neutral and
risk-averse wind power producers make correction actions in step
2. This is however more obvious for the risk-neutral wind power
producer.
Although the proposed plan is applied to the Australian NEM,
with some modification it can be generalized to other markets.
Indeed, the formulations need to be changed in order to address
both day-ahead and balancing markets. The first step indeed
clears the day-ahead market, while the second step balance the
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roduction deviation in the balancing market. This work will be
ddressed in our future work.
. Nomenclature
The variables decided in steps 1 and 2 are represented as S1 and
2, respectively.
. Indices
 Index showing fixed DR’s blocks
 index representing fixed DR contracts
ex index representing flexible DR agreements
 index representing DR options
 index representing the time interval
. Variables
Agrd,S1
flex contracted energy volume of flexible DR flex (S1)
DR
f,b
(t) power of fixed DR f, block b (S1)
DR,S1
flex (t) power of flexible DR flex (S1)
DR,S2
flex (t) power of flexible DR flex (S2)
s,S1(t, w)  initial power offered in the spot market (S1)
s,S2(t, s) final power offered in the spot market (S2)
gno(t) binary variable indicating whether DR option o is signed
or not (S1)
o(t) binary variable indicating whether DR option o is exer-
cised or not (S2)
, (w), (s) auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR (S1, S2)
. Constants
(t) duration of time interval t
pen
o (t) penalty of not exercising DR option o
DR,MAX
f,b
(t) maximum power of fixed DR f, block b
DR,MIN
f,b
(t) minimum power of fixed DR f, block b
DR,MAX
flex (t) maximum power of flexible DR flex
DR,MIN
flex (t) minimum power of flexible DR flex
o(t) power of DR option o
w,S1(t, w) wind power scenario w in step 1
w,S2(t, s) wind power scenario s in step 2
PDRflex(t) binary parameter indicating the intervals in which flexi-
ble DR flex is valid.
 risk level
 confidence level (Equal to 0.95)
DR
f,b
(t) price of fixed DR f, block b
DR
flex(t) price of flexible DR flex
s,S1(t, w)  spot price scenario w in step 1
s,S2(t, s) spot price scenario s in step 2
o(t) price of DR option o
(w) probability of scenario w in step 1 (
∑Nw
w=1(w) = 1)
(s) probability of scenario w in step 2 (
∑Ns
s=1(s) = 1)
. Numbers
BDR number of blocks of fixed DR contracts
FDR number of fixed DR contracts
flex number of flexible DR agreements
o number of DR options
w number of scenarios in step 1
s number of scenarios in step 2
[
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Appendix.
In profit functions, CVaR is defined as the expected value of the
profits smaller than the (1 − ˇ)-quantile of the profit distribution
(  ˇ is the confidence level, which is usually taken as 0.95). in other
words, CVaR is defined as the expected profit not exceeding Value-
at-Risk (VAR) [35]:
CVaR = Expected{profit
∣∣profit ≤ VaR }
where,
VaR = Max{x
∣∣probability(profit(x) ≤ x) ≤ 1 −  ˇ }
Hence, the linear formulation of CVaR is [35]:
Max,(w) −
1
1 − ˇ
∑
w
(w).(w)
where, the optimal value of  is VaR. (w) is equal to the differ-
ence between VaR and the profit of scenario w, and (w) is the
probability of scenario w.
Consequently, as CVaR is determined in a maximization func-
tion, it should have the same sign, i.e. (+), as the profit function.
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 This paper proposes a new model to include DR in wind offering strategy.
 A wind power producer is able to trade DR with a DR aggregator.
 The DR aggregator behavior is modelled through a revenue function.
 A bilevel problem is formulated which is transformed into a linear problem.
 The outcomes indicate the usefulness of the proposed strategy.a r t i c l e i n f o
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This paper proposes a new wind offering strategy in which a wind power producer employs demand
response (DR) to cope with the power production uncertainty and market violations. To this end, the
wind power producer sets demand response (DR) contracts with a DR aggregator. The DR aggregator
behavior is modeled through a revenue function. In this way the aggregator aims to maximize its revenue
through trading DR with the wind power producer, other market players and the day-ahead market. The
problem is formulated in bilevel programming in which the upper level represents wind power producer
decisions and the lower level models the DR aggregator behavior. The given bilevel problem is then trans-
formed into a single-level mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and linearized
using proper techniques. The feasibility of the given strategy is assessed on a case of the Nordic market.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Determining an optimal offering strategy is the main challenge
faced by a wind power producer. This is due to its power produc-
tion uncertainty as well as market price volatilities. Research in
the literature striving to present solutions for this issue mainly
focuses on market studies [1–7] and joint operation problems
[8–14].
Authors in [1] investigate a probabilistic bidding model for
wind power producers. The concept of minimizing imbalance costs
in wind offering strategies is investigated in [2,3]. Offering in var-
ious market floors including day-ahead, adjustment and balancing
markets is addressed in [4]. Ref. [5] recommends the coalition of
wind power producers to alleviate the wind power uncertainty.
Researchers in [6] evaluate the offering strategy by price-makerwind power producers. Finally, offering strategy considering two
models, i.e. naive use of wind production forecasts and stochastic
programming, is addressed in [7].
A joint operation of wind power producers and storage systems
is provided in [8–11]. The coordination of wind power producers
and hydro power plants is studied in [12,13]. The coordination of
wind power producers and thermal power plants is investigated
in [14]. Demand response (DR) is now becoming matured around
the world. Practical experience worldwide indicates this improved
trend. For instance, refer to [15] for the European demonstration,
[16] for the US experience and [17] for Italian programs. DR can
also be employed by wind power producers as a hedging resource.
The literature survey however indicates that relevant studies
mostly focus on the coordination of DR and wind power producers
to improve network and market operations [18–21].
This paper proposes a new offering strategy through which a
wind power producer is able to trade DR with a DR aggregator in
order to tackle the uncertainties associated with both power
WPP
DA market price
Competitors’ prices
Competitors’ price
Lower-Level Problem
DA market price
DR 
Aggregator
Competitors’ DR 
share
WPP’s DR share
DA market DR 
share
DR share
Wind power
Bal. price
DA price
Risk level
DA wind power 
offers
WPP’s price
Upper-Level Problem
DR price by WPP
Bal. wind power 
offers
Fig. 1. The proposed bilevel wind offering strategy.
348 N. Mahmoudi et al. / Applied Energy 133 (2014) 347–355production and market prices. The wind power producer decides
its offer in the day-ahead market while setting DR contracts with
the DR aggregator. To this end, the DR aggregator behavior is mod-
eled through a revenue maximization function in which the aggre-
gator determines its DR trading shares with three main resources:
the wind power producer in our study, other market players inter-
ested in DR, and the day-ahead market. A bilevel problem [22,23] is
formulated in which the upper-level decision maker (leader) is the
wind power producer while the lower-level problem is decided by
the DR aggregator (follower). The overall problem is then trans-
formed into a single-level mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints (MPEC) by replacing the lower-level problem with its
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions [24]. In addition,
the nonlinearities of the derived MPEC are linearized using the
strong duality theorem [24] and the technique provided in [25].
A case study of the Nordic market is used to evaluate the validity
of the proposed offering strategy. Uncertainties in each level are
characterized using a set of finite scenarios. In addition, the risk
is carried out using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR).
Overall, the contributions of the paper are as follows.
1. A new model is proposed to include DR in the offering strategy
of a wind power producer. Accordingly, the wind power pro-
ducer is able to participate in a day-ahead market while arrang-
ing DR contracts with a DR aggregator to lessen its risk.
2. The competition in the DR procurement is taken into account
through modelling the DR aggregator behavior. To this end, a
bilevel programming problem is formulated which is then ren-
dered into a single-level linear MPEC using proper methods.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
addresses the proposed wind offering strategy, where the mathe-
matical formulation of the proposed bilevel problem is described.
Then the equivalent linear formulation is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 provides a case study with numerical results. Section 5
concludes the paper. Finally, appendices are addressed in the last
section2. Wind offering strategy
2.1. Framework
The following assumptions are made in the proposed strategy.
First, it is assumed that the wind power producer makes offers in
the day-ahead market while clearing imbalances in the balancing
(regulating) market. Additionally, the given wind power producer
is treated as similar to conventional power plants [26], where it
is responsible for its bidding strategy and power production varia-
tion. Moreover, similar to [13], this paper determines the optimal
offering quantities instead of presenting bidding curves which is
investigated in [4]. A further assumption is that modelling techni-
cal DR programs through which the DR aggregator obtains DR from
customers is not the focus of this paper. Finally, note that the DR
flow can be either from the aggregator to players willing to trade
DR or in the opposite direction. In this way, the DR aggregator
maximizes its revenue when it is a DR seller and minimizes its cost
when buying energy through DR contracts.
The proposed bilevel wind offering strategy is illustrated in
Fig. 1. It is considered that the DR aggregator can trade DR with
the wind power producer (WPP), other competitors that are willing
to trade DR, and the day-ahead market. While parameters in each
level are shown by dash line boxes and arrows, decision variables
are represented using solid line boxes and arrows. The upper-level
problem belongs to the wind power producer (WPP), where it aims
to maximize its profit subject to the given constraints as well as theDR volume. Indeed, the obtained DR volume is determined by the
DR aggregator in the lower-level problem, where it depends on the
price that the wind power producer offers to the aggregator. Thus,
the links between the upper-level and lower-level problems are
the DR price offered by the wind power producer and conse-
quently, the DR share that the aggregator provides to the wind
power producer (double lines in Fig. 1).
The procedure carried out in this strategy is as follows. The
wind power producer determines its DR price while taking into
account the DR prices offered by other competitors as well as the
day-ahead (DA) market price (refer to upper-level problem, top
right-hand side). Accordingly, the DR aggregator decides the share
of each resource in the lower-level problem. Consequently, given
the DR share obtained by the wind power producer, the producer
makes its offer in the day-ahead and balancing markets. To this
end, besides the price forecasts of DA and Balancing (Bal.) markets,
the level of the risk taken by the producer is needed to be taken
into account (refer to upper-level problem, bottom left-hand side).
That is, depending on how risk averse the producer is, the energy
portion to be sold in each market is determined.
Note that the above decisions are made while the problem is
associated with the uncertainty of the following parameters:
day-ahead market price, balancing market price, wind power pro-
duction, and the DR price offered by other competitors. These
uncertain parameters are represented using finite scenarios. Two
distinct sets of scenarios are defined in this paper as follows.
Each upper-level scenario is represented by scenario w, which
comprises the vectors of day-ahead price (kDAðt;wÞ), balancing
price (kimbðt;wÞ) and wind power production Pw(t, w).
scenariow ¼ fkDAðt;wÞ; kimbðt;wÞ; PWðt;wÞg ð1Þ
N. Mahmoudi et al. / Applied Energy 133 (2014) 347–355 349The probability of each scenario occurrence equals p(w), whereP
w2XwpðwÞ ¼ 1.
Each lower-level scenario is shown by scenario s, which
involves a vector of other competitors’ prices (kcðt; sÞ) as well as
a day-ahead market price vector (kDAðt; sÞ).
scenarios ¼ fkcðt; sÞ; kDAðt; sÞg ð2Þ
Similar to the upper-level problem, the probability of each
scenario is p(s), where
P
s2XspðsÞ ¼ 1.
2.2. Market model
The proposed offering plan is applied to the Nordic market. This
market involves three floors, called the spot (day-ahead) market,
Elbas as an adjustment market and the regulating (balancing)
market [2]. Elbas is not very active [2] and hence it is not modeled
here.
The day-ahead (spot) market closes at 12:00 pm the preceding
day of the energy delivery. Then, offers and bids from players are
stacked and the day-ahead price is derived. The revenue obtained
from the day-ahead market is formulated in (3).
RDAðt;wÞ ¼ PDAðtÞ  kDAðt;wÞ  dðtÞ ð3Þ
PDA(t) is the offered power in the day-ahead market during period t.
kDAðt;wÞ represents the price of the day-ahead market in scenario
w eX during time period t. d(t) is the duration of period t.
The balancing (regulating) market is used to balance between
production and consumption. To this end, regulation up or down
is usually activated. Thus, imbalance price kimbðt;wÞ is represented
by a pair of positive and negative imbalance prices, i.e.
(kimb;posðt;wÞ; kimb;negðt;wÞ). The relationship between imbalance
prices (positive (kimb;pos) and negative (kimb;neg)) and the day-ahead
price (kDA) during upward and downward regulation is given as
follows [4].
Down
Up
kimb;pos kimb;neg
kimb;pos  kDA kDA
kDA kimb;neg  kDA
" #
ð4Þ
An estimation of positive and negative imbalance prices for the
Nordic market is provided in [13].
kimb;pos ¼ 0:95 kDA ð5Þ
kimb;neg ¼ 1:05 kDA ð6Þ
This paper further extends the given model in a way that the
uncertainty of the balancing market is taken into account:
kimb;pos ¼ SposðwÞ  kDA ð7Þ
kimb;neg ¼ SnegðwÞ  kDA ð8Þ
where Spos(w) 6 1 and Sneg(w)P 1 are the scenario-based factors of
positive and negative imbalance prices respectively. The revenue/
cost of the balancing market is then formulated below [4].
R=CImbðt;wÞ ¼ Pposðt;wÞ  Sposðt;wÞ  kDAðt;wÞ  dðtÞ  Pnegðt;wÞ
 Snegðt;wÞ  kDAðt;wÞ  dðtÞ ð9Þ
where Ppos(t, w) and Pneg(t, w) are the positive and negative
imbalance power in scenario w eX and time period t.
2.3. Objective function
The bilevel problem is formulated as follows:Maximize PF ¼
X
w2Xw
pðwÞ 
X
t2T
RDAðt;wÞ þ R=CImbðt;wÞ
h i

X
t2T
PDRðtÞ  kDRðtÞ
þ q  n 1
1 b
X
w2X
gðwÞ  pðwÞ
 !
ð10Þ
Subject to
0 6 Pposðt;wÞ 6 PWðt;wÞ þ PDRðtÞ ð11Þ
0 6 Pnegðt;wÞ 6 PInstW þ PDRðtÞ ð12Þ
PDAðtÞ þ PImbðt;wÞ ¼ PWðt;wÞ þ PDRðtÞ ð13Þ
PImbðt;wÞ ¼ Pposðt;wÞ  Pnegðt;wÞ ð14Þ
 ProfitðwÞ þ n gðwÞ  0;8w 2 X ð15Þ
gðwÞ  0;8w 2 X ð16Þ
ProfitðwÞ ¼
X
t2T
RDAðt;wÞ þ R=CImbðt;wÞ
h i

X
t2T
PDRðtÞ  kDRðTÞ ð17Þ
PDRðtÞ ¼ CDR;TðtÞ 
X
s2S
pðsÞ  spwðt; sÞ ð18Þ
CDR;TðtÞ ¼ Pmax;s  bsðtÞ  Pmax;b  bbðtÞ ð19Þ
where,
spwðt;sÞ 2 argmaximize
(
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ CDR;TðtÞ  spwðt;sÞ kDRðtÞþ spDAðt;sÞ kDAðt;sÞ
h
þ
XNTC
c¼1
spcðt;sÞ kcðt;sÞ
#
ð20Þ
spwðt;sÞþ spDAðt;sÞþ
XNTC
c¼1
spcðt;sÞ¼1 if fbsðtÞ¼1orbbðtÞ¼1g ð21Þ
spwðt;sÞ;spDAðt;sÞ;spcðt;sÞP0 8t;s;c
)
ð22Þ
The upper level problem indicates the profit maximization of
the wind power producer (Eq. (10)). This problem involves the
expected revenue obtained from the day-ahead market, the
expected revenue/cost of the balancing market, the cost of DR,
and the risk measure. PDR(t) and kDRðtÞ are respectively the DR
volume obtained and the DR price offered by the wind power pro-
ducer. n and g(w) are auxiliary variables for calculating conditional
value at risk (CVaR) [4]. b is the confidence level, which is 0.95.
Note that the risk level (q =[0–1)) represents a tradeoff between
the expected profit and the risk. A risk-averse wind power pro-
ducer willing to minimize the risk chooses a large value of the risk
level. On the other hand, as the wind power producer becomes a
risk taker and ultimately a risk-neutral, it prefers higher profits
and consequently selects a risk factor close to 0.
The profit function is subject to the following constraints. Posi-
tive and negative imbalance offers are limited by (11) and (12),
respectively. Pw(t, w) is wind power production in scenario w and
time t. PInstW is the installed capacity of the wind power producer.
The power balance is given in (13). In this equation, PImb(t, w) is the
power traded in the balancing market, which is represented in
(14). Expressions (15) and (16) represent conditional value at risk
(CVaR) constraints [4] which are derived to linearize this risk mea-
sure. Note that Profit(w) in (17) indicates the obtained profit in sce-
nario w. The DR volume is calculated in (18). CDR,T(t) is the total
available DR capacity that can be traded by the aggregator. As
mentioned earlier the DR flow can be either from the DR
aggregator to the wind power producer or in the reverse direction.
Therefore, the DR capacity is the maximum DR that the aggregator
350 N. Mahmoudi et al. / Applied Energy 133 (2014) 347–355can either sell (Pmax,s(t)) or buy (Pmax,b(t)) (see Eq. (19)). bs(t) and
bb(t) are binary parameters which respectively indicate whether
the DR aggregator is a DR seller or buyer in time period t.
spw(t, s) is the DR share percentage that the wind power pro-
ducer trades with the DR aggregator. Indeed, this share is obtained
by the lower level problem which is formulated in (20)–(22). The
revenue maximization problem of the DR aggregator is modeled
in (20). The DR aggregator trades DR with the wind power pro-
ducer, the day-ahead market, and other competitors. Note that
spDA(t, s) represents the DR share percentage of the day-ahead mar-
ket and spc(t, s) shows the share of competitor c (c = 1, 2, . . ., NTC).
Note also that during periods in which the aggregator is a DR
buyer, the objective is actually a cost minimization function.
Constraint (21) imposes that total DR share percentage must be
equal to 1. Finally, constraint (22) is used for variable declarations.3. Linear formulation
The given problem is bilevel programming that includes nonlin-
earity. This section provides an equivalent single-level linear prob-
lemwhich is easily solvable by commercially available software. To
this end, the following procedure is applied.
First, the bilevel problem is transformed into a single-level
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). For
this purpose, the lower-level problem is replaced by its first-order
optimality conditions through the KKT conditions [24] (Appendix
A). Note that this transformation is valid since the lower-level
problem is continuous and linear and thus convex. The next step
is to linearize the derived MPEC. Indeed, the MPEC is nonlinear
because of (1) the complimentary conditions resulting from apply-
ing KKT, and (2) the product of PDR(t) and kDRðtÞ in (10). While the
former is linearized using the method presented in [25] (Appendix
B), the latter is linearized using the strong duality theorem [24]
(Appendix C).
Overall, the equivalent single-level linear program is as:MaximizePF ¼
X
w2Xw
pðwÞ 
X
t2T
RDAðt;wÞ þ R=CImbðt;wÞ
h i

X
t2T
CostDRðtÞ
þ q  n 1
1 b
X
w2X
gðwÞ  pðwÞ
 !
ð23Þsubject toFig. 2. Average wind power and spot price.CostDRðtÞ¼
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ
 cðt;sÞþCDR;T ðtÞ  spDAðt;sÞ kDAðt;sÞþCDR;TðtÞ 
XNTC
c¼1
spcðt;sÞ kcðt;sÞ
! 
ð24Þ
Constraints (A2)–(A5).
Constraints (A9)–(A14).
The derived problem is a mixed-integer linear programming
approach. Constraints (11)–(19), (21) and (22) of the original
problem are applied here. Expression (24) shows the linear equiv-
alent of the product of PDR(t) and kDRðtÞ, which is obtained from
Appendix C (we called it CostDR(t) in (23)). Constraints (A2)–(A5)
are associated with KKT optimality conditions (shown in Appendix
A). Finally, constraints (A9)–(A14) are used to linearize the
complementarity slackness conditions resulting from the KKT
optimality conditions (shown in Appendix B).4. Case study
4.1. Data preparation and assumptions
The proposed offering strategy is assessed on a realistic case of
the Nordic market. Since hourly market prices are available [27]
each period in this paper is considered as one hour. Nevertheless,
the presented strategy is also applicable on shorter time horizons.
The upper-level scenarios are generated as follows. 10 price sce-
narios are generated. For this purpose, similar to leading studies in
this area [2,4], the ARIMA method is used. A time series of the spot
prices of the Nordic market spanning January 2012 is used to gen-
erate price scenarios [27]. In addition, four positive and negative
imbalance factors are randomly generated. For positive factors, sce-
narios range between 0.95 and 1 (0.95 6 Spos(w) 6 1), while for neg-
ative factors, they are between 1 and 1.05 (1 6 Sneg(w) 6 1.05).
The wind power producer Hemmet located in Denmark is cho-
sen [28]. The installed capacity of this farm is 27 MW (Vestas Tur-
bines). The main focus of the paper is to investigate wind offering
strategies considering DR. Therefore, wind power scenarios are
simply generated while weather conditions and the specific char-
acteristics of wind speed as well as wind turbines are neglected.
Wind speed scenarios are generated using the ARMA model where
the available data in 2012 is used as an input time series. Accord-
ingly, fourteen wind speed scenarios are generated. These scenar-
ios are then transformed into power scenarios using the Vestas
Wind curve. The overall number of scenarios makes a tradeoff
between the tractability of the problem and the accuracy of the
results [4]. Note that using wind speed and market price data for
a longer period will improve the accuracy of the generated scenar-
ios. However, due to the limited access to the wind speed data, this
paper uses a short-period data, i.e. January 2012. Note also that for
making a better correlation between wind power and market price
scenarios, the period of price data is chosen the same as wind
speed data.
Fig. 2 shows the expected day-ahead price and wind power
production. The day-ahead price involves two peak periods, just
before noon and during the evening. Wind power peaks however,
occur during midnight and the afternoon.
The lower-level scenarios are generated as follows. Besides the
wind power producer, two other competitors (C1 and C2) willing
to trade DR with the aggregator are considered. Three price scenar-
ios are generated for each competitor as illustrated in Fig. 3. Com-
petitors are indicated with ‘‘C’’, while ‘‘S’’ represents the scenarios.
Note that these scenarios are generated in a way that they are
closed to the day-ahead market price mean shown in Fig. 2. Indeed,
the DR aggregator determines the DR share of each individual
Fig. 3. Other competitors’ DR price scenarios.
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ahead price scenarios for the lower-level problem are the same
as those generated in the upper-level one.
DR is currently in its early stage, where DR data is not publicly
available. This paper therefore assumes the DR data as follows. The
maximum DR potential that the DR aggregator can either buy or
sell in each period is assumed to be 10 MW. The aggregator is
assumed to be a DR buyer from 2 am to 5 am and a seller from
9 am to 12 pm and 5 pm to 9 pm.
4.2. Numerical results
The given mixed integer programming approach is solved for
various risk levels using CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [29]. Note that
hereafter the risk level (q) is shown by ‘‘Rho’’ throughout the
figures.
Fig. 4 depicts the expected profit versus the standard deviation
for the given risk levels. The risk-averse wind power producer
(q = 2) obtains the expected profit of $16560 with the deviation
of $7740. As the producer becomes more of a risk taker (i.e. the risk
level decreases), both the expected profit and the standard devia-
tion grow. This is more obvious for the risk-neutral wind power
producer (q = 0), where the expected profit and its deviation are
$16,713 and $8000, respectively. In other words, the risk-neutral
wind power producer obtains 1% higher profit than the risk-averse
one with the cost of 3.4% higher profit deviation.Fig. 4. Expected profit vs. standard deviation for various risk levels.Figs. 5 and 6 show the bids placed into the day-ahead market
and the power exchanged in the balancing market, respectively.
While the risk-neutral wind power producer places the majority
of its energy offer into the day-ahead market (see Fig. 5), its offer
in the balancing market is low and even negative in some periods
(see Fig. 6). That is, the risk-neutral producer takes risk in some
periods to bid higher than its energy production with the hope of
buying that amount in the balancing market at a cheaper cost. This
trend is more obvious at hours 16–18 where at each hour the wind
power producer has to buy more than 5 MW from the balancing
market to compensate its high offer in the day-ahead market.
Increasing the risk level leads a significant drop in the day-
ahead market bids. For instance, while the producer with risk level
q = 0.5 has a reasonable day-ahead sale share during its peak pro-
duction, the shares of the most risk-averse wind power producers
(q = 1.5 and q = 2) are almost negligible in the day-ahead market.
Indeed, risk-averse producers sell the majority of their energy into
the balancing market. This trend is reasonable since the risk-averse
producers refuse to take more risk by selling their energy into the
day-ahead market while their production and also the market price
are associated with a significant level of uncertainty. Thus they
choose the balancing market where they are close to real time
and have a better forecast of their production as well as the market
price.
The DR volumes obtained by the wind power producer in vari-
ous risk levels are illustrated in Fig. 7. The wind power producer
sells DR to the aggregator at 2–5 am and buys DR at 9 am–12 pmFig. 5. Day-ahead market bids for the given risk levels.
Fig. 6. Balancing market participation for the given risk levels.
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share through DR. This is particularly evident for the risk-neutral
producer, where its DR sales for 3 am and 4–5 am are 5 MW and
4 MW, respectively. This share however decreases for risk-averse
wind power producers. More specifically, this falling trend is
significant for the risk levels q = 1.5 and q = 2 during the period
3–5 am. It can be seen that the DR sale decreases to less than
2 MW in these periods. This declining trend is sensible since risk-
averse producers tend to sell the majority of their energy through
the balancing market where they have a better forecast of their
production as well as the market price (see Fig. 6). Hence, selling
energy through DR on the day prior to the energy delivery can
increase their risk as they may face power shortage in the delivery
time and consequently not be able to meet the sold power through
DR.
During the periods in which the wind power producer is a DR
buyer, i.e. 9–12 pm and 5–9 pm, the risk-neutral producer buys
more DR than the risk-averse one. It can be seen that during most
hours, the risk-neutral producer buys around 2 MW DR from the
aggregator. However, increasing the risk level is followed by a
decreasing tendency in most hours. This is more apparent at
10 am, 12, 8 and 9 pm where the share of DR procurement by
risk-averse wind power producers, particularly in the risk levels
q = 1.5 and q = 2 is almost negligible. This tendency is true since
buying energy from DR in a fixed cost and selling it into the volatileFig. 7. DR obtained by the wind power producer.
Fig. 8. The DR price offered by the wind power producer.market increases the risk of risk-averse wind power producers and
hence, they may avoid this practice.
Fig. 8 delivers the DR prices offered by the wind power producer
at various risk levels. In addition, DR price scenarios by other com-
petitors (shown in Fig. 3) are also depicted in this figure to provide
a better comparison. Note that competitors are indicated with ‘‘C’’,
while ‘‘S’’ represents the scenarios. The risk-neutral wind power
producer offers around $1/MW h lower price than the risk-averse
producers at 3–5 am. This lower price indeed resulted in a higher
sale share shown in Fig. 7. For the rest of the periods in which
the wind power producer buys DR from the aggregator this inclina-
tion is reversed. Actually, the risk-neutral producer offers higher
prices to procure more DR as depicted in Fig. 7. For instance, this
producer gives around $1.5/MW h higher than risk-averse produc-
ers at 10–11 am and 8–9 pm. In compared with the other compet-
itors, the DR prices given by the wind power producers are low in
the first period covering 2–5 am. However, for the remaining peri-
ods, wind power producers offer DR prices close to the other
competitors.
Fig. 9 depicts the total DR share of both competitors together as
well as the day-ahead market. Note that as mentioned earlier the
periods in which DR is traded are as follows. Period 1 is 2–5 am,
period 2 represents 9 am–12 pm and period 3 covers 5–9 pm.
Obviously there is an opposition DR trend as compared to that of
the wind power producer. That is, as the risk level increases, partic-
ularly for q = 2, the DR aggregator buys more DR from these
resources during the time period 2–5 am (period 1). In addition,
during the periods in which the aggregator is a DR seller, i.e. peri-
ods 2 and 3, its sale share increases as the risk level grows. This
trend is more clarified in Table 1, where the DR volumes (MW h)
for each competitor, i.e. C1 and C2, as well as the day-ahead market
(DA) in risk levels q = 0 and q = 2 are distinctly provided. It can be
seen that in both risk levels, the DR share of the day-ahead market
is higher than other competitors. In addition, it is obvious that
while the aggregator refuses to buy DR from C1 and C2 in q = 0
at 3–5 am, it buys more than 1 MW in q = 2 at each relevant hour.4.3. Sensitivity analysis
This section evaluates the impact of power production uncer-
tainty on the proposed strategy. A deterministic case (Case1) is
compared with the current study in the paper (Case2). Indeed,
the expected wind power production, shown in Fig. 2, is considered
as the wind power input in the deterministic case. The day-ahead
offers by the risk-neutral and risk-averse wind power producers
are illustrated in Figs. 10 and 11. Further results are as follows.Fig. 9. The total DR share traded with other players and the DA market.
Table 1
DR share of other competitors and the DA market (MW h).
q = 0 q = 2
C1 C2 DA C1 C2 DA
2 am 0.8 0.9 7 0.7 1 7
3 am 0 0 5 1.3 1.4 5.4
4 am 0 0 6 1 1.2 6.4
5 am 0 0 6 1.8 1.1 6.4
9 am 1.7 1.7 4.4 1.6 1.8 4.4
10 am 1.2 1.6 5 2 2.1 5.4
11 am 1.4 1.33 5.4 1.3 1.4 5.4
Noon 0.8 0.9 7 1.1 1.6 7
5 pm 1.6 1.2 5.4 1.4 1.3 5.4
6 pm 1.3 1.4 5 1.6 1.2 5
7 pm 2 1.9 3.4 2 1.9 3.9
8 pm 1.6 1.2 5.4 2.1 2 5.4
9 pm 0.9 1.3 6 1.6 2 6.1
Fig. 12. DR trading by the risk-averse wind power producer: cases 1 and 2.
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in the balancing market when their production is known (Case1).
The risk-neutral producer has exactly the same DR trading in both
cases. However, DR trading by the risk-averse producer is different
in case 1 than case 2 (See Fig. 12).
The main findings from Cases 1 and 2 are as follows.
1. As can be seen from Fig. 10, the day-ahead offer by the risk-neu-
tral wind producer mostly follows its expected production in
Case 1, where the producer perfectly knows its production.Fig. 10. Day-ahead offers by the risk-neutral wind power producer: cases 1 and 2.
Fig. 11. Day-ahead offers by the risk-averse wind power producer: cases 1 and 2.Indeed, the differences are as a result of DR trading since the
producer in Case1 has no involvement in the balancing market.
On the other hand, it is obvious that when the producer has
uncertain power production, its day-ahead offer significantly
changes due to that uncertainty. Actually, the producer has to
compensate this deviation in the balancing market (refer to
Fig. 6).
2. The interesting point is interpreted for the risk-averse wind
power producer. It can be seen from Fig. 11 that the risk-averse
wind power producer mostly prefers to sell through the day-
ahead market if its production is perfectly known (Case1). This
is in contrast to the Case2, where the wind power production is
faced with uncertainty and thus, the risk-averse producer
mainly prefers to participate in the balancing market due to
its better production forecast in that market.
3. The risk-averse wind power producer sells more energy
through DR in Case1 than Case2 (see period 1 in Fig. 12). This
is reasonable since the power production in Case1 is determin-
istic and therefore, the producer can hedge against the risk of
the market by selling a portion of its energy through the bilat-
eral DR contract. Note that the producer behavior in buying DR
is arbitrary (periods 2 and 3 in Fig. 12). This is mainly because of
two opposite aims: on one hand, the risk-averse producer is not
interested in buying DR to sell it in the volatile market; on the
other hand, the producer may find some periods in which buy-
ing DR is beneficial as there may be a chance of increasing its
profit. This happens in period 3, where the market price is at
its peak (See the expected day-ahead price in Fig. 2).
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a new energy offering plan for wind power
producers. The producer is allowed to trade DR with a DR aggrega-
tor. The problem is formulated in a bilevel programming approach
where the upper-level represents the wind power producer profit
maximization objective and the lower-level problem models the
aggregator behavior through its own revenue function. The bilevel
problem is then transformed into a single-level linear program-
ming approach through proper techniques in order to make it solv-
able using commercially available software.
The overall problem is a stochastic programming approach in
which the risk is carried out using CVaR. A case of the Nordic Mar-
ket is chosen to assess the validity of the given problem. The main
findings are as follows. (1) While risk-neutral wind power produc-
ers mostly sell their energy in the day-ahead market, risk-averse
354 N. Mahmoudi et al. / Applied Energy 133 (2014) 347–355producers mainly choose the balancing market to participate in. (2)
The wind power producer can buy DR during the peak price peri-
ods to lessen the risk of its power production and market price
uncertainty. On the other hand, the producer is able to sell some
portion of its energy through DR contracts with the aggregator dur-
ing off-peak periods. (3) While the risk-neutral wind power pro-
ducer has a higher share in DR trading, either in selling or in
buying, the risk-averse producers mostly refuse to be involved in
DR. (4) Modelling the DR aggregator behavior makes DR trading
more competitive since the wind power producer is required to
compete with other players to offer a reasonable DR price to the
DR aggregator. (5) The uncertainty of wind power production
affects day-ahead offers of both risk-neutral and risk-averse wind
power producers, particularly the latter.
Appendix A. KKT optimality conditions
To make the lower-level problem in a standard form, we can
replace the maximization function by a minus minimization func-
tion. Then, the Lagrangian function of the lower-level problem is
given as:
L ¼ 
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ  CDR;TðtÞ
 spwðt; sÞ  kDRðtÞ þ spDAðt; sÞ  kDAðt; sÞ þ
XNTC
c¼1
spcðt; sÞ  kcðt; sÞ
" #
 cðt; sÞ  spwðt; sÞ þ spDAðt; sÞ þ
XNTC
c¼1
spcðt; sÞ  1
 !
 lwðt; sÞ  spwðt; sÞ  lDAðt; sÞ  spDAðt; sÞ  lcðt; sÞ
 spcðt; sÞ
ðA1Þ
In this function, c(t, s), lw(t, s), lDA(t, s) and lc(t, s) are the rele-
vant Lagrangian multipliers of the lower-level constraints. Accord-
ingly, KKT conditions associated with the lower-level problem are
obtained as follows.
@L
@spwðt;sÞ¼
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ CDR;T ðtÞ kDRðtÞcðt;sÞlwðt;sÞ¼0 ðA2Þ
@L
@spDAðt;sÞ¼
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ CDR;T ðtÞ kDAðt;sÞcðt;sÞlDAðt;sÞ¼0 ðA3Þ
@L
@spcðt;sÞ¼
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ CDR;T ðtÞ kcðt;sÞcðt;sÞlcðt;sÞ¼0 8c¼1; . . . ;Nc ðA4Þ
lwðt;sÞ; lDAðt;sÞ; lcðt;sÞP0 . . . 8t;s;c ðA5Þ
lwðt;sÞ  spwðt;sÞ¼0 ðA6Þ
lDAðt;sÞ  spDAðt;sÞ¼0 ðA7Þ
lcðt;sÞ  spcðt;sÞ¼0 8c¼1; . . . ;Nc ðA8Þ
Note that (A5)–(A8) are complementarity conditions.
Eqs. (A6)–(A8) make the problem nonlinear. The following subsec-
tion addresses how to make these equations linear.
Appendix B. Linearizing complementarity slackness conditions
With the cost of adding some binary variables, the complemen-
tarity slackness conditions can easily be linearized as follows [25].
spwðt; sÞ 6 Msp  vwðt; sÞ ðA9Þ
spDAðt; sÞ 6 Msp  vDAðt; sÞ ðA10Þ
spcðt; sÞ 6 Msp  vcðt; sÞ 8c ¼ 1; . . . ;Nc ðA11Þ
lwðt; sÞ 6 Mlð1 vwðt; sÞÞ ðA12Þ
lDAðt; sÞ 6 Mlð1 vDAðt; sÞÞ ðA13Þ
lcðt; sÞ 6 Mlð1 vcðt; sÞÞ 8c ¼ 1; . . . ;Nc ðA14ÞwhereMsp andMl are sufficiently large constants and mw, mDA and mc
are binary variables.Appendix C. Strong duality theorem
The strong duality theorem can be used to extract the linear for-
mulation of the product of PDR(t)kDRðtÞ. The dual of the lower-level
problem for the upper-level variable kDRðtÞ is given in (A15). Note
again that we replace the maximization function in the lower-level
problem by a minus minimization function to have it in a standard
form.
Maximize
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ  cðt; sÞ ðA15Þ
c(s, t) is the dual variable of the lower-level equality (21).
According to the strong duality theorem, the values of primal
objective function (20) and the dual function (A15) must be equal
at the optimal solution. That is:
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ cðt;sÞ ¼
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ CDR;TðtÞ
 spwðt;sÞ kDRðtÞþ spDAðt;sÞ kDAðt;sÞþ
XNTC
c¼1
spcðt;sÞ kcðt;sÞ
" #
ðA16Þ
Given the above expression and also from (18), the product of
PDR(t). kDRðtÞ is easily obtained.
PDRðtÞ kDRðtÞ¼
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ CDR;T ðtÞ spwðt;sÞ kDRðtÞ
¼
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ cðt;sÞ
X
s2Xs
pðsÞ CDR;T ðtÞ  spDAðt;sÞ kDAðt;sÞ
XNTC
c¼1
spcðt;sÞ kcðt;sÞ
 !
ðA17Þ
This product is now linear and can be used in the equivalent
single-level objective function.References
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A  new  demand  response  (DR) scheme  from  the  retailers’  point  of  view  is  presented  in this paper.  The
proposed  DR  scheme  allows  a retailer  to decide  how  to buy  DR from  aggregators  and  consumers.  Various
long-term  and real-time  DR agreements  are  proposed,  where  they  are  considered  as energy  resources
of  retailers  in  addition  to  the  commonly  used  providers.  These  innovative  agreements  include  pool-
order  options,  spike-order  options,  forward  DR  contracts  and reward-based  DR. A stochastic  energy
procurement  problem  for retailers  is formulated,  in  which  pool  prices  and  customers’  participation  in  theeywords:
emand response
lectricity retailer
orward DR
ool-order options
reward-based DR  are  uncertain  variables.  The  feasibility  of the  problem  is assessed  using  a  realistic  case
of the  Queensland  jurisdiction  within  the  Australian  National  Electricity  Market (NEM).  The  outcomes
indicate  the  usefulness  of  the given  DR  scheme  for  retailers,  particularly  for the  conservative  ones.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
eward-based DR
pike-order options
. Introduction
.1. Literature review, contributions and approach
Demand response (DR) can play a vital role in alleviating market
nd network issues. While network providers employ DR to main-
ain the security and reliability of the network, mitigating the risk
f pool price volatilities is the main aim of using DR by electricity
etailers.
There are various papers focusing on DR. The basic definitions
nd classifications of DR programs are addressed in [1], where
R is divided into two main categories, namely incentive and
rice-based programs. The elasticity concept is introduced in [2],
here it reflects the responsiveness of customers to price changes.
ncentive-based DR programs are formulated in some papers such
s [3–5]. Ref. [3] provides the mathematical formulations of DR
rograms. A coupon-based method is formulated in [4], where
he incentive offered to consumers is determined according to the
arket price. An incentive-based scheme is presented in [5], in
hich both the energy cost and peak-to-average ratio are mini-
ized through a game theory approach. Price-based DR actions are
resented in many research articles such as [6,7]. Authors in [6]
odel a real-time DR, where consumers are able to adjust their
nergy usage based on real-time prices. A comprehensive time-
f-use is formulated in [7], where the elasticity is modeled as a
on-zero cross and flexible function. Technical aspects of DR are
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 7 33653962; fax: +61 7 33654999.
E-mail addresses: n.mahmoudi@uq.edu.au (N. Mahmoudi), saha@itee.uq.edu.au,
ksaha@ieee.org (T.K. Saha), m.eghbal@uq.edu.au (M.  Eghbal).
378-7796/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2013.11.009illustrated in several papers. For instance, detailed control strate-
gies of managing electrical loads like water heater, air conditioners,
space heating and cooling systems are provided in [8–12].
A new concept is introduced in [13,14], where DR is treated as a
public good. Authors in [13] devise a DR Exchange, in which buyers
and sellers trade DR in a pool-based market. This market is modi-
fied in [14], where a Walrasian market clearing technique is used
instead of the former pool-based method.
Option valuation theories are used to evaluate the economic
value of DR. Paper [15] formulates option values for three distinct
DR programs, known as load curtailment, load shifting and fuel sub-
stitution. Consequently, customers can decide whether to invest in
these DR programs. This option valuation is applied to the critical
peak pricing program in [16,17]. Furthermore, a stochastic pro-
gramming approach is proposed in [18], where industry customers
can agree whether to accept a load curtailment option.
In line with retail markets, DR is a useful resource of hedging
risk by retailers. However, few papers address this concept: authors
in [19] use interruptible loads to alleviate the uncertainty of pool
markets faced by a load serving entity. Two interruptible load con-
tracts, pay-in-advance and pay-as-you-go, are evaluated in [20] as
the energy resources of electricity retailers. Self-production is also
used in [21] to limit the risk of cost fluctuations in pool markets.
Ref. [22] uses interruptible loads as an energy resource of distribu-
tion companies. A short-term deterministic model is presented in
[23], in which distribution companies can use interruptible loads
to place bids in the market. Besides interruptible loads, real-time
pricing and time-of-use are also offered by distribution companies
to alter the energy usage of consumers [24].
Concluding the above background, the following points can be
stated. (1) The majority of studies on DR focus on the basic concepts,
N. Mahmoudi et al. / Electric Power Syste
Nomenclature
A. Constants
d(t) duration of period t
f penpo (t) penalty of not exercising pool-order option po dur-
ing period t
f penso (t) penalty of not exercising spike-order option so dur-
ing period t
PDR,MAX
f,b
(t) upper limit of demand in the bth block of forward
DR f during period t
P¯DR
j
(t) demand of the jth step of stepwise DR
PMAX
f,b
(t) upper limit of demand in the bth block of forward
contract f during period t
PMAXpo (t) upper limit of demand in pool-order option po dur-
ing period t
PMAXso (t) upper limit of demand in spike-order option so dur-
ing period t
Preq(t, w)  required power by the retailer in period t
PF(w, t) scenario-based participation factor
R¯DR
j
(t) upper limit of the jth interval of stepwise DR
 ˇ confidence level
 risk level
po(t) price of pool-order option po during period t
DR
f,b
(t) price of the bth block of forward DR f during period
t
F
f,b
(t) price of the bth block of forward contract f during
period t
p(t, w)  pool-price scenario w during period t
Strso (t) strike price of spike-order po during period t
(w) probability of scenario w
B. Numbers
NBDR number of given blocks in forward DR
NF number of forward contracts
NFB number of forward contract’s blocks
NFDR number of forward DR contracts
NJ number of intervals in the reward-based DR
Npo number of pool-order options
Nso number of spike-order options
C. Variables
C(FDR) cost of forward DR contracts
C(F) cost of forward contracts
C(PO) cost of pool-order options
C(SP) cost of spike-order options
EC(P) expected cost of the pool market
EC(RDR) expected cost of reward-based DR
PDR(t) power bought from real-time DR in period t
Ppo(t) power bought from pool-order po in period t
Pso(t) power bought from spike-order so in period t
PDR
f,b
(t) power bought from the bth block of forward DR f
PF
f,b
(t) power bought from the bth block of forward f
Pp(t, w)  power traded in the pool in period t and scenario w
RDR(t) reward offered by the retailer in period t
RDR
j
(t) reward of the jth interval of stepwise DR
vDR,j(t) binary variable indicating if the jth interval of
reward-based DR is applied in period t
vpo(t) binary variable indicating if pool-order option po is
exercised in period t
vso(t) binary variable indicating if spike-order option so is
exercised in period t
(w) auxiliary variable for calculating CVaR
 auxiliary variable for calculating CVaRms Research 108 (2014) 144– 152 145
formulations and technical aspects of DR. To our knowledge, only
authors in [13,14] investigate a mechanism through which DR
is traded as a commodity between its providers and buyers. (2)
Though some papers address the financial option concept, they
mostly assess DR valuations from a customers’ point of view. There
is no significant work investigating trading DR option contracts.
(3) Less attention has been paid to the applicability of DR by elec-
tricity retailers, where among all DR, mostly the interruptible load
program is considered.
Considering these highlights, the contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows.
Firstly, this paper proposes a new DR scheme in which DR is
treated as a public good. The proposed scheme differs from that of
[13,14] in two  main directions. (1) In the proposed method, DR is
directly traded between its providers and buyers. (2) The proposed
scheme involves various DR agreements which cover both long-
term and short-term actions: A forward DR contract is proposed
through which DR is traded in a certain volume and price for a given
period. In addition, by adapting the well-known financial option
concept [25,26], two  distinct DR options are proposed here: pool-
order and spike-order options. While pool-order options are useful
to hedge against small deviations of pool prices, spike-order options
are employed during price spikes. These DR options are mathe-
matically formulated in this paper. Finally, a reward-based DR  [27]
is considered as a real-time resource in the proposed DR scheme.
According to this DR, the volume of load reduction increases as
higher incentives are offered by the retailer. This DR is modeled
stochastically, where the unpredictable behavior of consumers is
modeled through a scenario-based participation factor.
Secondly, the developed DR scheme is modeled as the energy
resource of electricity retailers. This scheme allows retailers to
decide how to procure various DR agreements from aggregators
or large consumers. Retailers are able to purchase DR through
secure contracts (forward DR). They can also set DR option agree-
ments (pool-order and spike-order options) which their exercising
depends on the pool market volatilities. Finally, they can rely on
real-time DR (reward-based DR) of which its outcome is influenced
by customers’ behavior.
The effectiveness of the proposed DR scheme is evaluated on an
energy procurement problem, in which the retailer aims to min-
imize its energy cost while maintaining its desired risk level. It
is assumed that the retailer employs DR in addition to forward
contracts and pool markets. A stochastic programming approach
is formulated, where pool prices and customer’s behavior are con-
sidered as uncertain variables. The risk is modeled by conditional
value-at-risk (CVaR). The problem is analyzed on a realistic case of
the Queensland region within the Australian NEM.
1.2. Motivations in the Australian NEM
In Australia, several trial DR programs have been implemented
by market entities such as network service providers as well as
electricity retailers. Nevertheless, DR is still in its early stage in
the NEM. This is derived from many challenges such as customers’
unwillingness to participate in DR, the lack of enough knowledge
and training, the lack of proper metering facilities (smart metering)
and market barriers such as market policies and registration fees.
The peak growth rate has become worse in the NEM over the
past few years. Between 2005 and 2011, the peak growth rate was
about four times higher than that of energy growth [28]. The Aus-
tralian government estimated that 25% of retail electricity costs
come from peak events even though they occur for a period of
less than 40 h a year [28]. Note that the peak demand has been
decreased from 2011 to 2012. This decrement trend is due to sev-
eral factors, where global recession, high penetrations of roof-top
PV and a mild summer are deemed to be the main reasons [29].
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The NEM is faced with high price periods or even price spikesFig. 1. The DR scheme in the energy problem of a retailer.
In addition, the full retail contestability in most states allows
ll electricity consumers to choose their retailers in the NEM. This
ontestability can enhance the competition in the retail market.
Considering the above motivations, more attention has recently
een paid to the implementation of DR across the NEM. The Minis-
erial Council on Energy of Australia asked the Australian Energy
arket Commission (AEMC) to facilitate efficient demand side
articipation (DSP) in the NEM. Consequently, the AEMC has inves-
igated the challenges and potentials of DR in Australia in its latest
eport [30] and suggested promoting recommendations to facilitate
R. The AEMC has emphasized the importance of market parties’
oles in assisting DR. In this way, retailers are expected to identify
emand side participation opportunities, where they employ DR to
essen the risk of pool price volatility. Aggregators are also invited
o play an intermediary role in buying DR from consumers to resell
o other entities. For instance, EnerNOC [31] currently provides DR
o TransGrid, the transmission network service provider in NSW,
ustralia.
According to the AEMC report, it is estimated that the reduction
n three major states of Australia (NSW, QLD and VIC) would be
etween 400 MW and over 1300 MW by 2020. This would lead to
 cost saving of between $4.3 and $11.8 billion over the next 10
ears, which equates to 3–9% of the total forecast expenditure on
he supply side.
. Comprehensive DR scheme
The proposed DR scheme for retailers is shown in Fig. 1. The
etailer can set various DR contracts with aggregators or even con-
umers. These contracts are determined with a specific volume of
R, its price and the period in which the given contract is applied.
ach contract has unique features which are discussed in this sec-
ion.
It should be emphasized that though DR providers are able to
ell their DR capacity through different markets such as the pool
nd ancillary services [32–34], this paper studies those DR aggre-
ators intending to sell DR to retailers. In addition, it is assumed that
etailers are not involved in the technical aspects of DR programs.
n fact, DR providers are responsible for implementing a variety
f DR programs such as interruptible load programs, critical peak
ricing, peak time rebate, load shifting, priced-based DR programs
nd distributed generation. Each program may  be valid for a short
orizon (for example 30 min). However, they can together cover longer period (for instance, several hours). A similar case exists
n Australia, where TransGrid buys DR from EnerNOC [31] without
oncerning the details of DR programs.Fig. 2. The structure of the pool-order option.
2.1. Pool-order option
A retailer can arrange a pool-order option with DR sellers. This
agreement is set for a certain volume of energy and price. Accord-
ing to this contract the retailer has the right but not an obligation
to purchase DR. This means that the retailer signs this contract at
the beginning of the decision time horizon. However, exercising the
contract at the energy delivery time depends on whether it is prof-
itable or not. In other words, the contracted DR is physically traded
only if the overall cost of DR is lower than the cost of buying energy
from the pool. Otherwise the retailer has to pay a predetermined
fee to DR sellers as the penalty of not exercising the contract. Fig. 2
shows the structure of a typical pool-order option.
The cost of pool-order options is mathematically formulated as:
C(PO) =
∑
t∈T
Npo∑
po=1
[Ppo(t) · po(t) · vpo(t) · d(t) + (1 − vpo(t)) · f penpo (t)]
(1)
0 ≤ Ppo(t) ≤ PMAXpo (t), ∀po = 1, 2, . . .,  Npo (2)
Ptotalpo (t) =
Npo∑
po=1
Ppo(t) · vpo(t) (3)
Eq. (1) represents the cost of the given pool-order options over
the considered time horizon. It consists of two terms addressing
the cost of practicing the pool-order option and the penalty of
not exercising the agreed contract. Eq. (2) enforces the upper and
lower limits for each pool-order option. Finally, the total pool-order
option demand is described in (3).
2.2. Spike-order optionduring each year. For instance, while the average pool price was
$43/MWh in 2012, in the worst case of the year the price spiked as
high as $2892/MWh [35].
 Systems Research 108 (2014) 144– 152 147
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A spike-order option agreement is proposed as a way  to limit the
uge cost faced by retailers during high price periods. This option is
imilar to the pool-order, in which the retailer has the right but not
n obligation to buy DR from sellers. The difference is that spike-
rder options are used during price spikes. When retailers and DR
ellers are setting this contract, they negotiate on a desired price,
alled a strike price. Taking into account the strike price, the retailer
an decide whether or not to exercise the spike-order option at the
elivery time. Note that similar to the pool-order option, the retailer
as to pay a predetermined penalty if the contract is not exercised
t the clearing time.
The cost of spike-order options is given in (4). The size of each
ontracted option is restricted in (5). In addition, the demand of
pike-order options in period t is shown in (6).
(SO) =
∑
t∈T
Nso∑
so=1
[Pso(t) · Strso (t) · vso(t) · d(t) + (1 − vso(t)) · f penso (t)]
(4)
 ≤ Pso(t) ≤ PMAXso (t), ∀so = 1, 2, . . .,  Nso (5)
total
so (t) =
Nso∑
so=1
Pso(t) · vso(t) (6)
.3. Forward DR
A forward contract is an agreement between the buyer and seller
f an asset which is traded at a given future time for a certain price
25]. This forward contract is adapted to DR, where the retailer buys
R from aggregators or consumers for a future period. The price of
orward contracts is usually determined in one of the following
ays [25]:
Over-the-Counter Market: prices are directly negotiated between
the buyer and the seller of forward contracts.
Exchange-Trade Market: this is a market where standardized
contracts with given size and price are traded. The benefit of this
type of trading is that prices are cleared and settled through a
centralized clearing house.
Since the proposed DR provides a trading scheme between
etailers and DR providers, the over-the-counter market is consid-
red for forward DR agreements.
Forward DR contracts are offered in various blocks. The cost of
his type of contract is given as:
(FDR) =
∑
t∈T
NFDR∑
f =1
NBDR∑
b=1
PDRf,b (t) · DRf,b (t) · d(t) (7)
 ≤ PDRf,b (t) ≤ P
DR,MAX
f,b
(t) (8)
Expressions (7) and (8) show the cost of forward contracts and
he boundary size of each contract’s block respectively. Forward DR
emand during period t is given in (9).
FDR(t) =
NFDR∑
f =1
NBDR∑
b=1
PDRf,b (t) (9).4. Reward-based DR
The proposed reward-based DR [27] is shown in Fig. 3.Fig. 3. The reward-based DR curve.
Based on this function, the volume of load reduction increases in
a stepwise trend as the retailer offers higher rewards. In addition,
the uncertainty of the DR outcome is modeled using a scenario-
based participation factor (PF(w, t)). This factor ranges between [0,
1]. Zero means that customers do not respond to the reward offered
in the proposed reward-based DR. As this factor increases the par-
ticipation rate grows. Finally, the participation factor equal to 1
indicates that the entire reward-based DR potential is attainable.
Note that each factor is identified with its own  probability, where
the summation of all probabilities is equal to one.
The overall reward-based DR is modeled as:
PDR(t) =
∑
w∈˝
(w) ·
NJ∑
j=1
PF(w, t) · P¯DRj (t) · vDR,j(t) (10)
RDR(t) =
NJ∑
j=1
RDRj (t) (11)
R¯DRj−1(t) · vDR,j(t) ≤ RDRj (t) ≤ R¯DRj (t) · vDR,j(t) (12)
NJ∑
j=1
vDR,j(t) = 1 (13)
Expressions (10)–(13) represent the total reduced demand by
customers as a function of the reward offered by the retailer.
Taking into account the given DR Eqs. (10)–(13), the expected
DR cost over all scenarios (w ∈ ˝)  is:
EC(RDR) =
∑
w∈˝
(w) ·
∑
t∈T
⎡
⎣ NJ∑
j=1
PF(w, t) · P¯DRj (t) · RDRj (t) · d(t)
⎤
⎦ (14)
3. Wholesale market suppliers
3.1. Pool marketThe retailer is able to either buy energy from or sell to the
pool market. Since the pool price is uncertain it is considered as a
stochastic variable. This variable is modeled through a set of scenar-
ios which represent the possible realizations of prices. As a result,
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he expected cost of the pool depends on price scenarios and is
ormulated as following:
C(P) =
∑
w∈˝
(w) ·
∑
t∈T
Pp(t, w)  · p(t, w) · d(t) (15)
.2. Forward contract
A forward contract is usually fixed in different blocks, where
ach block is represented in a specific size and price. These blocks
re provided in a stepwise manner where the price increases as the
uantity of energy grows [36].
The cost of forward contracts is given as:
(F) =
∑
t∈T
NF∑
f =1
NFB∑
b=1
PFf,b(t) · Ff,b(t) · d(t) (16)
 ≤ PFf,b(t) ≤ PMAXf,b (t) (17)
Similar to other contracts, each forward agreement is also con-
rolled by a minimum and maximum demand (17). Finally, total
emand of forward contracts during period t is shown in (18).
F(t) =
NF∑
f =1
NFB∑
b=1
PFf,b(t) (18)
. Problem description
.1. Risk modeling
The retailer aims to minimize its energy cost within a cer-
ain level of the risk. The risk is evaluated using the conditional
alue-at-risk (CVaR) measure. This technique has some advan-
ages compared to other methods such as value-at-risk (VaR) and
ean–variance, where it is coherent and convex in stochastic pro-
ramming [37]. CVaR is formulated as follows.
in,w +
1
1 − ˇ
∑
w∈˝
(w) · (w) (19)
ost(w) −  − (w) ≤ 0; ∀w ∈  ˝ (20)
(w) ≥ 0; ∀w ∈  ˝ (21)
The optimal value of  represents VaR and (w) is a scenario-
ependent variable that is equal to the difference between the cost
f scenario w and VaR [21].  ˇ is the confidence level (0.95).
.2. Cost function
The proposed cost function (CF) consists of the cost terms as
ell as the risk measure.
in  CF = Ec(P) + C(F) + C(PO) + C(SO) + C(FDR) + C(RDR)
+  · CVaR (22)
The risk level ([0– ∞))  represents the trade-off between the
xpected cost and risk. A conservative retailer willing to minimize
he risk chooses a large value of the risk. On the other hand, a risky
etailer prefers lower costs and consequently selects a risk factor
lose to 0. The cost function is subject to the following constraints:ms Research 108 (2014) 144– 152
• Expressions (2), (5) and (8) as the boundary limits of pool-order,
spike-order and forward DR, respectively;
• Eqs. (10)–(13), indicating the reward-based DR model;
• The forward contracts enforcement (17);
• CVaR constraints, (20) and (21);
• The energy balance equation:
Preq(t) = Pp(t, w) + PF(t) + Ptotalpo (t) + Ptotalso (t) + PFDR(t) + PDR(t)
(23)
5. Case study
5.1. Decision time horizon
The proposed scheme is evaluated on the peak periods of sum-
mer  and winter seasons. The time horizon is divided into 32 periods,
where each period corresponds to the peak times of one week.
These periods consist of 12 weeks of January–March, 17 weeks
of June–September and 3 weeks of December. Note that the peak
duration of summer days is from 11 am to 9 pm,  while those of win-
ter days are from 6 am–10 am to 4 pm–10 pm.  Note also that the
values of demand and price for each period are taken by averaging
the peak times of Monday–Friday in each week. It should be noted
that similar to the method in [38,39], the chosen peak periods are
driven by comparing the daily load profiles of Queensland in 2012.
A new factor, called the peak-to-average-ratio (PAR) is intro-
duced in [5]. This ratio for daily load profiles is:
PAR = Max  Lh
(1/24)
∑24
h=1Lh
(24)
where Lh is the demand at hour h. This concept is used in this paper
to evaluate the chosen peak periods.
First, the PAR is calculated for the annual load curve of Queens-
land in 2012. The peak demand in 2012 is 8706 MW and the average
value is 5826 MW.  Hence, the PAR is approximately equal to 1.49.
Then the PAR is calculated in a way that instead of the maxi-
mum demand in the numerator, the average of the peak demand in
the chosen peak period is used. This value over the considered 32
periods is around 6654 MW.  Therefore, the value of the PAR is 1.14.
It can be seen that the PAR calculated based on the chosen periods
is around 24% lower than the annual PAR. Since the denominators
in both calculated PARs are the same (both denominators are the
average value of annual demand) it can be said that the chosen
periods cover approximately the top 24% of the peak load in 2012.
Decisions on the given energy resources are made as follows.
The retailer signs the long-term derivatives, i.e. forward, pool-order
options, spike-order options and forward DR at the beginning of
the decision horizon. Throughout the time frame, decisions on (1)
the execution of pool-order and spike-order options, (2) energy
procurement from the pool market and (3) the energy obtained
from reward-based DR, are taken.
5.2. Data preparation and assumptions
The presented scheme is evaluated on a realistic case of the
Queensland jurisdiction within the NEM in 2012. There are various
retailers active in this region where the largest company provides
around 50% of the total demand [40]. Thus the demand of the given
retailer in this paper is assumed to be equal to 50% of the Queens-
land demand for each period in 2012 [35]. Recall that the demand of
each period is calculated by averaging the peak periods of working
days in the considered week.
 Systems Research 108 (2014) 144– 152 149
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Fig. 4. The expected demand required by the retailer.
is shown in Fig. 7. While a risky retailer ( = 0) spends around $4.72
million, the energy cost of the most conservative retailer ( = 5) is
$5.3 million. On the other hand, the values of standard deviation
for the risky and conservative retailers are approximately $2.08
Table 1
Forward prices ($/MWh).N. Mahmoudi et al. / Electric Power
The pool price is an uncertain variable which requires to be
odeled stochastically. This variable is characterized using proper
cenarios. Various methods have been used to characterize sce-
ario generation. However, investigating these methods is beyond
he scope of this paper. An ARIMA model is applied here. Accord-
ng to the literature [41], ARIMA models are not very accurate to
apture the nonlinearity and volatility of price data. However, this
aper considers weekly prices which obviously have a lower level
f variability. Hence, it can be said that the ARIMA model provides
esult with acceptable accuracy in this case study. In order to prove
his statement, the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) index
s calculated here, which is equal to 8.38%. Comparing this MAPE
ith other methods [41], it can be said that the ARIMA outcome is
easonable.
A series of pool prices of Queensland from 2006 to 2012 is used to
enerate price scenarios [35]. The ARIMA model with its estimated
arameters is shown (25). The first term indicates the autoregres-
ive parameters. The second term represents the seasonality of the
rice data which is for each 32 periods. The third terms differ-
ntiate the process to make it stable in terms of the mean value.
ogarithm function is also applied to stabilize the variance of the
rices. The right hand side of the equation states the moving aver-
ge parameters. ε(t) is referred to as the white noise or error term.
1 + 0.7˚1 − 0.03˚2 − 0.055˚25) · (1 − 0.34˚32) · (1 − B1)
·ln (p(t)) = (1 + 0.0861 − 0.6062 + 0.1113 + 0.006225
+ 0.14699 − 0.038100) · ε(t) (25)
The standard deviation of the error is 0.586. Using the given
RIMA model, 150 sets of price scenarios are randomly generated
or each period.
In addition, the behavior of customers in reward-based DR is
nother source of uncertainty. For this purpose, five scenarios,
anging between 0 and 1 are randomly generated. These scenarios
epresent the participation factor in the reward-based cost func-
ion. Furthermore, five demand scenarios are generated to address
he uncertainty of customers’ demand. These scenarios are gener-
ted using the method presented in [36]. It should be noted that
he number of scenarios is derived using the method in [42]. In this
ay, this number makes a trade-off between the tractability of the
roblem and the accuracy of the results.
Forward contracts span each quarter of a year in the NEM. There-
ore, three contracts (F1–F3) are considered here. F1 spans the
eriods of quarter 1, F2 covers the 17 weeks of winter and F3 relates
o the December period. It is assumed that each forward contract
nvolves six blocks, where each block is defined with a certain price
nd a maximum demand size. The forward prices of the Queens-
and region for each quarter of 2012 are used here [40]. Note that
he maximum demand of each block in each period is 450 MW.
Four pool-order and five spike-order options are taken into
ccount. Each agreement involves a specific volume of demand and
 negotiated price. The maximum demand quantities of each pool-
rder and spike-order option are 50 and 75 MW,  respectively. The
enalty of not exercising each option by the retailer is equal to 15%
f the contract cost value. This penalty depends on the size of the
ontracted option and also the period in which the given option is
et.
It is assumed that each forward DR contract is signed for a period
f one month. Hence, eight forward DR agreements are provided
overing eight given months of the planning horizon. Similar to
orward contracts, each forward DR involves six blocks where the
aximum contracted demand for each block is 75 MW.Fig. 5. Pool-order option prices.
With regards to the reward-based DR, 21 successive steps are
considered in the presented stepwise function.
The total potential of the given DR scheme is around 30% of
the entire demand. This potential is derived based on the trial DR
potential carried out in Australia [28]. Figs. 4–6 and Tables 1 and 2
illustrate the aforementioned input data.
5.3. Numerical results and discussions
The given problem is mixed-integer linear programming, which
is solved using CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [43].
The expected cost vs. standard deviation for various risk levelsB1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
F1 40 45 50 55 60 65
F2  38 42 46 50 54 58
F3  39 44 49 54 59 64
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Fig. 6. Spike-order option prices.
Table 2
Forward DR prices ($/MWh).
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
FDR1 35 37 39 41 43 45
FDR2 32 34 36 38 40 42
FDR3 29 31 33 35 37 39
FDR4 33 35 37 39 41 43
FDR5 45 47 49 51 53 55
FDR6 51 53 55 57 59 61
FDR7 56 58 60 62 64 66
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Fig. 8. The share of each resource in total required energy by the retailer.
Table 3
The percentage of each DR in total energy (%).
Rho Forward DR Pool-order
option
Spike-order
option
Reward-based
DR
Total
0 3.96 3.02 2.26 0.61 9.86
0.2 12.55  3.63 2.55 1.40 20.13
0.5  13.58 4.38 3.68 1.87 23.51
0.7  13.58 4.71 3.82 1.98 24.09FDR8 69 71 73 75 77 79
illion and $333,000, respectively. This means that the risk-neutral
etailer obtains an 11% reduction in the expected cost compared
o the conservative one. However, this retailer expects about 83%
igher cost deviation. In other words, risky retailers are expected
o buy their energy at lower costs while facing much higher cost
uctuations.
Fig. 8 depicts the share of each resource in the total requirednergy by the retailer. The significant results are:
Fig. 7. The expected cost vs. standard deviation.1  13.58 4.71 3.82 2.05 24.16
5  13.58 4.81 4.17 2.20 24.76
• As the risk factor increases the share of DR resources grows. This
is more obvious from  = 0 to  = 0.2, where the DR  share becomes
over than twice. For larger risk levels by  = 5 the DR contribution
slightly increases to around 25%. This increment rate illustrates
that the proposed DR agreements are more beneficial to conser-
vative retailers than risky ones. This is reasonable since the given
DR, particularly the long-term agreements are reliable resources.
• As the pool market is a volatile resource, its energy share signif-
icantly drops once the risk factor rises. This trend is reversed for
forward contracts.
Table 3 provides the percentage of each DR resource in the
energy share of the retailer. As the retailer becomes more conser-
vative, the share of all DR programs increases. This increment is
significant in forward DR, where the DR share is around 4% higher
for the most risk-averse retailer to around 14% for the risk-neutral
one, i.e. 10% increment. The growth rate of pool-order and spike
order options as well as reward-based DR is around 2%.
Figs. 9 and 10 provide the percentage of each resource in sum-
mer and winter seasons respectively. The main points interpreted
from these figures are:
• Though the proportions of DR resources in summer and winter
increase, as the retailer becomes more risk averse, this growth
rate is higher in summer than winter. For instance, for  = 5 DR
programs account for around 26% of the summer share compared
to 23% of winter energy. Additionally, it can be seen that more
pool-order and spike-order options are exercised in summer than
in winter.• Conservative retailers prefer to sell energy to the pool in winter.
This is more obvious from  = 0.2 to  = 0.5, where the sold energy
to the pool market becomes almost double.
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Table 4
Exercised periods of pool-order options.
Rho PO1 PO2 PO3 PO4
0 1–32 1–32 NE NE
0.2 1–32  1–32 5, 7, 10, 21, 24–32 NE
0.5  1–32 1–32 1–3, 5–8, 10, 11, 17–32 5, 7, 26, 30
0.7  1–32 1–32 1–8, 10, 11, 13, 17–32 5–8, 10, 11, 24, 26, 30
1  1–32 1–32 1–11, 13, 17–32 5–8, 10, 11, 30, 32
5  1–32 1–32 1–13, 17–21, 23–26, 28–32 1–3, 5–8, 10, 11, 30, 32
Table 5
Exercised periods of spike-order options.
Rho SO1 SO2 SO3 SO4 SO5
0 1–32 NE NE NE NE
0.2 1–32 5,  7, 10, 11 NE NE NE
0.5  1–32 1–13, 19, 20, 24, 28, 29 5, 7 NE NE
0.7  1–32 1–13, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29 
1  1–32 1–13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 29
5  1–32 1–15, 17, 19, 20, 24, 29 
o
a
tFig. 9. The percentage of energy procured from each resource in summer.
Tables 4 and 5 respectively represent the periods in which pool-
rder (PO) and spike-order (SO) options are exercised.From Table 4 it can be seen that a risky retailer only practices PO1
nd PO2. For  = 0.2, PO3 is also applied, where for higher values of
he risk PO4 is also instructed in some periods. Similar to pool-order
Fig. 10. The percentage of energy procured from each resource in winter.5, 7, 11 NE NE
5, 7 NE NE
5–8, 10, 11 7 NE
options, more spike-order options are utilized once the risk level
increases. The risk-neutral retailer uses only SO1. For  = 0.2, SO2 is
also applied in some periods. SO3 is exercised for the risk value of
0.5 and higher than that. SO4 is practiced for  = 1 and  = 5. Note
that SO5 is not used in this case.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a new DR scheme for electricity retailers.
Various long-term and real-time DR contracts including pool-order
options, spike-order options, forward DR and reward-based DR are
proposed. These resources are applied by energy suppliers of the
retailer in addition to the forward contracts and pool markets.
A stochastic energy procurement problem is formulated where
pool prices and customers’ enrollment in the reward-based DR are
uncertain variables. The proposed scheme is evaluated on a real-
istic case of the Australian NEM for different risk levels. The main
outcomes are as follows.
• The case study shows the feasibility of the proposed DR scheme
for retailers. The scheme allows retailers to procure their energy
from various DR contracts.
• Depending on the risk level, retailers change their energy share
from the proposed DR agreements. The risk-neutral retailer
obtains around 10% of its energy from the given DR agreements.
This share for the most conservative retailer ( = 5) increases to
around 25%. Forward DR agreements play a significant role in this
increment with about 10% growth.
• The DR scheme is employed in summer and winter. However,
the rate of summer is higher than that of winter. This higher
percentage is mostly due to the increasing usage of DR options.
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This paper proposes a new framework in which demand response (DR) is incorporated as an energy
resource of electricity retailers in addition to the commonly used forward contracts and pool markets.
In this way, a stepwise reward-based DR is proposed as a real-time resource of the retailer. In addition,
the unpredictable behavior of customers participating in the proposed reward-based DR is modeled
through a scenario-based participation factor. The overall problem is formulated as a stochastic
optimization approach in which pool prices and customers’ participation in DR are uncertain variables.
The feasibility of the problem is evaluated on a realistic case of the Australian National Electricity Market
(NEM) and solved using General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Demand Response (DR) is defined as changes in electricity
usages of consumers as a response to new price tariffs and/or
offered incentives [1]. Many studies have been presented to
explore the basic concepts, classifications, and technical aspects
of DR. The definition of DR programs are addressed in [1]. Addition-
ally, this reference introduces various DR programs and categorizes
them into two groups, namely incentive- and price-based DR.
Incentive-based DR programs are formulated in several papers
such as [2–4]. Ref. [2] provides the mathematical formulations of
interruptible load services. A coupon-based method is formulated
in [3] where the incentive offered to consumers is determined
according to market prices. An incentive-based scheme is
presented in [4] through which both the energy cost and peak-
to-average ratio are minimized using a game theory approach.
Price-based DR actions are also presented in many researches such
as [5–8]. Paper [5] models a real-time pricing approach for smart
grid applications. Authors in [6] address the elasticity concept
which reflects the responsiveness of customers to price changes.
A comprehensive time-of-use model is formulated in [7] where
the elasticity is considered as a non-zero cross and flexible
function. A commercial DR concept is introduced in [8] in order
to study DR impacts on the power market. Finally, the detailedcontrol strategies of managing electrical loads such as water heater
systems, air conditioners, space heating and cooling systems are
provided in [9–13].
Electricity retailers are intermediary companies which buy
electricity from wholesale markets and resell it to consumers. They
procure the required energy mainly from pool markets and
bilateral contracts. Another useful energy resource which can be
employed by retailers is DR. However, a few studies in the
literature address this concept. Authors in [14] use interruptible
loads to alleviate the uncertainty of pool markets faced by a load
serving entity. Two interruptible load contracts, pay-in-advance
and pay-as-you-go, are evaluated in [15] as suppliers of retailers.
Self-production is also used in [16] to limit the risk of cost fluctu-
ations in pool markets. Ref. [17] uses interruptible loads as an
energy resource of distribution companies. A short-term determin-
istic model is presented in [18] where distribution companies can
use interruptible loads to bid into the market. Authors in [19] use
interruptible programs in short-term decisions of retailers. Besides
interruptible loads, real-time pricing and time-of-use are also
offered by retailer to alter the electricity usage of consumers [20].
This paper proposes a stepwise reward-based DR in which the
uncertainty of customers’ behavior is modeled through a
scenario-based participation factor. A medium-term energy
procurement framework is proposed for retailers in which they
employ the reward-based DR in addition to forward contracts
and a pool market. A stochastic programming approach is formu-
lated where both pool prices and customers’ behavior are consid-
ered as uncertain variables. The overall problem is mixed-integer
Nomenclature
A. Constants
d(t) duration of time period t
PF(w,t) scenario-based participation factor
PDRj DR volume of the jth interval of the reward-based DR
curve
Psi ðw; tÞ the ith level of energy volume in the price-quota curve
RDRj reward of the jth interval of the reward-based DR curve
RDRj upper limit of the reward in the jth interval of the
reward-based DR curve
p(w) probability of scenario w
q risk level (factor)
b confidence level
kFf ;b price of forward contract f, block b during time period t
kp(w, t) pool market price in scenario w during time period t
ksi price of the ith level of the price-quota curve
ksi upper bound of the ith level of the price-quota curve
B. Variables
PDR(t) load reduction volume in reward-based DR during time
period t
PFf ;b power procured from forward contract f, block b during
time period t
Pp(w, t) power procured from the pool market in scenario w
during time period t
Ps(w, t) sold power to customers in scenario w during time
period t
vDR,j(t) binary variable indicating if the jth interval of the
reward-based DR curve is chosen
vi(t) binary variable indicating the level of the price-quota
curve
g(w) auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR
n auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR
C. Numbers
NB number of blocks in forward contracts
NF number of forward contracts
NI number of intervals in the price-quota curve
NJ number of intervals in the reward-based curve
NS number of scenarios
Fig. 1. Reward-based DR curve.
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tional Value-at-Risk (CVaR). The feasibility of the proposed method
is evaluated using the market data of the Queensland region within
the Australian NEM.
Generally, the contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
(1) A stepwise reward-based DR is mathematically formulated
where the unpredictable behavior of customers participating
in this DR program is modeled through scenario-based
participation factor.
(2) A stochastic energy procurement problem is proposed in
which the proposed reward-based DR is employed as a
real-time energy resource of electricity retailers.
Proposed framework
Reward-based DR
The proposed reward-based DR is illustrated in Fig. 1. According
to this function, offering higher rewards by the retailer is followed
by a stepwise growth in the expected reduced load by customers.
In addition, the uncertainty of DR outcomes is modeled through
a scenario-based participation factor (PF(w, t)). This factor ranges
between [0,1]. Zero means that customers are not willing to
participate in the reward-based DR. However, as the participation
factor increases, the participation rate grows, where ultimately
the participation factor equal to 1 indicates that the entire
reward-based DR potential is attainable.
The overall reward-based DR is derived from Fig. 1 as follows:
PDRðtÞ ¼
XNS
w¼1
pðwÞ 
XNJ
j¼1
PFðw; tÞ  PDRj ðtÞ  vDR;jðtÞ ð1Þ
RDRðtÞ ¼
XNJ
j¼1
RDRj ðtÞ ð2Þ
RDRj1ðtÞ  vDR;jðtÞ 6 RDRj ðtÞ 6 RDRj ðtÞ  vDR;jðtÞ ð3ÞXNJ
j¼1
vDR;jðtÞ ¼ 1 ð4Þ
Expression (1) indicates the volume of load reduction (PDR(t)) as the
product of participation scenarios (PF(w, t)) and the reduced load
level shown in Fig. 1 (PDRj ðtÞ). Eq. (2) states the reward offered to
customers. Constraint (3) binds the reward of each interval as
shown in Fig. 1. Eq. (4) enforces that only one interval of the
reward-based DR curve can be chosen.Problem description
This paper delivers a medium-term planning horizon for
procuring energy by a retailer during high-price periods (Fig. 2).
At the beginning of the time horizon, the retailer decides proper
forward contracts. Note that the share of forward contracts is
decided under the uncertainty of pool prices and customers’
behavior. Throughout the time frame, the amount of energy to be
bought/sold from/to the pool market as well as the energy volume
obtained from DR is set.
Fig. 2. The proposed energy framework.
Fig. 4. Price-quota curve for demand supplied by the retailer.
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uncertainties of pool prices and customers’ behavior participating
in the reward-based DR. To represent possible realizations of these
stochastic variables, a scenario tree is constructed, (Fig. 3). The root
node corresponds to the point at which the share of forward con-
tracts is determined. Branches leaving this node represent different
realizations of pool price scenarios. Hence, decisions on the pool
market are made in stage two. Finally, for each pool price, a set
of scenarios representing the uncertainty of the customers’ behav-
ior is generated. Consequently, the DR outcome is obtained in the
third stage.
Mathematical formulation
The objective function consists of the following terms.
Expected revenue
The expected revenue from selling energy to consumers is
calculated as follows.
ER ¼
XNS
w¼1
pðwÞ 
XT
t¼1
XNI
i¼1
Psi ðw; tÞ  ksi ðtÞ  dðtÞ ð5Þ
where Psi ðw; tÞ and ksi ðtÞ are illustrated in the price-quota curve
(Fig. 4) [21]. They, respectively, indicate the sold power to consum-
ers and its price. T is the number of periods in the considered time
horizon. Note that a bilevel programming approach has also been
proposed in [22] as an alternative method to the presented
price-quota curve. However, for the sake of simplicity and without
loss of generality, we use the price-quota curve concept in our
problem.
According to this curve, the demand supplied by the retailer is
modeled as:Fig. 3. The proposed scenario tree.Psðw; tÞ ¼
XNI
i¼1
Psi ðw; tÞ  v iðtÞ ð6Þ
ksðtÞ ¼
XNI
i¼1
ksi ðtÞ ð7Þ
ksi1ðtÞ  v iðtÞ 6 ksi ðtÞ 6 ksi ðtÞ  v iðtÞ ð8Þ
XNI
i¼1
v iðtÞ ¼ 1 ð9Þ
Eqs. (6)–(9) formulate the price-quota curve shown in Fig. 4.
Expected cost of DR
Based on the proposed reward-based DR in section ‘Reward-
based DR’, the expected cost of DR is formulated as (10).
ECðDRÞ ¼
XNS
w¼1
pðwÞ 
XT
t¼1
XNJ
j¼1
PFðw; tÞ  PDRj ðtÞ  RDRj ðtÞ  dðtÞ ð10ÞExpected revenue/cost of pool market
The retailer can either purchase energy from or sell it to the
pool market. The expected revenue/cost of the pool market is given
in (11).
ECðpoolÞ ¼
XNS
w¼1
pðwÞ 
XT
t¼1
Ppðw; tÞ  kpðw; tÞ  dðtÞ ð11Þ
Pp(w, t) and kp(w, t) are the power traded in the pool and the pool
price of scenario w during time period t, respectively.
Forward contracts cost
A forward contract is usually fixed in different contract blocks,
where each block is represented in a specific size and price. These
blocks are provided in a stepwise manner, where the price
increases as the quantity of energy grows. The cost of forward con-
tracts is given in (12). Also, the size of each contract block is
enforced in (13).
ECðforwardÞ ¼
XT
t¼1
XNF
f¼1
XNB
b¼1
PFf ;bðtÞ  kFf ;bðtÞ  dðtÞ ð12Þ
0 6 PFf ;bðtÞ 6 PF;maxf ;b ðtÞ ð13ÞRisk measure
Different techniques have been used to model the risk measure
in financial problems. However, conditional value-at-risk (CVaR)
takes some advantages than other methods such as value-at-risk
Table 1
Retailer’s demand.
Time 11 am 12 pm 1 pm
Demand (MW) 3500 4245 3000
Table 2
Forward contract’s blocks.
Forward block Maximum power (MW) Price ($/MW h)
1 350 106
2 350 107
3 350 108
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stochastic programming [23].
CVaR is defined as the expected profit not exceeding VaR [22]:
CVaR ¼ Expectedfprofitjprofit 6 VaRg ð14Þ
where
VaR ¼ Maxfxjpðprofit 6 xÞ 6 1 bg ð15Þ
where b represents the confidence level, which is usually taken as
0.95 [21]. Therefore, CVaR is formulated as:
Maxn;gðwÞn 11 b
XNS
w¼1
gðwÞ  pðwÞ ð16Þ
subject to
profitðwÞ þ n gðwÞ 6 0; 8w ¼ 1;2; . . . ;NS ð17Þ
gðwÞP 0; 8w ¼ 1;2; . . . ;NS ð18Þ
Constraints (17) and (18) are used to linearize the CVaR measure.
profit(w) is the profit obtained in scenario w . The optimal value
of n represents the VaR, and g(w) is a scenario-dependent variable
that is equal to the difference between the VaR and the profit of
scenario w [21].
Overall objective function
The overall profit function is given in (19). The first three terms
are dependent on scenarios. Hence they are averaged over all
scenarios. The first term indicates the revenue obtained from sell-
ing energy to customers. The second term gives the cost of the pool
market, while the third term denotes the cost of reward-based DR.
The fourth term is the cost of forward contracts, which is indepen-
dent of scenarios. Finally, the last term illustrates the CVaR risk
measure which is weighted using the risk factor (q). The risk level
([0–1)) indeed represents the trade-off between the expected cost
and the risk. A conservative (risk-averse) retailer willing to mini-
mize the risk chooses a large value of risk. On the other hand, a
risk-neutral retailer prefers lower costs and consequently selects
a risk factor close to 0.
Maximize
XNS
w¼1
pðwÞ 
XT
t¼1
XNI
i¼1
psi ðw;tÞ ksi ðtÞPpðw;tÞ kpðw;tÞ
 

XNJ
j¼1
PFðw;tÞ PDRj ðtÞ RDRj ðtÞ
!
dðtÞ
XT
t¼1
XNF
f¼1
XNB
b¼1
PFf ;bðtÞ kFf ;bðtÞ dðtÞ
þq  ðn 1
1b
XNS
w¼1
gðwÞ pðwÞÞ ð19Þ
The profit function is subject to the following constrains:
 Eqs. (1)–(4), as DR constraints;
 Constraints (6)–(9), representing the expected revenue from
selling electricity to consumers;
 Forward contracts boundary limitation, Eq. (13);
 CVaR constraints (17), (18);
 Energy balance equation as (20). This constraint enforces that
the energy sold to consumers must be equal to the energy pro-
cured from the pool market as well as the reward-based DR and
forward contracts.
Psðw; tÞ ¼ Ppðw; tÞ þ PDRðtÞ þ
XNF
f¼1
XNB
b¼1
PFf ;bðtÞ;
8w ¼ 1;2; . . . ;NS;8t ¼ 1;2; . . . ; T ð20ÞCase study
Data
The performance of the proposed method is evaluated on a
realistic case of the Queensland jurisdiction within the Australian
national electricity market [24]. As the proposed methodology
focuses on utilizing DR resources during high-price periods, a
period of 3 h in a peak day of Queensland is chosen. Note that
the proposed method is also applicable for multi-period problems.
Price and DR scenarios are simply generated as follows. First, 25
pool price scenarios are generated for each hour using the Autore-
gressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model. In order to
estimate the parameters of the ARIMA model, a set of time series
of Queensland market prices for 1 month spanning January 2011
is used. Secondly, for each generated pool price, four scenarios,
representing different realizations of customers’ behavior, are ran-
domly generated. The values of these scenarios range between zero
and one, where zero represents no participation and ultimately,
one indicates that the retailer can achieve its total expected load
reduction from DR.
A percentage of the Queensland peak load is incorporated as the
required demand by the retailer (Table 1). For the sake of simplic-
ity, it is considered that the retailer has the ability to forecast its
demand precisely, and hence, we assume that the retailer’s
demand is known.
Three blocks of forward contracts are given. Table 2 shows the
upper limit of each block’s demand and price.
Fig. 5 displays the price-quota curve offered by the retailer. The
stepwise DR function is also exhibited in Fig. 6. Note that the
maximum potential of DR in each hour is equal to 329 MW. Note
also that both curves, the price-quota and the stepwise DR, are
assumed to be identical for all given hours.Numerical results
The proposed problem is formulated in mixed-integer linear
programming and solved using CPLEX under GAMS [25]. Fig. 7
shows the expected profit of the retailer versus the standard
deviation for different risk values (q). It is obvious that as the retai-
ler becomes more of a risk taker, both the expected profit and its
standard deviation grow. However, the increment rate of the profit
deviation is much higher than that of the expected profit. For
example, the expected profit of a risk-averse retailer (q = 20) is
around $71,000, while its standard deviation is about $6000. These
values for the risk-neutral retailer (q = 0) are approximately
$103,000 and $85,000, respectively. That is, the risk-neutral retai-
ler expects to obtain 31% higher profit than the risk-averse one.
However, this extra profit is achieved at the cost of expecting
93% higher profit deviation.
Fig. 5. The price-quota curve.
Fig. 6. Stepwise reward-based DR curve.
Fig. 7. The expected profit versus the profit standard deviation for different risk
levels.
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different risk levels. The risk-neutral retailer (q = 0) buys
351 MW h from DR, the moderate one (q = 5) obtains 277 MW h,
and the risk-averse retailer (q = 20) purchases 257 MW h from
DR. This falling trend is reasonable since risk-averse retailers prefer
to decrease their energy share from uncertain resources (i.e.
reward-based DR in our case).
The offered reward and the load reduction obtained from
implementing the reward-based DR are illustrated in Table 3. It
can be seen that the retailer offers various rewards depending on
the time and the risk level. The rewards offered at 12 pm are higher
than other hours. In addition, the risk-neutral retailer pays more
rewards to customers than does the risk-averse one. For instance,
the risk-neutral retailer offers $59/MW h at 11 am and the equal
reward of $65/MW h at 12 pm and 1 pm. However, the rewards
paid by the risk-averse retailer (q = 20) reduce to $51/MW h (at
11 am), $57/MW h (at noon) and $55/MW h (at 1 pm).
Table 4 represents the energy volume served by each resource
for the given risk levels. As can be seen, the risk-neutral retailer
prefers to buy its whole energy from the pool market and DR,
where their proportions are about 93% and 7%, respectively. Hence,
no forward contract is signed for q = 0. This is because of the higherFig. 8. Procured energy from the reward-based DR resource.
Table 3
The offered reward and the reduced demand.
Risk Level Reward ($/MW h) Demand (MW)
11 am 12 pm 1 pm 11 am 12 pm 1 pm
0 59 65 65 114 125 112
0.7 56 65 67 107 125 118
1 55 65 65 99 125 112
5 51 59 57 85 104 88
7 51 57 57 85 98 88
20 51 57 55 77 98 82
Table 4
Energy procured by the retailer for different risk levels (MW h).
Risk
level
Pool DR Forward
contract 1
Forward
contract 2
Forward
contract 3
Total
energy
0 5002 351 0 0 0 5353
0.7 1404 349 1050 1035 0 3839
1 1369 336 1050 1050 33 3839
5 1025 277 1050 1050 228 3628
7 1010 270 1050 1050 246 3628
20 874 257 1050 1050 579 3810
460 N. Mahmoudi et al. / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 63 (2014) 455–460cost of forward contracts in comparing with the pool market and
DR. However, higher risk values lead to a decrease in the share of
the pool market and DR, and conversely an increase in the forward
contribution. Once the risk level increases to 0.7, contract 1 and a
portion of contract 2 are signed. For the risk level equal to 1, con-
tract 3 is also set. Finally, the risk-averse retailer (q = 20) purchases
2679 MW h from forward contracts, which is about 70% of its total
required energy.Conclusions
This paper proposes a new framework to incorporate demand
response in energy procurement problems of retailers during
high-price periods. A reward-based DR is developed in which the
uncertain behavior of customers is modeled through a scenario-
based participation factor. The proposed problem is formulated
in a stochastic programming approach and evaluated on a realistic
case of the Australian NEM. The main outcomes are as follows.
(1) The results show the validity of employing DR by electricity
retailers, where they can rely on DR as a useful energy
resource.
(2) Particularly, the proposed reward-based DR is more benefi-
cial to risk-neutral retailers, where their main preference is
to increase the obtained profit. Consequently, these retailers
are willing to pay higher rewards than risk-averse retailers.
(3) Risk-neutral retailers expect higher profit with the cost of
much higher profit deviation. This is vice versa for conserva-
tive retailers, where they seek lower risks and therefore rely
more on forward contracts.References
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Abstract- This paper deals with short-term decisions made by 
electricity retailers. It is assumed that a retailer aims to 
minimize the cost of procuring energy from two sources: one is 
the commonly-used pool market, and the other is the demand 
response (DR) program proposed in this paper. A reward-based 
DR is mathematically formulated where the volume of load 
reduction is modeled as a stepwise function of offered incentives 
by the retailer. Furthermore, a novel scenario-based 
participation factor is developed here to take into account the 
unpredictable behavior of customers. The presented problem is 
formulated in stochastic programming where its feasibility is 
evaluated on a realistic case of the Queensland region within the 
Australian National Electricity Market (NEM). Additionally, we 
define four distinct cases to study the impact of uncertainties 
associated with both resources, particularly DR, on short-term 
decisions of the retailer. 
Index Terms- Demand response, electricity retailer, pool market, 
reward-based DR, scenario-based participation factor 
I. NOMENCLATURE
A. Constants 
 Duration of period 
	
 Maximum load reduction of interval 

 Total required load in period 
  Participation factor of scenario 
	
 Upper bound of the offered reward of interval 
 Risk factor 
 Confidence level 
  Pool price of scenario  in period 
 Probability of DR scenario 
 Probability of pool scenario 
 Probability of scenario  as:   
B. Variables 
  Power bought from the pool in scenario 
	
 Power bought from DR  
	
 Reward of interval 
	
 Offered reward 
	
 Binary variable indicating level of reduced load 
 Auxiliary variable used to calculate CVaR 
 Auxiliary variable used to calculate CVaR 
II. INTRODUCTION 
A. Basic Concepts and Motivation 
Demand Response is defined as modifying the load 
profiles of customers via offering incentives or establishing 
new price tariffs [1]. The key drivers of these programs 
comprise network and market issues. While maintaining the 
security and reliability of the network is the primary goal of 
network-driven DR, alleviating the risk of pool price volatility 
is known as the main cause of employing market-driven 
programs [2].  
Among all market players, electricity retailers are the 
principal employers of market-driven DR, where their leading 
aim is to hedge against pool price fluctuations. They use DR 
programs ranging from long-term contracts like interruptible 
load contracts to real-time ones such as emergency DR. While 
such long-term contracts are usually set with a certain volume 
of load reduction, the outcome of short-term DR is uncertain 
due to the unpredictable behavior of customers. This 
uncertainty, however, may mislead retailers in which the 
volume of achieved load reduction can significantly violate 
from that of anticipated. 
B. Aim and Approach 
This paper aims to assess the impact of the uncertainty 
associated with real-time DR on short-term decisions of 
electricity retailers. A retailer is supposed to minimize its cost 
of buying the required energy from a pool market and real-
time DR on an-hour-ahead basis. For this purpose, a reward-
based DR is mathematically formulated. In this order, the 
amount of load reduction is modeled as a stepwise function of 
offered rewards by the retailer. Both pool prices and 
customers’ behavior are assumed to involve uncertainty. 
Proper pool price scenarios are generated using the historical 
data of the Queensland region within the Australian National 
electricity Market (NEM). In addition, a scenario-based 
participation factor is proposed to model the uncertainty 
associated with customers’ enrolling in DR. This factor ranges 
[0,1]. While zero means no willingness of participating in DR, 
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the participation rate rises by increasing this factor. Finally, 
the participation factor equal to 1 indicates that the entire DR 
potential is attainable. 
C. Literature Review and Countributions  
In line with incorporating DR in energy problems of 
retailers or other energy providers, surprisingly few studies 
have been investigated. Authors in [3] have applied 
interruptible loads (IL) to alleviate the uncertainty of pool 
markets faced by a load serving entity (LSE). It has been 
shown that ILs are of particular interest during price spikes. 
Self-production has also been used in [4],[ 5] to limit the risk 
of cost fluctuations of pool markets. Distributed generation 
and interruptible loads have been used in [6], [7] as two 
energy suppliers of distribution companies (DISCOs).  
With regard to DR models, there have been several 
undergoing investigations focusing on the mathematical 
formulation of DR. Different DR programs have been 
mathematically modeled using single or multi-period 
economic models [8]-[12]. These models are based on an 
elasticity factor, defined as demand sensitivity to price 
changes. A new DR model has also been proposed in [13] 
addressing customers’ response to hourly electricity prices in 
which customers can adjust their consumption based on the 
market price. In addition, authors in [14] have proposed a new 
incentive-based DR using coupon rewards, where LSEs can 
use this scheme during peak periods to alleviate high prices.  
Considering the above studies, it can be concluded that: 1) 
only long-term DRs such as interruptible loads have been 
employed as energy resources of retailers; 2) All DR models 
presented in the aforementioned work are formulated 
deterministically. These two points are addressed as the 
contributions of this paper. Firstly, a real-time DR is proposed 
to be considered in short-term decisions of retailers. Secondly, 
we model the presented DR in a stochastic manner to take into 
account the uncertainty of customers’ behavior. 
D. DR Experience in the NEM 
The NEM has faced several price spikes each year. For 
instance, the numbers of spikes higher than $5000 in 2009-10 
and 2010-11 were around 95 and 40, respectively [15]. These 
events were mainly caused by high demand, market power, 
and rebidding of generation companies [15]. Among them, 
high peak demand is known as the key driver, where it has 
been the trigger of around 61% of events happened since 
2008. Knowing these fluctuations, there has being an 
increasing reputation of applying DR in the NEM during past 
few years. Retailers, as active market players in the NEM, 
have been evaluating DR trials in which they have obtained 
valuable outcomes. As some cases [16], Essential Energy 
achieved peak reduction of about 30% in response to critical 
peak pricing (CPP) of around 38 cents/kWh. Endeavour 
Energy also gained 30-40% reduction for CPP of about 
$1.67/kWh in the Western Sydney Pricing Trial (WSPT). In a 
trial time-of-use tariff by Ausgrid for residential consumers, 
load was shifted around 4% in the normalized maximum 
demand. Endeavour energy implemented a peak time rebate 
before the 2010-11 summer and gained peak demand 
reduction between 29% and 51%. As an outcome of 
emergency DR, peak demand reduced around 265 MW in the 
New South Wales jurisdiction on 10 August 2010, when the 
price reached $6,200/MWh. 
E. Paper Organization 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section III 
addresses the proposed reward-based DR. Then, the problem 
formulation is described in section IV. Section V covers the 
case study and experimental results and finally, section VI 
concludes the paper. 
III. REWARD-BASED DR 
In order to model the proposed reward-based DR, a 
stepwise function is developed, as shown in Fig. 1. Based on 
this function, the volume of load reduction increases in a 
stepwise trend as the retailer offers higher rewards.  
Figure 1. Reward-based DR curve 
In addition, the uncertainty of DR outcomes is modeled 
using   as the given scenario-based participation 
factor. As mentioned before, this factor ranges between 0 and 
1 for different scenarios, .   !. The overall reward-
based DR is formulated as follows: 
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Expressions (1)-(4) represent the total reduced demand by 
customers as a function of the reward offered by the retailer. 
	
 refers to the total reduced load through implementing 
DR, and 	
 indicates the reward paid to DR participants. 
Furthermore, 	
 is a binary variable showing the level of 
the reduced load in the DR curve.  
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The proposed cost function consists of the below terms: 
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These components are described in details as follows. 
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• Expected cost of the pool market 
As noted earlier, pool prices are uncertain where they are 
modeled using proper scenarios. Therefore, the expected cost 
of purchasing energy from the pool market is determined as 
the overall expectation of all scenarios’ costs. This is 
computed by the product of the probability of each pool price 
scenario () and the cost of that scenario: 
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• Expected cost of DR 
Taking into account the given DR expressions (1)-(4), the 
expected DR cost is formulated as follows: 
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• Risk measure 
Different techniques have been used to model the risk 
measure in financial problems. However, conditional value-
at-risk (CVaR) takes some advantages in comparing with 
other methods such as value-at-risk (VaR) and mean-variance 
in which it is coherent and convex in stochastic programming 
[17]. CVaR is formulated as follows. 
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 8
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Where the optimal value of  represents VaR and  is 
a scenario-dependent variable that is equal to the difference 
between the cost of scenario  and VaR [4]. Note that  is 
the confidence level and in most problems it is assumed to be 
0.95.  
• Overall cost function 
Based on the above terms, the overall cost function is 
mathematically modeled as follows. Note that, all terms are 
presented in $ values. Note also that the total number of 
scenarios is equal to the number of DR scenarios multiplied 
by the number of pool scenarios. 
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where  is the risk factor showing the risk averseness of 
the retailer.  
The cost function is subject to the following enforcements: 
• Equations (1)-(4) as DR cost constraints; 
• Expressions (8), (9) as CVaR constraints; 
• Energy balance equation as below: 
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V. CASE STUDY
A. Data 
As stated earlier, an hour-ahead market is assumed in this 
paper. Based on this market scheme, the validity of the 
proposed method is evaluated using the duration of two peak 
hours. In this way, the Queensland market price data spanning 
January 2011 are used to generate pool price scenarios. Note 
that, pool scenarios are simply generated using the 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model. 
Furthermore, for each price value, four scenarios, representing 
DR participation factor, are randomly generated.  
A portion of total peak load in the Queensland jurisdiction has 
been considered as the hourly load of the retailer (Table I).  
TABLE I. HOURLY REQUIRED LOAD OF THE RETAILER
 Hour1 Hour2 
Total Load (MW) 2000 3000 
In addition, Fig. 2 illustrates the reward-based curve 
considered in this paper. This curve is assumed to be identical 
for both two hours. 
Figure 2. Considered reward-based curve 
B. Exprimental Results 
The proposed problem is formulated in mixed-integer 
linear programming and solved using CPLEX under General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) [18]. 
In order to evaluate the impact of the uncertainty of both 
pool prices and DR, four cases are compared: C1) both pool 
prices and customers’ participation in DR are intermittent; C2)
only the pool market involves uncertainty. DR is assumed to 
be deterministic (the given participation factor is equal to 1); 
C3) only DR is faced by intermittency. The pool price at each 
hour is calculated by averaging the price scenarios of that 
hour; C4) both the pool and DR are deterministic resources. 
Tables II and III represent the procured energy from the 
pool and DR for different risk factors () in all given cases at 
hours 1 and 2, respectively. Note that case 4 is deterministic 
and hence, its outcomes are free from the risk factor. 
However, for the sake of comparison, we put its results 
identically for all risk factors.  
TABLE II. ENERGY PROCURED FROM THE POOL AND DR AT HOUR 1
DR Energy (MWh) Pool Energy (MWh) 
] C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 
0 102 180 106 180 1898 1820 1894 1820 
0.5 170 300 0 180 1830 1700 2000 1820 
1 203 360 0 180 1796 1640 2000 1820 
2 238 420 0 180 1762 1580 2000 1820 
3 272 420 0 180 1728 1580 2000 1820 
4 272 480 0 180 1728 1520 2000 1820 
9 306 480 0 180 1694 1520 2000 1820 
TABLE III. ENERGY PROCURED FROM THE POOL AND DR AT HOUR 2
 DR Energy (MWh) Pool Energy (MWh) 
] C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 
0 93 180 97 180 2907 2820 2903 2820 
0.5 124 240 0 180 2876 2760 3000 2820 
1 156 300 0 180 2844 2700 3000 2820 
2 187 360 0 180 2813 2640 3000 2820 
3 218 420 0 180 2782 2580 3000 2820 
4 218 420 0 180 2782 2580 3000 2820 
9 279 480 0 180 2751 2520 3000 2820 
From the above tables, the following points can be 
interpreted: 
1. Energy purchased from DR is much higher in 
case 2 than case 1. For instance, the average share 
of DR in case 2 is about 70% higher than case 1 
at hour 1. This value is around 90% at hour 2. 
This means once DR uncertainty is taken into 
account, retailers massively reduce their energy 
share from this resource. In this situation, they 
rely on the pool as the commonly used market.  
2. In case 3, only a risk-neutral retailer ( " S) buys 
a percentage of its energy from DR. Conservative 
retailers purchase only from the pool as its price 
is assumed to be deterministic in case 3. This is 
reasonable since as the retailer becomes more risk 
averse, it prefers to buy its energy from reliable 
resources (the pool in case 3). 
3. The volume of DR in case 4 is equal to 180MW. 
Needless to say, this value is risk free, but it is put 
identically for all risk factors. It should be noted 
that DR share in case 4 is higher than case 3. The 
reason is that DR is a reliable resource in case 4, 
while it involves uncertainty in case 3. 
Table IV provides the offered rewards to DR participants. 
It can be observed that the rewards offered in cases 1 and 2 are 
equal for most of risk factors. On the other hand, based on 
tables II and III, a retailer achieves more DR in case 2 than 
case 1. This means that a retailer achieves higher share of DR 
by neglecting the uncertainty of this resource though it offers 
the same reward as the case of including this intermittency. 
This is also true in cases 3 and 4. Both offers $98/MWh, while 
the DR share in case 4 is much higher than case 3. Note in 
case 3 that only a risk-neutral retailer pays incentive to 
customers ($98/MWh).  
TABLE IV. OFFERED REWARD TO CUSTOMERS ($/MWH)
Reward-Hour1 Reward-Hour2 
] C1 C2 C3 C4 C1 C2 C3 C4 
0 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
0.5 106 106 - 98 102 102 - 98
1 110 110 - 98 106 106 - 98
2 114 114 - 98 110 110 - 98
3 118 114 - 98 114 114 - 98
4 118 118 - 98 114 114 - 98
9 122 118 - 98 118 118 - 98
In order to compare the impact of the volatility of 
resources, in particular DR, on the cost value of all cases, we 
compute the cost and its standard deviation for each case. 
Note that, case 4 is not faced by the uncertainty and therefore, 
no deviation is expected in its cost, which is $512,611. 
Furthermore, in case 3, only a risk-neutral retailer buys from 
DR where its cost is $513,394 with the standard deviation of 
$9,762. The total cost is the same for other risk factors of this 
case ($514,420). 
Fig. 3 depicts the expected costs of cases 1 and 2 as a 
function of their standard deviation for different risk factors. 
As can be seen, as the retailer takes more risk, the expected 
costs of both cases decrease while on the other hand, their 
standard deviation increases. However, the incremental rate of 
the standard deviation is higher than the falling rate of the 
expected cost. This means risky retailers are expected to buy 
their energy in lower costs while facing much higher cost 
fluctuations.  
Figure 3. The expected cost versus standard deviation 
Another interesting point in Fig. 3 is the difference 
between the trends of cases 1 and 2. In order to clarify this 
difference, table V exhibits the changes of the expected cost 
and standard deviation in case 1 than case 2. 
TABLE V. THE PERCENTAGE OF CHANGES OF THE EXPECTED COST 
AND STANDARD DEVIATION IN CASE 2 THAN CASE 1
]
Expected 
Cost Changes 
in C1 than C2 
Standard Deviation 
Changes  
in C1 than C2 
0 0.16% 1.77% 
0.5 -0.05% 3.74% 
1 -0.29% 5.18% 
2 -0.61% 6.76% 
3 -0.53% 6.80% 
4 -1.01% 8.52% 
9 -0.92% 8.67% 
As can be seen, the differences between the expected costs 
of both cases are not very significant. In the worst situation, 
the expected cost of case 1 is 1% lower than case 2. On the 
other hand, it can be observed that the difference of standard 
deviations in these cases is relatively high. This dissimilarity 
is more notable once the risk factor increases. For instance, the 
standard deviation of case 1 is around 9% higher than case 2 
for  " ^. This means ignoring the uncertainty of DR 
considerably changes the expected cost deviation. In other 
words, these results show how neglecting DR uncertainty may 
mislead a retailer in its expected outcomes. Note that, this 
misleading also happens in case 3 in compared to  case 4 
where high cost fluctuation ($9,762) is resulted once DR 
uncertainty is modeled in case 3.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper evaluates the validity of employing real-time 
uncertain DR in short-term energy problems of retailers. It is 
assumed that a retailer intends to buy its required energy from 
pool markets and DR. For this purpose, a reward-based DR is 
mathematically formulated in which the unpredictable 
behavior of customers is modeled though a proposed scenario-
based participation factor. Four distinct cases are defined to 
evaluate the impact of the uncertainty of both resources, 
especially DR, on short-term energy decisions of retailers. As 
a whole, the main findings of the paper are as follows: 
1. DR programs are beneficial for short-term decisions 
of electricity retailers; 
2. Ignoring the uncertainty of DR does not have a 
significant impact on the expected cost of retailer’s 
energy. However, it may mislead the retailer in its 
energy decisions in which 1) it may influence the 
retailer to rely more on DR while it may not be 
achievable in reality, and 2) the retailer may 
underestimate the expected cost deviation.  
This paper clearly demonstrates the importance of 
incorporating the unpredictable behavior of customers in DR 
models, which is particularly critical for conservative retailers 
intending to employ real-time DR. 
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Abstract- This paper proposes a new trading framework which 
allows demand response (DR) aggregators to procure DR from 
consumers and sell it to purchasers. The aggregator obtains DR 
from the proposed price and incentive-based DR programs. On 
the other side, the DR outcome is sold to purchasers through the 
proposed agreements, namely fixed DR contracts and DR 
options. The presented problem is formulated as a stochastic 
programming approach, where its feasibility is studied on a case 
of the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM).  
Index Terms- Demand response, DR aggregator, DR options, 
fixed DR agreements, reward-based DR, time-of-use, stochastic 
programming 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. Basic Concepts, Literature Review and Approach 
Demand Response is a well-known strategy, which is 
employed by various electricity market players. For instance, 
market operators use DR to satisfy both market and power 
system security. DR is beneficial to transmission network 
providers to maintain their network secure and reliable. 
Retailers employ DR to hedge against the risk of spot market 
volatilities.  
Various investigations have been addressed to facilitate the 
use of DR. One group of studies discusses the DR theory (see 
[1] and [2]) and formulate distinct DR programs such as 
incentive-based DR [3, 4] and price-based programs [5, 6]. 
The second group delivers the smart grid technologies such as 
Home Energy Management (HEM) systems [7, 8] and bi-
directional communications between consumers and DR 
seekers [9]. In addition, some papers provide detailed control 
strategies for managing electrical loads such as water heater 
and air conditioners [10, 11]. 
DR aggregators can also play a vital role in enhancing DR. 
They indeed implement various DR programs on consumers 
to sell the outcome to other market players such as 
transmission network providers. A few papers address this 
topic in the literature. Authors in [12] propose a new DR 
market, which allows aggregators to sell their product through 
a pool-based market. The impact of aggregating DR on 
electricity markets is evaluated in [13]. A hierarchical market 
model is developed in [14], where aggregators are considered 
as a broker between residential end users and the market 
operator. With the aim of maximizing social welfare, paper 
[15] proposes a decomposition algorithm to ease 
implementing DR by aggregators. 
This paper proposes a new trading framework for a DR 
aggregator. The aggregator acquires DR by implementing 
time-of-use (TOU) and reward-based DR programs on 
consumers. The behavior of consumers in the TOU program is 
modeled through elasticity factors, while in the reward-based 
DR it is demonstrated using uncertainty characterization. The 
obtained DR is then sold to purchasers through two proposed 
contracts: A fixed DR contract is formulated, in which the 
aggregator can sell a certain amount of DR in a specific price 
for a given time period. In addition, a DR option agreement is 
proposed, which gives the aggregator a right to exercise the 
contracted DR only if it is profitable.  
The problem is formulated in a stochastic profit function, 
which is solved using GAMS. A case of the Australian 
National Electricity Market (NEM) is used to assess the 
validity of the proposed trading framework. 
B. DR in the Australian NEM 
DR is still at an early stage in the Australian NEM. Many 
challenges such as customers’ unwillingness to participate in 
DR, lack of enough knowledge and training, lack of proper 
metering facilities (smart metering), as well as market barriers 
such as market policies are key drivers.  
The peak demand growth rate has become worse in the 
NEM over the past few years. This growth rate between 2005 
and 2011 was about four times higher than the rate of energy 
growth [16]. It is estimated that approximately 25% of retail 
electricity costs come from peak events even though they 
occur for a period of less than 40 hours a year [16].  
Considering the above issues, DR is becoming more 
important in Australia. The Ministerial Council on Energy of 
Australia asked the Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC) to facilitate an efficient demand side participation 
(DSP) in the NEM. Consequently, a comprehensive 
investigation has been taken by the AEMC [17]. As one of the 
solutions proposed to enhance the DR outcome, the AEMC 
emphasizes the importance of market parties’ roles in assisting 
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DR. Among all parties, aggregators are invited to become 
more active in implementing DR programs on consumers. 
This is also given more attention in practice in the NEM. For 
instance, EnerNOC [18] currently provides DR to TransGrid, 
the transmission network service provider in New South 
Wales (NSW), Australia.  
According to the AEMC report, it is estimated that the 
load reduction in three major states of Australia (NSW, QLD, 
and VIC) would be from 400 MW to over 1300 MW by 2020 
[17]. This would lead a cost saving of between $4.3 and $11.8 
billion over the next ten years, which equates to 3-9% of total 
forecast expenditure on the supply side. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
addresses the proposed DR trading framework. The profit 
function is formulated in section III. Section IV discusses the 
case study and results. Last section concludes the paper  
II. TRADING FRAMEWORK 
The proposed DR trading framework is given in Figure 1. 
Electricity consumers include industrial, commercial and 
residential sectors. Each sector is offered a unique time-of-use 
tariff and a distinctive reward-based DR. On the other side, the 
aggregator trades the DR product with purchasers through 
fixed DR contracts and DR option agreements. Note that 
double-sided arrows indicate that the energy flow can be either 
from consumers to DR purchasers or in the opposite direction. 
That is, while the aggregator achieves DR to sell to buyers 
during peak time, it encourages consumers to consume more 
energy during off-peak periods, where the required energy is 
provided by DR purchasers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  The DR Trading Framework 
A. Time-of-Use program 
Time-of-use (TOU) programs are well-known in the power 
industry. According to this program, consumers receive 
distinct price tariffs during a day, for example peak and off-
peak tariffs. Consequently they manage their electricity usage 
depending on how elastic they are to price changes. If they are 
highly elastic, the response is high and vice versa. 
The TOU program is formulated in (1), where it is obtained 
from all consumers (ܿ = 1, 2, … , ܰ) over the given horizon ܶ. 
ܧ(ܱܷܶ) = 
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(1) 
ߣ଴(ܿ, ݌) indicates the initial price dedicated to consumer ܿ 
in period ݌. ߣ(ܿ, ݌) shows the TOU price offered to consumer 
ܿ in period ݌. ܧ(ܿ, ݐ, ݌) is the elasticity of consumer ܿ during 
time ݐ with regards to the electricity price in period ݌. ܦ଴(ܿ, ݐ) 
represents the initial demand of consumer ܿ within time ݐ. 
Finally, ݀(ݐ) represents the duration of time ݐ. 
B. Reward-based DR 
The reward-based DR is described in a stepwise function as 
shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Reward-based DR curve 
According to this figure, the amount of load reduction 
grows in a stepwise manner as the aggregator offers higher 
rewards. This function is expressed in the following 
equations: 
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ܲ஽ோ(ݐ) refers to the total reduced load through 
implementing DR, and ܴ஽ோ(ݐ) indicates the reward paid to DR 
participants. Furthermore, ݒ஽ோ,௝(ݐ) is a binary variable 
showing the level of the reduced load in the DR curve. 
ܲܨ(ݓ, ݐ) is a scenario-based participation factor which models 
the uncertainty of customers’ behavior. This factor ranges 
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between 0 and 1, where zero means no reward-based DR is 
attainable and ܲܨ(ݓ, ݐ) = 1 indicates that the anticipated DR is 
accessible. Finally, ߨ(ݓ) is the probability of scenario ݓ.   
The overall reward-based DR is given in (2): 
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(6) 
C. Fixed DR contract 
A fixed contract is an agreement between buyers and 
sellers of an asset, which is traded in a future time [19]. 
Considering this concept, a fixed DR contract is proposed here 
in which the aggregator trades DR with purchasers.  
Fixed DR contracts are offered in various blocks, where 
each one involves a fixed amount of DR and price:  
ܥ(ܨܦܴ) = ෍ ෍ ෍ ௙ܲ,௕஽ோ(ݐ). ߣ௙,௕஽ோ(ݐ). ݀(ݐ)
ேಳವೃ
௕ୀଵ
ேಷವೃ
௙ୀଵ
்
௧ୀଵ
 
 
(7) 
௙ܲ,௕
 ஽ோ,ெூே(ݐ) ≤ ௙ܲ,௕ ஽ோ(ݐ) ≤ ௙ܲ,௕ ஽ோ,ெ஺௑(ݐ) (8) 
The marginal size of each contract’s block is imposed by 
(8). ௙ܲ,௕ ஽ோ(ݐ) and ߣ௙,௕ ஽ோ(ݐ) are the power and the price of the ܾth 
block of fixed DR ݂. The number of contracts is given by 
ிܰ஽ோ and the number of blocks is represented by ஻ܰ஽ோ. 
D. DR Option Aggrement 
A DR option is proposed in which the aggregator is given 
the right but not an obligation to trade DR with purchasers. 
This means that the DR aggregator signs this agreement at the 
beginning of the decision time horizon. However, exercising 
the contract at the energy delivery time depends on whether it 
is profitable or not. If the aggregator refuses to exercise the 
contracted DR option, it has to pay a predetermined penalty 
fee to the DR purchaser.  
The DR option agreement is mathematically formulated in 
(9).  
ܥ(ܦܴܱ) = ෍ ෍ ቂ ௢ܲ௣(ݐ). ߣ௢௣(ݐ). ݒ௢௣(ݐ). ݀(ݐ)
ே೚೛
௢௣ୀଵ௧∈்
− ቀ1 − ݒ௢௣(ݐ)ቁ . ௢݂௣௣௘௡(ݐ)ቃ 
 
 
(9) 
 
௢ܲ௣ெூே(ݐ) ≤ ௢ܲ௣(ݐ) ≤ ௢ܲ௣ெ஺௑(ݐ) ∀݋݌ = 1, 2, … , ௢ܰ௣ (10) 
Equation (9) consists of two terms addressing the revenue 
of practicing the DR option and the penalty of not exercising 
the signed contract. ௢ܲ௣(ݐ) and ߣ௢௣(ݐ) are the power traded in 
the DR option ݋݌ and its price during time  ݐ. Binary variable 
ݒ௢௣(ݐ) indicates whether the contract is exercised or not. 
௢݂௣
௣௘௡(ݐ) is the penalty of not exercising the option during 
time ݐ. ௢ܰ௣ presents the number of DR options. Equation (10) 
imposes the upper and lower limits for each DR option. 
III.  PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The overall problem is formulated as a profit function 
represented by (11). It consists of the revenue of selling DR 
through fixed DR contracts and DR option agreements, as 
well as the cost of the reward-based DR. The last component 
is CVaR, which is weighted using the risk factor (ߩ).  ߦ and 
ߟ௪ are auxiliary variables for calculating CVaR [20]. ߚ is the 
confidence level, which usually equals to 0.95. Note that the 
risk level (ߩ =[0-∞)) represents the trade-off between the 
expected profit and the risk. A conservative aggregator 
willing to minimize the risk chooses a large value of the risk. 
On the other hand, a risky aggregator prefers higher profits, 
and consequently selects a risk factor close to 0. 
ܯܽݔ ෍ ቎ቌ ෍ ෍ ݂ܲ,ܾܦܴ(ݐ). ߣ݂,ܾܦܴ(ݐ). ݀(ݐ) 
ܰܤܦܴ
ܾ=1
ܰܨܦܴ
݂=1
ቍ
ܶ
ݐ=1
+ ቌ ෍ ቂܲ݌݋(ݐ). ߣ݌݋(ݐ). ݒ݌݋(ݐ). ݀(ݐ)    
ܰ݌݋
݌݋=1
− ቀ1 − ݒ݌݋(ݐ)ቁ . ݂݌݋݌݁݊(ݐ)ቃቍ቏
− ෍ ߨ(ݓ). ෍ ൮෍ ܲܨ(ݓ, ݐ). തܲ௝஽ோ
ே಻
௝ୀଵ
(ݐ). ௝ܴ஽ோ(ݐ). ݀(ݐ)൲
்
௧ୀଵ௪∈ఆೢ
+ ߩ. (ߦ − 11 − ߚ ෍ ߟ௪. ߨ௪௪
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(11) 
It should be noted that it is assumed consumers have smart 
meters and therefore the cost of installing meters is not 
included in the profit function. The profit function is subject 
to the following constraints: 
- CVaR constraints 
−ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ(ݓ) + ߦ − ߟ(ݓ) ≤ 0; ∀ݓ (12) 
ߟ(ݓ) ≥ 0; ∀ݓ (13) 
- Power balance equation (14): 
෍ ௢ܲ௣(ݐ). ݒ௢௣(ݐ)
ே೚೛
௢௣ୀଵ
+ ෍ ෍ ௙ܲ,௕ ஽ோ(ݐ). ߣ௙,௕஽ோ(ݐ). ݀(ݐ)
ேಳವೃ
௕ୀଵ
ேಷವೃ
௙ୀଵ
= ܲ஽ோ(ݐ)
− ෍ ܦ଴(ܿ, ݐ). ෍ ܧ(ܿ, ݐ, ݌). ቆ
ߣ(ܿ, ݌) − ߣ଴(ܿ, ݌)
ߣ଴(ܿ, ݌) ቇ
௉
௣ୀଵ
ே
௖ୀଵ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(14) 
- Reward-based DR constraints (2)-(5); 
- Fixed DR contract size limitation (8) 
-  DR option constraint (10); 
 
IV. CASE STUDY 
A. Data 
The highest consumption day of Queensland in 2013 
occurred in summer (January 9th). The load curve of this day is 
shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Load curve of Queensland on 9 January 2013 
A working day in summer is also considered in this study, 
which is divided into two periods, peak and off-peak. Peak 
time is between 9am and 10pm, while other times are 
considered as off-peak periods. It is assumed that the 
aggregator buys DR from consumers to sell it to purchasers 
during peak time, while this flow is reverse during off peak 
periods. Industrial, commercial and residential consumers are 
considered here. TOU prices for each consumer are derived 
from retail tariffs in Queensland, Australia [21]. The elasticity 
matrix is provided in Table I [5]. Unique reward-based DR 
curves involving 25 steps are assumed for each sector. 
Furthermore, for each reward-based DR, 20 scenarios 
representing consumer uncertainties are randomly generated.  
A fixed DR contract involving six blocks is considered for 
each period. The maximum demand of each block is 90kW 
and 30kW during peak and off-peak periods, respectively. 
Finally, four DR option agreements are modeled for each 
period, where the penalty of not exercising each agreement is 
assumed to be 10% of the contract’s value. 
TABLE I.  ELASTICITY MATRIX 
 Peak Off Peak 
Residential 
Peak -0.15 0.05 
Off Peak 0.02 -0.03 
Commercial 
Peak -0.16 0.06 
Off Peak 0.03 -0.04 
Industrial 
Peak -0.2 0.1 
Off Peak 0.07 -0.08 
 
B. Exprimental Results 
The problem is formulated in a mixed-integer linear 
programming approach and is solved for different risk levels 
using CPLEX under GAMS [22]. Figure 4 depicts the TOU 
outcome. It can be seen that consumers reduce their 
consumption during peak, while they use more energy during 
off-peak time. The reduction during peak time is 
approximately 7% and the load growth in off-peak periods is 
5.54%. Note that since the outcome of the TOU only depends 
on consumers’ elasticity, it is constant for various risk levels. 
 
Figure 4.  TOU results 
Figure 5 illustrates the reward-based DR achievements. 
Increasing the risk level leads a declining trend in this 
program. This is reasonable since this program involves 
uncertainty and hence conservative aggregators prefer to 
reduce their share from it. It should be noted that negative 
values during off-peak periods mean that the aggregator sell 
the reward-based DR to consumers. In other words, consumers 
are encouraged to consume more energy through this program 
during off peak. 
 
Figure 5.  Reward-Based DR results 
Table II shows the energy traded in fixed DR contracts. 
The aggregator sells DR to purchasers in the peak period, 
while it buys energy during off-peak time. It can also be said 
that the conservative aggregator (ߩ = 2) trades more fixed DR 
than the risk-neutral one (ߩ = 0) in both periods.  
TABLE II.  FIXED DR ENERGY (KWH) 
࣋ Peak Off Peak 
0 4559 -1004 
1 4539 -1004 
2 4735 -1074 
Table III represents the exercised DR options for different 
risk levels. All DR options are used for risk factors 0 and 1. 
For ߩ = 2, DR options (DROP) 1 and 3 are not exercised 
during peak and off-peak periods, respectively. This trend 
indeed follows the declining tendency of the reward-based DR 
as a result of increasing the risk level. 
TABLE III.  DR OPTION EXERCISMENT 
࣋ Peak Off Peak 
0 All All 
1 All All 
2 DROP2-DROP4 DROP1, DROP2, DROP4 
Finally, the impact of the unpredictable behavior of 
consumers is evaluated here. Two cases are considered: Case 
1 represents the outcome when the uncertainty is modeled (for 
the risk-neutral aggregators) and case 2 ignores the 
unpredictable behavior of customers (ܲܨ(ݓ, ݐ) = 1 in the 
reward-based DR). The amounts of TOU and DR options 
remain constant in both cases. But the reward-based DR and 
fixed DR contracts change as Figure 6. As can be seen, 
disregarding the behavior leads to a higher reward-based DR 
outcome and consequently, higher amounts of fixed DR. This 
indeed shows how ignoring customers’ behavior may mislead 
the aggregator in its energy plan. 
 
Figure 6.  Impact of uncertain behavior of consumers on DR outcomes 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposes a new trading framework for DR 
aggregators, which allows them to play an arbitrator role 
between consumers and market participants. TOU and reward-
based DR programs are modeled to be applied to consumers. 
On the other hand, the aggregator is able to trade the DR 
product with purchasers through the proposed fixed-DR and 
DR option agreements. The problem is formulated using a 
mixed-integer profit function, which is evaluated on a case of 
the Australian national electricity market. The main findings 
are as follows: 
1. The proposed framework helps the aggregator to become 
more active in the DR market. In this framework the 
aggregator can provide a bidirectional energy flow 
between consumers and DR purchasers. 
2. The uncertainty of customers’ behavior has an important 
impact on the decisions of the aggregator. Modeling the 
behavior results in distinct decisions for various risk 
levels. In addition, disregarding this uncertainty misleads 
the aggregator in its DR strategy. 
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 
Abstract— This paper considers a wind power producer 
playing strategically in a day-ahead market while willing to set 
demand response (DR) contracts with a DR aggregator. To this 
end, a bilevel problem including a single leader and two followers 
is formulated. The wind power producer is the leader aiming at 
maximizing its profit through offering into a day-ahead market 
and clearing its deviation in a balancing market. The strategic 
behavior of the producer in the day-ahead market is modelled 
through the market clearing process (follower 1). In addition, the 
DR aggregator behavior is modelled through a revenue function 
in which the aggregator is able to sell its DR product to the wind 
power producer, other competitors and the day-ahead market 
(follower 2). The overall problem is a stochastic mathematical 
program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) in which wind 
power production and imbalance prices are associated with 
uncertainty. The problem is then transformed into a linear 
programming approach. A case of the Nordic market is chosen to 
assess the validity of the given problem. 
Index Terms—Bilevel programming, demand response, DR 
aggregator behavior, MPEC, social welfare, stochastic 
programming, strategic wind power producer  
NOMENCLATURE 
, ( )DR TC t  Total DR capacity 
( , , )DP du db t  Demand scheduled of unit 𝑑𝑢, block 𝑑𝑏 
( )DRP t  DR obtained by the wind power producer 
, ( , )DR DAP dru t  DR scheduled for aggregator unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 
( , , )GP gu b t  
Power scheduled for generator unit 𝑔𝑢, 
block 𝑏 
Im ( , )bP t w  Imbalance power by the wind producer 
( , )WDAP wu t  
Wind power scheduled in the DA market 
for wind unit 𝑤𝑢 
 ,WPP t w  Wind power production in scenario 𝑤 
, ( , )W ofP wu t  Offered wind power in the DA market  
( , , )DMaxP du db t  Upper level of demand unit 𝑑𝑢, block 𝑑𝑏 
( , )DRMaxP dru t  Upper level of DR unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 
( , , )GMaxP gu b t  
Upper level of generation unit 𝑔𝑢, block 
𝑔𝑏 
( , , )Csp c t s  
DR share percentage of competitor 𝑐 in 
scenario 𝑠 
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, ( , )DR DAsp dru t  DR share percentage of the DA market 
( , )Wsp t s  DR share percentage of the wind producer 
( )DA t  DA market price 
 , ,D du db t  Marginal utility of demand 𝑑𝑢, block 𝑑𝑏 
 , ,C c t s  DR price by competitor 𝑐 in scenario 𝑠 
( )DR t  DR price offered by the wind producer 
, ( , )DR DA dru t  Marginal cost of DR unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 
 , ,G gu b t  Marginal cost of generator 𝑔𝑢, block 𝑏 
Im ( , )b t w  Imbalance price in scenario w 
, ( , )W of wu t  Offer price by the wind producer unit 𝑤𝑢 
 , ( )w  Auxiliary variable for CVaR calculation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  Background, aim, and approach 
ITH various predetermined renewable energy targets, it 
is expected that wind power will rapidly grow in the 
near future. Some goals are for example 50% from wind 
in Denmark by 2020, 20% renewable energy (mostly wind 
production) in Australia and the European Union by 2020, and 
a 33% target in California by 2020 [1].  
As wind power becomes matured enough in electricity 
markets, it is expected wind power producers are treated as 
similar to conventional power plants. To this end, they have to 
participate in the electricity market and place their energy and 
price offer. In addition, they are required to take the 
responsibility of their power imbalances between their offer 
and real production in the real time dispatch. This is currently 
applied for some wind power producers in real markets such 
as Western Denmark [2], Germany and Australia [1]. 
In addition, significant wind power penetration leads to 
new challenges. One important issue is that a wind power 
producer with high power production may become dominant 
in the market and plays strategically to change the market 
price. Indeed, exercising market power by power plants 
including wind power producers may happen in any electricity 
market. This is due to different circumstances, where one 
reason for exercising market power by wind power producers 
is their high power penetration. For instance, as reported in 
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[3], the Danish Elspot areas, DK1 and DK2, had negative 
prices for 39 and 30 hours respectively in 2013, due to high 
wind power production. In addition, a study on the Nordic 
market [4] shows that producers with fluctuating production 
such as wind producers may act strategically in their bidding 
on the spot market due to the asymmetric cost of the 
regulating market. Note that the assumption of owning high 
wind power production by a wind power producer is not 
unrealistic as there are some real cases which the coordination 
of several wind farms is recommended as a solution to 
alleviate their production deviation [5, 6]. 
Furthermore, since the wind power producer is required 
place its offer in the day-ahead market, which is several hours 
prior to the real time dispatch, it may face power production 
deviation in real time. This deviation is indeed required to be 
compensated in the balancing (regulating) market. However, 
there may be a possibility of price violations in this market. 
Hence, the producer can use flexible resources such as hydro, 
storage systems and thermal power plants to overcome the risk 
of facing the imbalance price violation [7-11]. Demand 
response (DR) is another resource which has recently been 
used for this purpose. DR is a fast and flexible resource which 
is growing rapidly around the world. For instance, according 
to a report by the Federal Utility Regulatory Commission, DR 
is capable to offset 20% of the peak demand in the US [12]. 
DR can be used in different markets, where for a system 
integrating wind power it is a useful tool to cope with the 
uncertainty of wind power production, both from the producer 
and ISOs’ perspectives. 
This paper is motivated by the above issues, i.e. study of a 
strategic wind power producer which is responsible for its 
participation in the market and also can use DR to lessen the 
risk of uncertainty. An offering strategy for this producer is 
proposed as follows. The producer offers into the day-ahead 
market. It is assumed that the wind power producer is the only 
player with market power in this market while other 
participants are fully competitive. Consequently, a day-ahead 
market clearing process is modelled through which the wind 
producer can determine its power level and price in this 
market. In addition, the wind power producer uses DR to 
alleviate its power production deviation in the real-time 
dispatch. This paper proposes a DR scheme in which the wind 
power producer can bilaterally set a DR contract with a DR 
aggregator. The DR aggregator itself seeks to maximize its 
revenue from selling the DR product through three purchasers, 
namely, the wind power producer in this paper, the day-ahead 
market, and other players willing in DR. Note that trading DR 
through bilateral contracts exists in the real case [13]. In 
addition, DR aggregators can directly participate in some 
markets such as PJM [14].  
The problem is formulated in a bilevel programming 
approach involving a single upper-level (leader) and two 
lower-level (followers) problems. The wind power producer’s 
objective is to maximize its profit, which is modelled in the 
upper-level problem. Social welfare maximization is 
formulated to represent the day-ahead market clearing process 
in lower-level problem 1. In addition, the aggregator behavior 
in selling DR to DR buyers is formulated through revenue 
maximization in lower-level problem 2. The given problem is 
a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), 
which is transformed into a single-level problem by replacing 
the lower-level problems with their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
(KKT) optimality conditions [15, 16]. The problem is then 
linearized using the strong duality theorem [15, 16] and the 
technique provided in [17]. The rendered problem is stochastic 
mixed-integer programming in which wind power production 
and imbalance prices are uncertain parameters. In order to 
model the risk, the CVaR measure is applied here. The 
problem is evaluated on a case of the Nordic market [18].  
Note that the proposed approach is applicable in electricity 
markets integrating substantial wind power production. Such 
markets with the mentioned regulatory framework exist in the 
real world, where Western Denmark, Germany and the state of 
South Australia are the leaders. Note also that the market 
regulators are constantly updating the regulatory framework to 
overcome new issues. With regards to wind and renewable 
resources, for instance, they first initiated new policies and 
incentives such as feed-in-tariff (FIT) schemes to grow these 
resources. However, as these resources became significant in 
some countries such as Denmark and Germany, they changed 
the rules and policies. For instance, Denmark has replaced FIT 
with a fixed premium payment in 2000, which is paid on top 
of earing by wind farms in the market [1]. Furthermore, they 
may need to revise the rules and policies due to the significant 
increase of wind production which may bring several issues 
such as exercising market power. Therefore, the study of a 
price-maker wind producer may help the market regulator to 
better design rules and policies, which would result in 
increasing the competiveness of the market [15].  
B.  Literature review and contributions   
Offering strategies by fully competitive wind power 
producers are addressed in some studies. For instance, the 
concept of minimizing imbalance costs in wind offering 
strategies is investigated in [19]. Offering in various market 
floors including day-ahead, adjustment and balancing markets 
are addressed in [20]. Authors in [5] recommend the coalition 
of wind producers to alleviate wind power uncertainty.  
Few papers have recently raised the issue of the market 
power capability by wind power producers. Ref. [15] is the 
most recent and comprehensive one. The authors investigate 
the high penetration of a wind producer by modelling it as a 
strategic player in both day-ahead and balancing markets. An 
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) is 
formulated to this end. Authors in [2] consider a wind power 
producer which is a price maker in the day-ahead market and a 
deviator in the balancing market. Unlike [2], wind power 
producer in [21] is fully competitive in the day-ahead market 
while having market power in the balancing market. Authors 
in [6] investigate the effect of a price-maker wind power 
producer on the market price. A study of the Nordic market in 
[3] indicates that producers with fluctuating production may 
act strategically in their bidding on the spot market due to the 
asymmetric cost of the regulating market. 
As discussed earlier, wind power producers may use 
flexible resources to cope with their power production 
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uncertainty. This is addressed in some studies such as [7-11]. 
While hydro power plants are used in coordination with wind 
in [7, 9], references [8, 10] study the feasibility of using 
storage systems by wind power producers. In addition, authors 
in [11] recommend the coordinated trading of wind power 
producers and thermal energy. DR is also used for this 
purpose. However, it is mainly employed by market operators 
to improve market and network issues [22-24]. Few papers 
investigate the problem from a wind power producer’s point of 
view. For instance, authors in [25] propose a method in which 
a virtual power plant is modelled to coordinate wind power 
and demand response. Our very recent studies investigate the 
benefits of employing DR by wind power producers [26, 27]. 
This paper is in a common purpose with [2, 6, 15, 21], 
where it investigates the strategic offering of a wind producer. 
However, the main contributions of the paper are:  
1- The paper proposes a new scheme in which a strategic 
wind power producer can use demand response in its 
energy offering in order to alleviate its production 
uncertainty risk. A bilateral DR contract is presented 
between the producer and a DR aggregator in which the 
DR aggregator behavior is taken into account.  
2- The above problem is formulated in bilevel programming 
including a single leader and two followers. The linear 
form of this problem is then derived to be solvable using 
commercially available software.  
3- The risk faced with the wind power producer is modelled 
using CVaR. The offering strategies of both risk-neutral 
and risk-averse wind power producers are investigated. 
In addition, the impact of imbalance prices on the 
strategic behavior of each producer is studied.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
discusses the proposed offering strategy of a strategic wind 
power producer. The mathematical formulations of the 
proposed bilevel problem are addressed in section III. Section 
IV presents the equivalent linear formulation of the given 
bilevel problem. Section V provides a case study with 
numerical results. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI. 
Finally, appendices are addressed in the last section.  
II.  STRATEGIC WIND OFFERING  
A.  Framework 
The following assumptions are considered. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume the strategic behavior of a wind power 
producer in the day-ahead market only, which is similar to [2]. 
This is reasonable as the majority of the energy is traded in 
this market. In addition, the transmission network is not 
modelled in this paper, which makes the findings intuitive. 
This is a common assumption in wind offering studies such as 
[7, 10, 20]. Nevertheless, the network constraints can be 
modelled in the paper in a similar way to [2]. In addition, the 
balancing market is assumed to be settled in a single-price 
system, which is used in the US, instead of a dual-price 
scheme. Furthermore, similar to the existing studies, a single 
one hour period is chosen. However, the problem is also valid 
for multi period problems. The problem size increases as the 
multi-hour model is considered. One simplification is 
provided in [2], where the problem is solved hour by hour for 
the entire day. This is justified since the wind power producer 
is not faced with ramp constraints due to its uncontrollable 
production. The problem without simplifications is complex 
and there are some solutions for it. If we consider the lower-
level problem as a DC OPF, which is mainly used in the 
literature, the overall multi-period problem can be solved 
using a Benders’ Decomposition technique. To this end, the 
problem is decomposed into sub-problems, one per each time 
and each scenario, which can be solved separately with the 
reduced computational burden [28]. For the complicated 
systems such as multi-area one, there is a need for approaches 
such as the augmentation Lagrangian relaxation [29] or the 
model which solves non-convexities of the market pricing in 
[30]. This is not the focus of our work as we seek to show the 
feasibility of employing DR by strategic wind power 
producers.  
The proposed bilevel problem is depicted in Fig. 1. Note 
that parameters in each level are shown by dash line boxes and 
arrows, while the decision variables are represented using 
solid line boxes and arrows. In addition, the links between 
different levels of the problem are indicated by double lines. 
The procedure carried out in this bilevel problem is as 
follows. In the upper-level problem, the wind power producer 
(WPP) makes two decisions: D1) the day-ahead offer; D2) the 
DR price given to the DR aggregator. The day-ahead (DA) 
offer includes the energy volume and price for each dispatch 
interval. This decision is faced with the uncertainty involved 
in the power production and imbalance price forecasts. To this 
end, plausible realizations of these stochastic parameters are 
required to be taken into account. In addition, the level of the 
risk taken by the producer affects the DA offer decision. That 
is, the sale share of day-ahead and balancing markets may 
change in various risk levels. The day-ahead energy volume 
and price as well as the DR share procured by the wind power 
producer are the other factors that affect the DA offer. The 
former, i.e. the day-ahead energy volume and price, is decided 
in lower-level problem 1 through a market clearing process. 
To this end, offers from the wind power producer as well as 
other generators and the DR aggregator are stacked. On the 
other hand, demand bids are also received. Consequently, the 
day-ahead market price and energy volume are determined 
from the intersection of supply and demand curves (See lower-
level problem 1). The latter, i.e. the DR share procured by the 
wind power producer, is decided in lower-level problem 2. In 
a revenue maximization problem, the DR aggregator 
determines the DR share to be sold to three DR purchasers: the 
wind power producer, other DR buyers and the day-ahead 
market. This decision is made according to the prices offered 
by the DR purchasers. Note that the DR price offered by the 
wind power producer is decided in the upper level problem as 
decision 2 (D2). The wind power producer decides on this 
price based on the day-ahead price (derived in lower-level 
problem 1) and an anticipation of DR prices offered by other 
DR purchasers (See the upper-level problem, right-hand side). 
B.  Uncertainty characterization 
Each upper-level scenario is represented by scenario 𝑤, 
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which comprises a vector of imbalance prices (𝜆𝐼𝑚𝑏(𝑡, 𝑤)) and 
wind power production 𝑃𝑊𝑃(𝑡, 𝑤). 
 ( , ), (. , ). Imb WPscenario w t w P t w  (1) 
The probability of each scenario occurrence equals 𝜋(𝑤), 
where ∑ 𝜋(𝑤) = 1𝑤∈𝛺𝑤 . 
Each scenario in lower-level problem 2 is illustrated by 
scenario 𝑠, which involves a vector of other competitors’ DR 
prices (𝜆𝑐(𝑡, 𝑠)). 
  .. ,cscenari so s t  (2) 
Similar to the upper-level problem, the probability of each 
scenario is 𝜋(𝑠), where ∑ 𝜋(𝑠) = 1𝑠∈𝛺𝑠 . 
Note that lower-level problem 1 is a deterministic problem 
and independent of scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Strategic wind offering considering the DR aggregator behavior 
III.  PROBLEM FORMULATION  
The bilevel problem is formulated as follows. 
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The upper-level problem is provided in (3)-(9). The profit 
function of the wind power producer is indicated in (3). The 
first term of this function shows the revenue obtained from 
selling into the day-ahead market. 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑤𝑢, 𝑡) and 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) 
are decided in the day-ahead market clearing process, i.e. 
lower-level problem 1 (Eqs. (10)-(15)). The second term 
indicates the cost of DR. The third term is the revenue 
achieved from the balancing market. Note that if the wind 
power producer has deficit generation, it has to buy its 
deviation from the balancing market and hence, this term is a 
cost for the producer. Finally, the last term illustrates CVaR 
which is weighted using the risk factor (𝜌). A risk level (𝜌) 
closed to 0 means that the wind power producer is risk-neutral 
while larger risk levels model risk-averse producers.  𝛽 is the 
confidence level, which is 0.95. Equation (4) enforces the 
power balance for the wind power production. Non-negativity 
of the wind power offer (𝑃𝑊,𝑜𝑓(𝑤𝑢, 𝑡)) in the day-ahead 
market is represented in (5). Expressions (6) and (7) represent 
CVaR constraints [20], which are derived to linearize this risk 
measure. Note that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑤) in (6) indicates the obtained 
profit for scenario 𝑤, as illustrated in (8). In (9), 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) is 
formulated as a function of the DR percentage (𝑠𝑝𝑊(𝑡, 𝑠)) 
which the DR aggregator sells to the wind power producer. 
This DR share (𝑠𝑝𝑊(𝑡, 𝑠)) is indeed a variable which is 
determined by the DR aggregator, i.e. lower-level problem 2 
(Eqs. (16)-(18)).  
Lower-level problem 1 is addressed in (10)-(15). This 
problem clears the day-ahead market. In order to make the 
canonical representation, the minus social welfare (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑊) 
is used in (10). The first three terms of this function 
respectively provide the offers by the wind power producer, 
other generators and the DR aggregator. The last term is the 
demand offer. The energy balance of the day-ahead market is 
imposed in (11). Constraints (12)-(15) respectively enforce the 
upper and lower limits of power for the wind power producer, 
other generators, the DR aggregator and the demand. Dual 
variables for each constraint are indicated following a colon.  
As mentioned earlier, the DR percentage procured by the 
wind power producer (𝑠𝑝𝑊(𝑡, 𝑠)) is determined in lower-level 
problem 2. This problem is addressed in (16)-(18). The DR 
aggregator’s objective function is shown in (16). Again, the 
minus revenue (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝐷𝑅_𝑅) is used in the objective function 
to make it canonical. The first two terms respectively indicate 
the expected revenues from the wind power producer as well 
as other players which are interested in buying DR. The last 
term represents the revenue obtained from selling DR to the 
day-ahead market. Note that this term is the product of two 
variables, i.e. 𝑠𝑝𝐷𝑅,𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡) and 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡). However, since 
these variables are decided in lower-level problem 1, this 
product is constant here and we can remove it from the 
objective function. Instead, a new constraint is added to the 
problem to relate lower-level problems 1 and 2: 
, , ,( , ) ( ). ( , )DR DA DR T DR DAP dru t C t sp dru t  (19) 
Constraint (17) imposes that total DR share percentage 
must be equal to 1. Finally, constraint (18) is used for variable 
declarations. Again, dual variables for each constraint are 
indicated following a colon. 
It should be emphasized that the variables of lower-level 
problem 1 are 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑤𝑢, 𝑡), 𝑃𝐺(𝑔𝑢, 𝑏, 𝑡), 𝑃𝐷𝑅,𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡), 
𝑃𝐷(𝑑𝑢, 𝑑𝑏, 𝑡), plus all dual variables shown in (11)-(15). 
In addition, the variables of lower-level problem 2 include: 
 2 ( , ), ( , , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , , )LL W CW C t ssp t s sp c t s c st s t     
Finally, the upper-level variables contain all variables of 
lower-level problems 1 and 2 plus the following: 
 ,Im ,( ), ( , )( , ), ( , ),DR b WU WofL ofPt P t w w wu t u t    
IV.  LINEAR FORMULATION 
The given bilevel programming includes nonlinearity. This 
section provides an equivalent single-level linear problem 
which is easily solvable by commercially available software. 
To this end, the following procedure is applied. 
First, the bilevel problem is transformed into a single-level 
MPEC. For this purpose, each lower-level problem is replaced 
by its first-order optimality conditions through the KKT 
conditions [16] (Appendix A). Note that this transformation is 
valid since the lower-level problems are continuous and linear 
and thus convex. The next step is to linearize the derived 
MPEC. Indeed, the MPEC is nonlinear as a result of 1) the 
complimentary conditions resulting from applying KKTs, and 
2) the products of 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑤𝑢, 𝑡) × 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) as well as 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) ×
𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) in (3). While the former is linearized using the method 
presented in [17] (Appendix A), the latter is linearized using 
the strong duality theorem [16] (Appendix B). 
Overall, the equivalent single-level linear problem is as:  
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subject to  
Constraints (4)-(9), (11)-(15), and (17)-(19); 
Constraints (A1)-(A26). 
The derived problem in (20) is a mixed-integer linear 
programming approach. Note that the linear equivalent of the 
product of 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) and 𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) as well as that of 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡) 
and 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) are respectively presented in (A29) and (A31) in 
Appendix B. Constraints (4)-(9), (11)-(15) and (17)-(19) of the 
original problem are applied here. (A1)-(A26) are associated 
with the KKT optimality conditions and the linearized 
complementarity slackness conditions (See Appendix A).  
V.  CASE STUDY 
A.  Data Preparation and Assumptions 
The proposed offering strategy is assessed on a realistic case 
of the Nordic market [18]. Demand, generators and DR offers 
are depicted in Table I. The offers for demand and generators 
are taken from the Nordic market for hour 12 am on the 23th 
of January 2012. Since the cost offers of individual generators 
as well as demand are not publicly available, this paper uses 
the supply and demand curves of the aggregated generation 
and demand offers, which are represented in the market 
clearing price (MCP) model of the Nordic market for the 
relevant hour. However, DR offers are assumed since there is 
no DR data available. These offers are indeed chosen in such a 
way to be close to other generators’ offers. The assumption is 
reasonable since the DR aggregator needs to compete with 
other power plants to be able to sell its DR product in the 
market. 
The upper-level scenarios are generated as follows. The 
wind power producer Hemmet located in Denmark is chosen 
[31]. The installed capacity is 27MW (Vestas Turbines). Wind 
speed scenarios are generated using the ARMA model where 
the available data in 2012 is used as input time series. 10 wind 
speed scenarios are generated. These scenarios are then 
transformed into power scenarios using the Vestas Wind 
Curve. Note that in order to make the wind power producer 
influential in the market, we consider a wind farm sized 200 
times of the given farm, i.e. 5400MW capacity. 
In addition, 10 imbalance price scenarios are generated. For 
this purpose, the ARIMA method is used. A time series of the 
prices of the Nordic market in 2012 is used to generate price 
scenarios.  
In the lower-level problem, the rival DR prices, i.e. the DR 
price given to the DR aggregator by other players interested in 
DR, are considered to be stochastic. To this end, 3 players are 
taken into account. In addition, 3 scenarios are generated to 
represent the uncertainty of each rival competitor.  
 
 
TABLE I  
OFFERS BY DEMAND, GENERATORS AND DR IN THE DAY-AHEAD MARKET 
Demand Offer Generators’ Offer DR Aggregator Offer 
Volume 
(MWh) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Volume 
(MWh) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Volume 
(MWh) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
33662.2 55 25000 21 150 29 
17 49.5 2000 22 150 30 
17 45 2500 24 150 31 
19.9 39.9 700 26 150 32 
115 39.2 1000 31 150 32.5 
57.3 35.31 1800 31.5 150 33.5 
48.8 35 3000 32 
 
23.8 34.2 1000 32.8 
20 34 3000 33 
41.9 33.87 
 
647 33 
12.2 32.64 
8.4 32.51 
17.3 32.3 
44.1 32 
24.7 31.6 
52.1 31.5 
165.1 31.4 
329.3 30 
B.  Numerical results 
The proposed problem is solved for two risk levels using 
CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [32]. The problem is solved on a 
personal computer with the processor of Intel® core™ i7 at 
3.4GHz and RAM of 8GB. The model statistics are as follows. 
The number of single equations is 282 while the number of 
non-zero elements is 779. In addition, the numbers of single 
and discrete variables are respectively 256 and 79. The 
computation time for the optimal solution is 18.8s. 
Day-ahead market clearing prices for two risk-levels are 
shown in Table II. Note that these prices are cleared as a result 
of exercising market power (strategic behavior) by the wind 
power producer. While the risk-neutral producer fixes the 
price at $30/MWh, the risk-averse producer tends to increase 
the price to $31/MWh. This is sensible since the risk-neutral 
producer prefers to have a higher sale share in the day-ahead 
market and therefore, keeps the price as low as possible to be 
successful in this market. On the other hand, the risk-averse 
producer is interested in selling more energy in the balancing 
market, where it has a better forecast of its production. 
Consequently, it increases the day-ahead price to compensate 
possible fluctuation (losses) in the balancing market. 
TABLE II  
DAY-AHEAD MARKET CLEARING PRICE  
 
DA Price ($/MWh) 
Rho=0 30 
Rho=10 31 
Table III provides the energy sold to the day-ahead market 
by the wind power producer (WPP), generation companies 
(GENCOs) and the DR aggregator. An interesting result is that 
as the risk level increases, the wind producer significantly 
decreases its participation in the day-ahead market. This 
indeed proves the discussion mentioned above. As a result of 
this declining trend and also because of the increased day-
ahead price in risk level 10 (See Table II), the shares of other 
generators as well as the DR aggregator grow. Note that the 
total demand served in both risk levels is identical. Indeed, the 
last demand offer, i.e. (329.3MWh, $30/MWh) is not 
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approved in the day-ahead market in both risk levels. 
TABLE III  
ENERGY VOLUME SOLD TO THE DA MARKET BY THE WPP, GENCOS AND  
THE DR AGGREGATOR (MWH) 
 
WPP GENCOs DR Aggregator Total 
Rho=0 4643 30200 150 34993 
Rho=10 3493 31200 300 34993 
Fig. 2 displays the energy volume traded by the wind 
power producer in the balancing market. The wind power 
producer in risk level zero has to buy around 370MWh from 
the balancing market to compensate its overbid in the day-
ahead market. Actually, the expected production of wind 
power producer is around 4280MWh while its power sold in 
the day-ahead market is 4643MWh. On the other hand, the 
significant sale share of the risk-averse wind power producer 
(Rho=10) in the balancing market is obvious here. 
 
Fig. 2. Wind power participation in the balancing market  
The DR volume that the aggregator sells to each DR 
purchaser is depicted in Fig. 3. The risk-neutral wind power 
producer has no DR procurement from the DR aggregator 
while the risk-averse producer purchases 500MWh. This is 
reasonable since the risk-averse producer tends to buy DR to 
compensate its possible deviation in the real time. This 
tendency is confirmed in Table IV, where the risk-neutral 
wind power producer offers a DR price equal to $27.44/MWh 
while the risk-averse producer’s price given to the DR 
aggregator is $31/MWh. It is also obvious from Fig. 3 that the 
DR aggregator sells more DR to the day-ahead market in risk 
level equal to 10. This is as a consequence of the higher day-
ahead price in this risk level compared to the risk level equal 
to zero (See Table II). Finally, as a result of the increment in 
the DR share of the wind power producer and the day-ahead 
market, that of other competitors declines in risk level 10. 
 
Fig. 3. DR Sold to different DR purchasers 
TABLE IV  
DR PRICE OFFERED BY THE WIND POWER PRODUCER 
 
Offered Price 
Rho=0 27.44 
Rho=10 31 
C.  Imbalance price sensitivity analysis 
This section analyzes the impact of the imbalance price on 
the behavior models of the strategic wind power producer. 
Three cases are considered. Case1: the imbalance price is 95% 
of the original price used in the main study; Case2: the 
outcomes of the main study; Case3: the original imbalance 
price is increased 5%. 
The day-ahead market clearing price is delivered in  
Table V. In addition, the wind power scheduled for different 
imbalance prices is provided in Fig. 4. It can be seen that the 
day-ahead price for case 1 in risk level 10 decreases compared 
to the main case, i.e. Case 2. The strategic wind power 
producer indeed bids in such a way to reduce the market price 
and consequently sells a higher portion of its production in the 
day-ahead market (See Fig. 4). This behavior is resulted since 
the imbalance price is low in Case 1 and therefore the 
producer can easily compensate its deviation from the day-
ahead schedule in the balancing market at a low price. On the 
other hand, in case 3 where the expected imbalance price is 
high, both risk-neutral and risk-averse producers tend to 
increase the day-ahead market price. Therefore, the risk-
neutral can increase its profit in a higher day-ahead price. In 
addition, this producer reduces its share in the day-ahead 
market with the hope of selling energy in the balancing market 
at a higher price (Fig. 4). However, the risk-averse producer 
does not take the deviation risk in case 3 with high imbalance 
prices. Therefore, it has no participation in the day-ahead 
market with the aim of selling in the balancing market with the 
perfect knowledge of the market price as well as its power 
production. 
TABLE V  
IMPACT OF THE IMBALANCE PRICE ON THE DA MARKET PRICE ($/MWH) 
 
0.95% Imb. price Imb. price 1.05% Imb. price 
Rho=0 30 30 31 
Rho=10 30 31 32 
 
 
Fig. 4. Impact of imbalance price on wind power in the DA market 
The participation of the wind power producer in the 
balancing market for various imbalance prices is shown in 
 8 
Table VI. The strategic behavior of the producer is obvious, 
where in both risk levels it has to buy significant energy in 
case1 while it has a substantial sale share in case 3. 
 
TABLE VI  
IMPACT OF THE IMBALANCE PRICE ON THE WIND POWER PARTICIPATION IN THE 
BALANCING MARKET (MWH) 
 
0.95% 
Imb. price 
Imb. price 
1.05% 
Imb. price 
Rho=0 -696 -366 1283 
Rho=10 -696 1283 4726 
 
In addition, the total demand cleared in different imbalance 
prices are shown in Fig. 5. Imbalance prices affects the total 
demand scheduled in the day-ahead market, where higher 
imbalance prices lead to a falling trend in the demand served. 
 
Fig. 5. Impact of imbalance price on demand scheduled in the DA market 
Finally, the impact of imbalance prices on the total DR 
procurement by the wind power producer is given in Table 
VII. The producer in both risk levels for case 1 is not willing 
to buy DR and thus, offers a low DR price to the aggregator 
(i.e. $27.44/MWh). On the other hand, both risk-neutral and 
risk-averse producers buy significant DR in high imbalance 
prices to cope with the risk of the balancing market (Case3). 
To this end, they offer $31/MWh to the DR aggregator and 
obtain 500 and 450 MW DR respectively. 
TABLE VII 
IMPACT OF THE IMBALANCE PRICE ON DR PROCUREMENT BY  
THE WIND POWER PRODUCER (MW, $/MWH) 
 
0.95% Imb. price Imb. price 1.05% Imb. price 
 Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price 
Rho=0 0 27.44 0 27.4 500 31 
Rho=10 0 27.44 500 31 450 31 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper considers a wind power producer with market 
power in the day-ahead market. An energy offering strategy is 
proposed through which the strategic wind power producer 
purchases demand response (DR) from a DR aggregator. The 
problem is formulated using a bilevel approach, where the 
upper-level represents the wind producer profit maximization 
while the lower-level problems respectively model the day-
ahead market clearing process and the DR aggregator 
behavior. The problem is then transformed into a linear 
approach through proper techniques. 
The overall problem is solved using stochastic 
programming in which the risk is carried out using CVaR. It is 
assessed on a case of the Nordic Market. The main findings 
are as follows. 1) A strategic wind power producer affects the 
market by using its market power to fix the market price. 2) A 
risk-neutral producer plays strategically to increase its profit in 
the day-ahead market while the risk-averse producer uses its 
market power in such a way to compensate possible deviations 
in the balancing market. In addition, the risk-averse producer 
tends to employ more DR for this purpose. 3) Imbalance 
prices have a significant impact on the behavior of a strategic 
wind producer in the market as well as DR procurement.  
 
VII.  APPENDIX 
A.  KKT optimality conditions 
The Lagrangian function of each lower-level problem is 
differentiated with respect to the relevant variables to derive 
its KKT optimality conditions. In addition, the 
complementarity slackness conditions obtained from these 
KKT conditions are linearized using Fortuny-Amat approach 
[17]. Expressions (A1)-(A20) shows the corresponding 
derivatives for lower-level problem 1. 
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The KKT conditions of lower-level problem 2 are shown in 
(A21)-(A26): 
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Note that 𝑀.(.) parameters in all the above equations are 
sufficiently large constants and 𝑣 .(. ) variables are binary 
variables. 
 
B.  Strong duality theorem 
The strong duality theorem is used to extract the linear 
formulation of the product of 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡) × 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) as well 
as 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡) × 𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡). According to the strong duality theorem, 
the values of primal objective function and the dual function 
must be equal at the optimal solution [16].  
Lower-level problem 1: The primal problem (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑊 from 
Eq. (10)) is equal to its dual (right hand side) as follows.  
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Also, from slackness conditions we can derive: 
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Thus, substituting the above term in the primal problem 
(𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑊) and simplifying it, the linear form of the product 
of 𝑃𝑊𝐷𝐴(𝑑𝑟𝑢, 𝑡) × 𝜆𝐷𝐴(𝑡) is given as: 
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Lower-level problem 2: Similarly, we have the primal 
problem (𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠𝐷𝑅_𝑅 from Eq. (16)) equal to its dual (right 
hand side) as follows: 
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(A30) 
Given the above duality and also from Eq. (9), the product 
of 𝑃𝐷𝑅(𝑡).𝜆𝐷𝑅(𝑡) is easily obtained as follows. 
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 
Abstract— Renewable energy resources are increasingly 
growing around the world where wind and solar power are 
predominant. Apart from many advantages that these resources 
bring to power systems, they pose some significant challenges as 
well. Wind power is intermittent and non-dispatchable. This is 
even worse for solar power resources, when they mainly tend to 
be in small-scale systems such as roof-top PVs, which are beyond 
the control for an Independent System Operator (ISO). Thus 
ISOs need to explore new ways to cope with these issues. This 
paper proposes a market clearing problem from an ISO’s point 
of view. The ISO clears the energy and reserve markets while 
taking into account the uncertainty of wind power in the supply 
side and PV in the demand side. Additionally, the ISO is enabled 
to use demand response (DR) to alleviate the renewable 
intermittency. To this end, a DR aggregator is considered with 
the permission of participating in the reserve market. The 
proposed problem is evaluated on a test case and also the IEEE 
RTS system, where wind and PV data fed to this system are 
obtained from the Australian National Electricity Market 
(NEM).  
Index Terms— Demand response, energy and reserve market 
clearing, ISO, roof-top PV, wind power.  
NOMENCLATURE 
A.  Indices 
dru  Index for DR units ( 1: drudru N ) 
l  Index for loads ( 1: ll N ) 
g  Index for generator ( 1: gg N ) 
w  Index for scenarios ( 1: ww N ) 
wp  Index for wind producers ( 1: wpwp N ) 
B.  Constants 
nrB  Susceptance of line 𝑛𝑟 
,D DR
dru
C  
Cost offer of demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 for 
downward regulation 
,U DR
dru
C  
Cost offer of demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 for 
upward regulation 
gC  Cost offer of generator 𝑔 
D
gC  
Cost offer of generator 𝑔 for downward 
regulation 
U
gC  Cost offer of generator 𝑔 for upward regulation 
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Line
nrC  Line 𝑛𝑟 capacity limit 
wpC  Cost offer of wind producer 𝑤𝑝 
,l w
NetL  Net demand of load 𝑙 in scenario 𝑤 
Orgl
l
L  
Original demand of load 𝑙 without PV 
integration 
Max
gp  Maximum power of generator 𝑔 
,
PV
l wP  PV production at load point 𝑙 in scenario 𝑤 
Expec
wpP  Forecast power of wind producer 𝑤𝑝 
,
total
wp wP  Total power of wind producer 𝑤𝑝 in scenario 𝑤 
,D DRMax
dru
R
 
Maximum downward reserve by demand 
response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢  
,U DRMax
dru
R
 
Maximum upward reserve by demand response 
unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢  
,D Max
gR  Maximum downward reserve by generator 𝑔 
,U Max
gR  Maximum upward reserve by generator 𝑔 
lVoll  Value of lost load 𝑙 
( )w  Probability of scenario 𝑤 
C.  Variables 
Shed
lL  Load shedding for load 𝑙 
gP  Power scheduled for generator 𝑔 
S
wpP  Power scheduled for wind producer 𝑤𝑝 
,
spill
wp wP  
Wind spillage of wind producer 𝑤𝑝 in scenario 
𝑤 
,
,
D DR
dru w
r  
Downward reserve by demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 
in scenario 𝑤 
,
,
U DR
dru w
r  
Upward reserve by demand response unit 𝑑𝑟𝑢 in 
scenario 𝑤 
,
D
g wr  Downward reserve by generator 𝑔 in scenario 𝑤 
,
U
g wr  Upward reserve by generator 𝑔 in scenario 𝑤 
n  Locational marginal price at node 𝑛 
0
n  
Voltage angle at node 𝑛 in the day-ahead market 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
ENEWABLE energy growth is expected to continue with 
a rapid pace in near future. Wind power is dominant 
among all renewable resources, where in some countries such 
as Denmark and Germany it is becoming matured enough. 
Solar PV penetration has also been significantly increasing in 
many countries. This increasing trend in solar power is mainly 
due to roof-top based small-scale PV units installed by 
electricity consumers. 
High penetrations of such renewable resources bring some 
challenges to the electricity market. Wind power, usually in a 
large scale, is uncertain and non-dispatchable. The good thing 
however is that as wind penetration becomes significant, it is 
expected to be treated as similar to conventional power plants. 
This way, wind power producers have to participate in the 
market while compensating their power imbalances. Note that 
this is currently practiced for some wind power producers in 
electricity markets such as Western Denmark [1], Germany 
and Australia [2]. This observation is not valid for PV power, 
where it is usually in the demand side. Indeed, PV power 
imposes uncertainty to demand, which causes more difficulties 
in the market dispatch carried out by ISOs.  
Investigations are underway to resolve the above issues. A 
review of the literature indicates the majority of the study is 
dedicated to the wind related problems and their proposed  
solutions. The joint operation of wind and controllable 
resources such as pump-storage systems, hydro power plants, 
battery storage units and demand response (DR) are provided 
as a solution for alleviating wind intermittency, mainly from 
wind power producers’ perspective [3-7]. Wind integration 
from an ISO point of view is modelled in some studies as in 
[8-14]. Authors in [8] assess the level of wind penetration in 
the Portuguese system while using flexible backup production. 
Authors in [9-11] indicate that applying real-time pricing 
schemes result in a higher utilization of wind production and a 
lower cost of the system. The reserve requirement for a system 
integrating wind power production is addressed in [12]. Pool 
pricing for such a system is presented in [13]. Authors in [14] 
evaluate the impact of DR on the generation mix of a system 
integrating wind power. The studies on PV are not as many as 
that of wind incorporation. A solar-powered micro-gird is 
studied in [15] where its pricing mechanism is proposed. A 
model for participating concentrating solar power in the 
market is proposed in [16], where the unit can use storage to 
increase its revenue. Economic impacts of solar power on the 
PJM electricity market are analysed in [17]. There has been no 
investigation which explicitly studied a system integrating 
both PV (small units) and wind power production while 
employing DR for easing their intermittency. 
This paper considers an electricity market integrating wind 
and solar power. To this end, a single-period auction including 
energy and reserve markets is taken into account. In this 
context, wind power producers play like conventional power 
plants, with an exception that they may only be capable of 
doing reserve down in the market. Additionally, plausible 
realizations of wind power production are taken into account 
to address the wind power uncertainty. On the other hand, load 
comprises three parts. The majority of the load is considered 
as an inelastic demand to be supplied in the energy market. PV 
power production is represented as a negative load deducted 
from the original load. PV power is intermittent which is 
modelled as an uncertainty of the demand side. Finally, a 
limited specific portion of the load is considered to be elastic. 
A DR aggregator is proposed, which is responsible for this 
elastic load. The DR aggregator indeed enrols in the reserve 
market as a regulation up/down provider. The overall problem 
is formulated as a stochastic market dispatch problem carried 
out by an ISO. The problem is evaluated on a test case and 
also the IEEE RTS 24 bus system. PV and wind power for this 
system are modelled from the Australian NEM realistic data. 
The contributions of the paper are as follows. 
 A market model integrating both wind and PV 
resources is proposed in which their corresponding 
intermittency in the supply and demand sides is taken 
into account.  
 In order to help the ISO to lessen the renewable 
production uncertainty, a DR aggregator is proposed, 
which provides upward and downward regulation in 
the reserve market.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
discusses the proposed market model and provides its problem 
formulation. The case study and results are explained in 
section III. Section IV concludes the paper. 
II.  THE PROPOSED MODEL 
The proposed model studies a single-period market, which 
is rather similar to the market dispatch presented in [13] than 
the security constrained unit commitment analysed in [18]. 
The model decides on the energy dispatch and reserve 
deployment. Indeed, energy decisions are made on the day 
prior to the market dispatch while those of the reserve market 
are cleared at real time. The following procedure is used in the 
proposed model.  
Conventional power plants place their offer in the market 
while determining the maximum ramp up and ramp down that 
they can provide in the reserve market. The spinning reserve 
market is only modelled in the paper. Nevertheless, non-
spinning reserves can be included in the model with some 
modifications. The cost associated with these power plants is 
given in (1). In addition, the size limit of the scheduled power 
of generating unit 𝑔 in the day-ahead market is enforced in 
(2). This limit for upward and downward regulation is posed 
in (3) and (4), respectively. Finally, constraint (5) ensures the 
total participation of the power plant does not exceed its 
maximum capacity.  
, ,
U U D D
g g w gg g g wP C r C rC    (1) 
0 M xgg
aP p   (2) 
,
,0
U U Max
g w gr R   (3) 
,
,0
D D Max
g w gr R   (4) 
, ,0
U D Max
g w g w ggP r r p   (5) 
R 
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Wind power producers are also able to offer their energy in 
the market. However, these producers can only make 
regulation down in the reserve market. This is indeed the 
current practice for some semi-scheduled wind power 
producers in the Australian National Electricity Market [19]. 
In addition, similar to [13], the cost of downward regulation is 
assumed to be identical to the cost offer of the producer in the 
market . The cost function corresponding to the offer of wind 
power producer 𝑤𝑝 is calculated as follows. 
,( )
S spill
wp wp wwpC PP   (6) 
The wind spillage (downward regulation reserve by the 
wind power producer) is: 
, ,
spill total S
wp w wp w wpP P P   (7) 
Substituting (7) in (6), and since the term 𝐶𝑤𝑝𝑃𝑤𝑝,𝑤
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  is 
constant, the cost term of (6) can be simplified as follows.  
,
spill
wp wwpC P  (8) 
0 S Expecwp wpP P   
(9) 
,0
spill S
wp w wpP P   
(10) 
Constraints (9) and (10) respectively impose the power 
scheduled in the day-ahead market and the spilled wind power 
at real time.  
On the other hand, demand is considered to be mainly 
inelastic. Small-scale PV systems such as roof-top PV are 
taken into account as the negative load. These systems have 
widely been used in Australia, particularly in the states of 
Queensland and South Australia. Some serious issues that they 
have brought to the power system are voltage fluctuations, 
power quality problems and market clearing issues. Of course, 
this paper’s concern is on the market related problems. Fig. 1 
indicates a typical weekly load profile of South Australia (SA) 
for a summer season (14-20 Jan 2013). It is obvious how PV 
production affects the load shape during the day. Additionally, 
the uncertainty of PV is noticeable, where for instance PV 
production in some periods such as the first day is significant 
while in others like the fourth day is small. This change and 
uncertainty may cause the shutdown of some power plants and 
in the worst case, wind power spillage. This is an obvious 
disadvantage since huge subsidies are spent to increase wind 
power penetration while the market operator has to spill part 
of wind power as a result of PV production. For this reason, 
demand response (DR) is included as a solution. To this end, 
DR aggregators are allowed to enrol in the reserve market. 
They can provide both types of reserves, i.e. upward and 
downward. Indeed, in the upward regulation they ask their 
customers to reduce their load while in the downward 
regulation they encourage consumers to consume more 
energy.  
Overall the load model is formulated in (11). 
,
,
l w
OrglNet PV
l wl
L L P   (11) 
 
Fig. 1. Original vs. net load profile (SA, 14-22 Jan 2013) 
We assume that the part of the load which is inelastic has to 
be scheduled in the day-ahead market and it is derived as 
follows. 
,
1
( )
wNOrglS PV
l l wl
w
L L w P

    (12) 
Thus, the cost term in the proposed market dispatch is 
indeed the cost of load shedding, shown in (13). The 
maximum load shedding is constrained in (14). 
,
Shed
l l wVoll L  (13) 
,0
Shed S
l w lL L   (14) 
Finally, the cost related to the participation of DR in the 
reserve market is illustrated in (15). In addition, the sizes of 
regulation up and down are restricted in (16) and (17), 
respectively. 
, , , ,
, ,
U DR U DR D DR D DR
dru dru w dru dru w
C r C r  (15) 
, ,
,
0 U DR U DRMax
dru w dru
r R   (16) 
, ,
,
0 D DR D DRMax
dru w dru
r R   (17) 
The ISO aims at maximizing social welfare or minimizing 
the system cost. Since this paper assumes that the majority of 
load is inelastic, the latter objective is used here. 
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subject to  
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( ) : (... .. )
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(20) 
0 0( ) Linenr n r nrB C    (21) 
( ) Linenr n r nrB C    (22) 
Constraints for generators: (2)-(5)  
Constraints for wind power producers: (9)-(10)  
Constraint for load shedding: (14)  
Constraints for demand response: (16)-(17)  
The objective function comprises the expected cost of 
conventional power plants in both energy and reserve markets, 
and the expected cost of demand response, wind spillage and 
load shedding, all in the reserve market. Constraint (19) 
represents the power balance in the day-ahead market dispatch 
at each node. Note that the network losses are disregarded here 
while the model considers a DC power flow. Constraint (20) 
indicates the power balance enforcement in the reserve 
market. Constraints (21) and (22) impose the line capacity 
limit. The remaining constraints are explained earlier. The 
overall problem is a stochastic mixed-integer programming 
approach. CPLEX 11.1.1 under GAMS [20] is used to solve 
this problem. 
III.  CASE STUDY 
A.  Three Bus System 
A three-bus system is considered to assess the proposed 
problem. The information of this system is as follows [13]. 
The data for conventional power plants and demand response 
is provided in Table I. It is assumed that the cost of reserve by 
conventional power plants is identical to the cost of their 
power production [13]. In addition, the uncertainty of wind 
and PV power is represented by three scenarios each, overall 9 
scenarios (Table II). The capacity of each line is limited by 
100MW while the line reactance is 0.13 p.u. Note that for the 
sake of simplicity, network losses are neglected here. The 
original load located at bus 3 is 200 MW with the assumed 
VOLL of $1000. In addition, we assume that the wind power 
producer places its offer price at zero. Moreover, maximum 
wind offer in the market is restricted by the expected wind 
power scenarios in Table II, i.e. 30.5MW. Finally note that, 
the amount of load to be scheduled in the day-ahead market is 
obtained from Eq. (12). 
TABLE I 
GENERATOR DATA 
 
Max 
Power 
(MW) 
Offer  
Cost 
($/MWh) 
Upward 
Cost 
($/MWh) 
Downward 
Cost 
($/MWh) 
Max 
Upward 
Power 
(MW) 
Max 
Downward 
Power  
(MW) 
G1 100 20 20 20 0 0 
G2 50 25 25 25 20 20 
G3 100 30 30 30 30 30 
DR - - 30 30 20 20 
TABLE II 
WIND AND PV POWER SCENARIOS (MW) 
Scenario w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
PV 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30 
Wind 10 10 10 35 35 35 50 50 50 
Probability 
of each 
scenario 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.067 0.067 0.067 
 
G
G
G
Bus1 Bus2
Bus3
DR
 
Fig. 2. Three-bus system 
The DR capacity (Table I) as well as PV and wind power 
productions in Table II is considered as the base case. 
Consequently, six distinct cases are determined according to 
the base case (See Table III). Note that the values represented 
for each resource, i.e. DR, PV and wind, indicates the 
percentage of the base case. Note also that the maximum wind 
offer also changes accordingly. Finally, it should be 
emphasized that the uncertainty of PV and wind power 
increases as the level of their penetration grows in the given 
cases.  
TABLE III 
STUDIED CASES WITH VARIOUS RESOURCES INTEGRATION (%) 
  DR PV Wind 
C0 C0-1 0 0 0 
C1 
C1-1 0 100 100 
C1-2 0 150 100 
C1-3 0 200 100 
C1-4 0 250 100 
C1-5 0 300 100 
C2 
C2-1 100 100 100 
C2-2 100 150 100 
C2-3 100 200 100 
C2-4 100 250 100 
C2-5 100 300 100 
C3 
C3-1 0 150 150 
C3-2 0 200 200 
C3-3 0 250 250 
C3-4 0 300 300 
C4 
C4-1 100 150 150 
C4-2 100 200 200 
C4-3 100 250 250 
C4-4 100 300 300 
C5 
C5-1 200 200 200 
C5-2 200 250 250 
C5-3 200 300 300 
The cases provided in Table III are as follows. 
 C0: the system integrates neither DR nor 
renewable energy resources. 
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 C1: the system only has PV and wind. While wind 
production is identical to the base case, the PV 
penetration increases up to three times of the base 
PV production. 
 C2: this case is similar to C1, but it includes DR as 
well. 
 C3: this case simultaneously studies the high 
penetration of wind and PV production while no 
DR is modelled. 
 C4: C3 is studied while DR is added to the system. 
 C5: this case is similar to C4, but it models the 
impact of an increasing DR penetration level.  
Fig. 3 displays the cost of the system for different cases. 
The following observations are made from the cost trend. 
First, it is obvious that integrating wind and PV resources 
reduces the cost of the system (C0 vs. C1). In addition, 
introducing a higher penetration level of PV in the demand 
side leads to a decreasing cost of the system (See C1). This 
reduction is even higher with the application of demand 
response along with using PV (C2). One interesting result is 
that increasing the level of both wind and PV production is 
costly for the system (C3). In the worst case, the cost of the 
system in comparison with the base case increases by around 
40% when the wind and PV penetration is three times than the 
base case. This cost is alleviated when DR is used in the 
system (See C4). However, there is still an increasing trend for 
the system cost with regards to high levels of PV and wind 
production. This issue could be resolved when the DR 
capacity increases (C5). The reasons behind all changing 
trends are discussed in following by giving more results. 
 
Fig. 3. The cost of the system for various cases 
The amount of load shedding in cases C3, C4 and C5 are 
delivered in Fig. 4. The load shedding occurs in scenarios 1 
and 2 (𝑤1 and 𝑤2) only. Note that the load is entirely supplied 
in other cases. The results indicate that load shedding in C3-2 
is around 11 MW (only 𝑤1), while it is approximately 27 and 
53 MW for C3-3 and C3-4, respectively. With applying the 
probability of these scenarios, i.e. 0.1, these values 
respectively come to 1.1, 2.7 and 5.3 MW load shedding in the 
mentioned cases. Indeed, these amounts of load shedding 
bring a high cost to the system as shown in Fig. 3. Case 4 
illustrates that employing DR by the ISO lessen the severity of 
load shedding. C4-2 has no load shedding while C4-3 and C4-
4 still suffer from around 0.5 and 2 MW of the load that is not 
supplied. Consider that the DR potential in case 4 is limited by 
20 MW and thus it cannot help the system to eliminate all the 
load shortage. This potential is increased by twice in case 5. 
Consequently, there is almost no load shedding in this case. In 
addition, the cost of the system significantly drops (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 4. Load Shedding in various cases 
Table IV compares the wind spillage in different cases for 
individual scenarios. No wind spillage is observed in the first 
four scenarios. These scenarios indeed coincide with low and 
partly medium wind power scenarios in Table II. The main 
findings from Table IV are as follows. The increasing 
penetration of PV production in the demand side causes more 
wind spillage. Ultimately, in C1-5 where the PV production is 
three times, wind is spilled 14.5 and 29.5 MW in scenarios 6 
and 9, respectively. That means the overall spillage of around 
4.4 MW in C1-5. The ISO can reduce this cut using DR (C2). 
However, there still exists wind spillage in scenario 9 of C2-4 
and C2-5, where the PV penetration is considerably high. It is 
obvious that increasing wind and PV penetration 
simultaneously leads higher wind spillage (C3). C3-4, where 
there is the highest wind and PV integration, results in 21 MW 
wind cut. This is just under five times greater than wind 
spillage in C1-5, where the wind penetration is one third. That 
is, the wind spillage does not follow a linear proportion of 
wind production increment. Similar to case 2, introducing DR 
eases the wind spillage and increasing its potential can even 
help more to this end (C2 & C5).  
Table V illustrates how DR is able to facilitate both load 
shedding and wind spillage. Note that, regulations up and 
down are shown by ‘U’ and ‘D’, respectively. Note also that 
regulation up means that the DR aggregator exercise load 
reduction programs while in regulation down it encourages 
consumers to consume more energy. Consider scenarios 1 and 
2 (𝑤1 and 𝑤2) which coincide with the load shedding shown 
in Fig. 4. The ISO accepts downward regulation from the DR 
aggregator in the low penetration of PV. However, as the 
penetration of both PV and wind production grows, the 
upward regulation is requested from the DR aggregator. This 
way, the ISO is able to manage the load shedding by using DR 
(See Fig. 4, C4 vs. C5). With regards to scenarios 5-9, where 
wind spillage occurs, it can be seen that the DR aggregator 
only provides downward regulation to compensate this 
spillage.  
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TABLE IV 
WIND SPILLAGE IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR THE GIVEN CASES (MW)  
Case w1-w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
C0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C1-1 0 0 0 0 0 9.5 
C1-2 0 0 0 0 0 14.5 
C1-3 0 0 4.5 0 0 19.5 
C1-4 0 0 9.5 0 0 24.5 
C1-5 0 0 14.5 0 0 29.5 
C2-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C2-2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C2-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C2-4 0 0 0 0 0 5 
C2-5 0 0 0 0 0 15 
C3-1 0 0 1.75 0 9.25 24.25 
C3-2 0 9 29 19 39 59 
C3-3 0 11.25 36.25 23.75 48.75 73.75 
C3-4 0 13.5 43.5 28.5 58.5 88.5 
C4-1 0 0 0 0 0 4.25 
C4-2 0 0 9 0 19 39 
C4-3 0 0 16.25 11.9 28.75 53.75 
C4-4 0 0 23.5 24.25 38.5 68.5 
C5-1 0 0 0 0 0 19 
C5-2 0 0 0 11.88 11.875 33.75 
C5-3 0 0 3.5 24.25 24.25 48.5 
 
TABLE V 
DEMAND RESPONSE IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR THE GIVEN CASES (MW)  
 Reg. w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
C2-1 
U 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 10 0 20 5 20 10 20 20 
C2-2 
U 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 5 20 5 20 15 20 15 20 20 
C2-3 
U 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 9.5 20 19.5 20 20 20 19.5 20 20 
C2-4 
U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 4.5 20 20 20 20 20 14.5 20 20 
C2-5 
U 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 20 20 20 20 20 9.5 20 20 
C4-1 
U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 4.25 19.25 4.25 20 20 20 15 20 20 
C4-2 
U 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 9 0 20 20 20 19.5 20 20 
C4-3 
U 20 1.25 6.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 20 20 20 11.88 20 20 
C4-4 
U 20 11.5 11.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 20 20 20 4.25 20 20 
C5-1 
U 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 9 0 39 29 40 19.5 40 40 
C5-2 
U 26.25 1.25 6.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 36.25 31.25 40 11.88 40 40 
C5-3 
U 40 11.5 11.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 33.5 33.5 40 1.25 40 40 
The wind power scheduled in the energy market is 
illustrated in Table VI.  The ISO indeed dispatches the 
maximum expected power of the wind power producer. This is 
sensible since the energy offer price of wind power is placed 
at zero. 
TABLE VI 
WIND POWER SCHEDULED IN THE ENERGY MARKET (MW)  
Case Wind Power 
C1, C2 30.5 
C3-1, C4-1 45.75 
C3-2, C4-2, C5-1 61 
C3-3, C4-3, C5-2 76.25 
C3-4, C4-4, C5-3 91.5 
The amount of power scheduled for conventional power 
plants is shown in Fig. 5. The results obviously indicate a 
decreasing trend in the accepted offers of generators when the 
penetration of PV and wind production increases. This is 
reasonable since on one hand PV integration reduces the net 
load and on the other hand, wind production is cheap and thus 
the ISO can reduce the system cost by using this resource. 
Another observation interpreted from Fig. 5 is that DR slightly 
changes (small reduction) the scheduled power of 
conventional power plants.  
 
Fig. 5. The scheduled power for power plants in the day-ahead market 
Since the main changes are in scenarios 1-2 and 5-9, Fig. 6 
and Table VII study the upward and downward reserve for 
conventional power plants in these scenarios. Fig. 6 shows the 
upward reserve in scenarios 1 and 2 for generators 2 and 3. It 
is obvious that increasing wind and PV production is followed 
by a higher upward reserve requirement from conventional 
power pants. This is sensible since wind power production in 
these scenarios is lower than the expected production. Thus, 
the ISO calls conventional power plants to compensate this 
deviation. 
 
Fig. 6. The upward reserve for conventional power plants  
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Table VII represents the downward reserve deployed from 
generator 2 in scenarios 5-9 (𝑤5-𝑤9). Note that no downward 
reserve is procured from generator 3. The ISO does not require 
this reserve when there is no renewable production (C0). 
However, the integration of PV and wind urges the 
deployment of the downward reserve from generator 2. This is 
mainly because of the fluctuation between the dispatched wind 
power and load scheduled in the day-ahead market and their 
real-time amounts. The results also illustrate that the need for 
downward reserve decreases as DR is introduced in the system 
(See C2 and C5). In addition, a higher wind production results 
in the same way (C2 vs. C4). 
TABLE VII 
DOWNWARD RESERVE FROM GENERATOR (MW)  
Upward w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 
C0-1 0 0 0 0 0 
C1-1 4.5 14.5 9.5 19.5 20 
C1-2 4.5 19.5 4.5 19.5 20 
C1-3 4.5 20 0 19.5 20 
C1-4 4.5 20 0 19.5 20 
C1-5 4.5 20 0 19.5 20 
C2-1 0 0 0 0 9.5 
C2-2 0 0 0 0 14.5 
C2-3 0 4.5 0 0 19.5 
C2-4 0 9.5 0 0 19.5 
C2-5 0 14.5 0 0 14.5 
C3-1 6.75 20 14.25 20 20 
C3-2 0 0 0 0 0 
C3-3 0 0 0 0 0 
C3-4 0 0 0 0 0 
C4-1 0 1.75 0 9.25 20 
C4-2 0 0 0 0 0 
C4-3 0 0 0 0 0 
C4-4 0 0 0 0 0 
C5-1 0 0 0 0 0 
C5-2 0 0 0 0 0 
C5-3 0 0 0 0 0 
B.  IEEE RTS System 
The proposed problem is also studied on the IEEE 24-bus 
system [21]. The simulation is done for one period, i.e. 12pm. 
Two wind power producers are considered at buses 6 and 8. 
Each wind power producer is considered at the size of three 
times than the following wind farm. The wind farm Lake 
Bonney 2 in South Australia is chosen [22]. This wind farm is 
located at Mt Gambier AERO and its installed capacity is 
159MW (53 of Vestas 3MW Turbines). Wind speed scenarios 
are generated using the ARMA model where the summer 
season data from 2007-2012 is used as input time series. 
Twenty wind speed scenarios are generated for each site. The 
median wind power for this wind farm is 45 MW. Five PV 
units are considered at buses 5, 6, 8, 15, 18, 20. Ten PV power 
scenarios are simply considered where each scenario coincides 
with PV production in South Australia at 12pm. Overall 200 
scenarios are generated with the identical probability. Note 
that PV production is rescaled based on the IEEE system to 
represents 10% of total load at the relevant buses. DR 
aggregators are assumed to present their offers at buses 5, 6, 8, 
15, 18. The cost offers of the DR aggregators are chosen in 
such a way that they are close to the power plants at or near 
their corresponding buses. Note also that the above PV and 
wind production is considered as the base case here. Four 
main cases are designed accordingly (Table VIII).  
TABLE VIII 
CASES CONSIDERED FOR STUDY ON THE IEEE RTS 24-BUS SYSTEM  
Case DR PV Wind 
C0 C0-1 0 0 0 
C1 
C1-1 0 200 200 
C1-2 0 300 200 
C2 
C2-1 100 200 200 
C2-2 100 300 200 
C3 C3-1 200 300 200 
The cost of the system for various cases is depicted in Fig. 
7. The declining trend with respect to the higher integration of 
wind and PV power as well as the DR capacity confirms the 
results obtained from the 3 bus test case in Fig. 3. Note that 
the system has no load shedding in the studied cases and thus 
it is not faced with the cost spikes shown in the previous 
section. 
 
Fig. 7. The cost of the IEEE 24-bus system 
Power spillage for wind power producers 1 and 2 (WP1 & 
WP2) is provided in Table IX. The wind power spilled from 
the WP1 is significant while that of WP2 is low. In addition, it 
is obvious that integrating more PV leads to a higher level of 
wind spillage. This clearly shows the impact of PV and its 
production uncertainty on wind spillage in the market 
(Consider that there is no PV at WP2’s bus). Another 
observation is the impact of DR on the wind spillage. The 
results here also confirm the findings of the 3-bus case studied 
earlier. 
TABLE IX 
WIND SPILLAGE FOR THE IEEE RTS 24-BUS SYSTEM  
 
WP1 WP2 
C0-1 0 0 
C1-1 49.5 1.85 
C1-2 58.2 4.4 
C2-1 38.5 0 
C2-2 43.1 0.2 
C3-1 33.4 0 
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Finally, the demand response deployed in the reserve 
market is displayed in Table X. The results summarize for the 
overall scenarios. Indeed, there are some scenarios in which 
the upward reserve is required while for others DR is called 
for the downward reserve. In addition, it is obvious that DR is 
mostly required to provide downward regulations at the buses 
which integrate wind power (dru2 and dru3). This is more 
apparent for dru3, where it provides downward reserve only.  
TABLE X 
DR DEPLOYED IN THE RESERVE MARKET FOR THE IEEE RTS 24-BUS SYSTEM  
 Reserve dru1 dru2 dru3 dru4 dru5 
C2-1 
 
Upward 4.8 7.1 0 0 7.1 
Downward 13.5 12.5 20 19.7 1.4 
C2-2 
Upward 7.1 7.1 0 7.1 15.9 
Downward 12.7 12.7 20 12.1 1.3 
C3-1 
Upward 13.3 15.3 0 11.4 35.7 
Downward 12.9 24 40 24.7 0 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a market model for an ISO. This 
market integrates wind and PV power. In addition, DR is 
considered as a solution to resolve the issues related to the 
high level of wind and PV production. A DR aggregator is 
modelled, which is able to participate in the reserve market. 
The problem is formulated in a stochastic cost minimization 
from the ISO’s point of view. Plausible realizations of wind 
and PV power productions are applied to represent their 
uncertainty. The proposed method is solved in a test case and 
also the IEEE 24-bus system using CPLEX 11.1.1 under 
GAMS. The main findings are as follows. 
1- Integrating wind and PV production reduces the cost of 
the system. However, higher levels of penetration may 
pose a high cost to the system. This is mainly due to the 
fluctuation of renewable resources that causes load 
shedding in some cases. 
2- Employing DR can reduce the cost of the system. In 
addition, it may lessen the severity of load shedding as a 
result of high renewable power penetration. Furthermore, 
DR is able to encourage consumers to consume more 
energy and consequently reduce wind spillage. 
3- Increasing DR capacity for the systems with significant 
levels of renewable energy resources such as wind and 
PV has a major impact on controlling these resources 
fluctuation as well as reducing the cost of the system.  
It should be emphasized that modelling a security-
constrained unit commitment covering the whole 24 hours of 
the day of energy delivery makes our case stronger, where all 
technical aspects of power plants as well as load and DR are 
properly modelled. This study will indeed be presented in our 
future work. 
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